


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

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
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
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
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
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
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The Institution is situated opposite the Horse Guards in Whitehall. It provides members with a comfortable reading room containing the leading papers, periodicals, and principal Service (including foreign) Journals.

There is a lecture theatre where lectures are given followed by discussions in which officers of every rank are encouraged to take part.

Members can obtain on loan four volumes at a time from the best professional library in the Country. They are provided with a free copy of the JOURNAL.

There is a private entrance to the celebrated R.U.S. Museum in the former Banqueting House of old Whitehall Palace.

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Commissioned officers on the active and retired lists of all H.M. Services, including those of the Dominions and Colonies, also midshipmen of the Royal and Dominion Navies, the R.N.R., R.N.V.R., and R.N.V.S.R. are eligible for membership without formality.

Retired officers of the Regular and Auxiliary forces, including the Home Guard, whose names no longer appear in the official lists, are eligible for membership by ballot.

Ladies whose names appear or have appeared in the official lists as serving or having served as officers in any of the three Services are eligible as above.

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The R.U.S. Museum is open daily from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., except on Sundays, Christmas Day, and Good Friday. Members may obtain free passes for their friends on application to the Secretary.

Members of the Services in uniform are admitted free.

SECRETARY'S NOTES

November, 1958

COUNCIL

Representative Member

Air Vice-Marshal J. Worrall, D.F.C., has accepted the Council's invitation to serve as the Air Ministry Representative vice Air Vice-Marshal Sir George D. Harvey, K.B.E., C.B., D.F.C., posted.

Ex Officio Members

General Sir Francis W. Festing, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., has accepted the Council's invitation to become an ex officio Member of the Council on taking up the appointment of Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Air Vice-Marshal Sir Laurence Sinclair, G.C., K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., has accepted the Council's invitation to become an ex officio Member of the Council on taking up the appointment of Commandant of the Joint Services Staff College, vice Major-General P. N. White, C.B., C.B.E.

Major-General R. H. Hewetson, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., has accepted the Council's invitation to become an ex officio Member of the Council on taking up the appointment of Commandant of the the Staff College, Camberley, vice Major-General J. H. N. Poett, C.B., D.S.O.

NEW MEMBERS

The following officers joined the Institution between 12th July and 10th October, 1958:—

NAVY

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Temporary Acting Sub-Lieutenant P. W. Brockman, R.N.V.R.(S).
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Lieutenant F. P. Duppa-Miller, R.N.
Captain D. G. F. W. Macintyre, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N. (Retd.)
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Captain J. H. Hobart, 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.
Colonel M. E. Fell, C.B.E., M.C., late Indian Army.
Captain R. P. Fenwick, M.B.E., Intelligence Corps, T.A.
Major J. L. Knyvett, M.C., Royal Artillery.
Major W. G. H. Beach, M.B.E., M.C., Royal Engineers.
Captain A. E. L. de Watteville, Royal Engineers.
Captain J. K. Courtney-Clarke, 10th Royal Hussars.
Captain B. W. Davis, Royal Artillery.
Cadet P. J. Puttock.
Captain P. H. Brazier, Royal Engineers.
Major W. G. Jukes, M.B.E., T.D., late The Royal Hampshire Regiment.
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Lieut.-Colonel J. O. M. Roberts, M.B.E., M.C., 2nd King Edward VII's Own Gurkha Rifles.
Lieutenant R. I. Raitt, The Gordon Highlanders.
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Lieutenant C. B. Gorton, The York & Lancaster Regiment.

Captain W. Stanford, Royal Artillery.
 Major D. V. L. Allott, 17th/21st Lancers.
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 Flying Officer G. H. Hopkins, R.A.F.
 Squadron Leader D. J. Hammond, R.A.F. (Retd.)
 The Reverend Doctor I. W. J. Machin, M.A., Ph.D., Officiating Chaplain to the R.A.F.

PRIZE MEMBERSHIP

Pilot Officer M. E. Bee, R.A.F., has been awarded five years' free membership of the Institution.

LIAISON OFFICERS

The following alterations to the list of Liaison Officers, as published in February, have taken place :—

<i>Command or Establishment</i>	<i>Name</i>
Amphibious Warfare Headquarters	Lieut.-Colonel J. C. d'E. Coke, D.S.C., R.M.
Southern Command ...	Lieut.-Colonel H. A. Styles.
Technical Training Command ...	Squadron Leader A. F. Carvosso.

MUSEUM

ADDITIONS

The Victoria Cross, three medals, and a sword which belonged to General W. F. Cafe, Indian Army, 1842-73 (9736-7). Given by Miss W. P. Housden.

A fully equipped "Essgee Aqualung" shallow water swimming outfit (9753). Given by Messrs. Siebe, Gorman & Co., Ltd.

JOURNAL

Offers of suitable contributions to the JOURNAL are invited. Confidential matter cannot be used, but there is ample scope for professional articles which contain useful lessons of recent wars; also contributions of a general Service character, such as strategic principles, command and leadership, morale, staff work, and naval, military, and air force history, customs, and traditions.

The Editor is authorized to receive articles from serving officers and, if found suitable, to seek permission for their publication from the appropriate Service Department.

Army officers are reminded that such articles must be accompanied by the written approval of the author's commanding officer.

LECTURES

The programme of lectures for the second half of the 1958-59 session is published with this number of the JOURNAL. Special attention is drawn to the note on the lecture by the Rt. Hon. Aneurin Bevan, M.P.

There is an extension of the loudspeaker system from the Lecture Theatre to the Reading Room for use as required. Members and their guests will on arrival be accommodated in the theatre until it is full, when the excess number will be directed to the Reading Room.

Tickets are not issued for any lectures and seats cannot be reserved, other than for the Council and official guests. Reservation by placing coats, etc., on chairs is not recognized.

Before the lecture on 24th October about 40 members booked but did not use the buffet, which led to financial loss. Those requiring sandwich lunches are asked to pay in advance.

CHANGE OF ADDRESS

Members are particularly requested to notify any change of address which will affect the dispatch of the JOURNAL. Naval officers are strongly advised to keep the Institution informed of their address as JOURNALS sent to them via C.W. Branch of the Admiralty are invariably greatly delayed.

As a serving officer is liable to frequent changes of station, it is better for such members to register either a permanent home or a bank address.

CHRISTMAS CARDS

Orders for Christmas cards, specially designed for members of the Institution, can still be placed.


Card A has the crest of the Institution on the outside, and inside a reproduction of a black and white sketch of Vanbrugh House in Whitehall Yard, the first home of the Institution. The price, including envelopes, is 12s. a dozen.

Card B is a reproduction in colour of "The Loyal Associated and Volunteer Corps of the City of Westminster, 1799"; inside is the crest of the Institution. The price, including envelopes, is 20s. a dozen.

Postage and packing is 1s. for the first dozen and 6d. for each additional dozen by ordinary mail.

Members are requested to ensure that the correct remittance, including postage, is sent with their orders. It is regretted that *orders cannot be executed until payment is made.*

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THE JOURNAL

of the

Royal United Service Institution

Vol. CIII.

NOVEMBER, 1958.

No. 612

EDITOR'S NOTES

TWO months ago, full of honour and respected by all, Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein reached the end of his military career. He is probably the most distinguished soldier of our time, known and beloved by the countless thousands he has led both in victory and in times when victory was still but a far-off goal. He is one of those rare few about whose name a touch of magic seems to linger, carrying with it almost a guarantee that the pendulum will begin to swing in the right direction.

Time dulls many memories, but there is one which will remain fresh and vivid to a great many soldiers. It is that almost magical transformation of the spirit of the 8th Army within a few days of Montgomery being appointed to its command. Almost overnight an army, dispirited over recent setbacks, was changed from a defeated army into a victorious one. True, the victory was still to come, but no longer was there any doubt about it. To one observer that was a more remarkable fact than the victory itself when, in due course, it came.

This is not the place, nor is it the time, to make a recital of Field-Marshal Montgomery's many successes. They are still too fresh in our minds for that to be necessary. But it is the time and place to recall our love and admiration of a great soldier who has now laid down the burden. There is, of course, a special place for him in the hearts of the men he led, for to them he gave renown and pride of achievement. But there is equally a place for him in the hearts of all his countrymen and countrywomen, for it was the inspiration of his name which, in the dark days of 1942, rekindled for us our belief in the invincibility of the British soldier.

He has ever been a good friend of this Institution, and the lectures he has given in our theatre have been stimulating and thought-provoking. That a man so busy, so immersed in high affairs, could take time off to prepare and deliver six lectures to our members is, we hope, some measure of his regard for the value of the Institution. His sixth lecture and the subsequent discussion are printed on pp. 468-487 of this issue of the JOURNAL.

Field-Marshal's never retire, which precludes our wishing him happiness in his retirement. But we can take another milestone in his Service career and pay our tribute to a great soldier, still on the active list of the Army he has served so faithfully and so brilliantly for 50 years. It would be the desire of all our members, we think, to offer him our good wishes for his happiness and contentment in the evening of his life, and with our tribute and our wishes must also go the thanks of this Institution for the many services he has done for us.

He will have many memories, but perhaps the one which will give him most pleasure will be of those remarkable days when he first took over command of the 8th Army. And no doubt it will be a source of pride to him, as it is to so many of us, that our proudest boast still is, "I served with Monty."

* * *

The art and practice of what has become known as 'brinkmanship' has introduced a new development into international relations. It is a development which, to some extent, affects the Services, for in the last resort they are the instruments through which national, and in these days supra-national, policies are implemented. The nearer the brink is approached, the more careful must be the Services that no act of theirs, however remote from the scene, can be construed as a step towards the abyss.

This is not to say that the policy of 'brinkmanship' is necessarily wrong, or even necessarily dangerous, in the international conditions of today. As Mr. George Kennan pointed out in his Reith Lectures last year, governments have access to information which is not known to the general public. It must be assumed that, in the light of this information, they can appreciate with some exactitude exactly how close to the brink they can go without slipping disastrously over the edge. Indeed, the policy would not make sense without this special knowledge.

Yet, in spite of all, it is an uneasy policy. It may well pay dividends on the short-term view provided that there is no unnecessary loitering on the edge, but it can hardly be considered a healthy development when subjected to a longer view. Now, more than ever before, the world needs peace, a long period of peace in which to consider and digest the implications of the new weapons of mass destruction. We are obviously still a long way from striking a true balance in their application, if any, to modern war, and periodic adventures on the brink are hardly conducive to achieving the necessary breathing space in which to bring modern weapon development into a correct focus.

Certainly it is difficult to suggest an alternative policy in the conditions which exist today. The world has had, in recent years, so many examples of bad faith, of international promises broken almost as they are made, that there is no longer trust between the nations. This is the atmosphere in which 'brinkmanship' breeds, bringing with it a further period of crisis and a yet remoter chance of the peace of which the whole world stands in need.

Yet somewhere a solution must lie if the world is not to degenerate into madness. Someone—a nation or a group of nations—must take the first step towards lifting the conduct of international relations above the level of mutual vituperation and 'brinkmanship' which exists today between East and West. It may be old-fashioned, and out of date, to resurrect the term 'gentleman' in this connection, but in its true significance of behaviour it may possibly hold a key to the problem.

Some of these thoughts are discussed in the Trench Gascoigne Prize Essay, published in this issue of the JOURNAL. To some readers they may appear fanciful, altruistic, incapable of application in the world as it stands today. Yet what else is there? If we are all to be condemned to madness, at least it would bring honour to our madness.

* * *

For those who may have wondered what was the significance of the familiar bulldog outside the public entrance to the museum, Commander W. B. Rowbotham

provides the answer in an article in this issue. Another sideline on naval history, rather less remote in time, is given by Mr. Marcus, who has written an amusing and extremely well documented account of the impact of the "We want eight and we won't wait" controversy on a by-election at the time at Croydon. The subject, though it treats of a single episode of 50 years ago, is perhaps of more than purely academic interest in view of the strength of the fleet today, and particularly so in the light of Field-Marshal Montgomery's remarks in his lecture about the importance of the sea flanks in N.A.T.O. strategy. The lesson, if any, is that a reluctant government can be forced into action if enough people care deeply enough about maritime security to become vocal about it.

Also in this issue, Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett discusses the recent White Paper on the new Defence Organization which was presented to Parliament last July. He gives us, it is to be presumed, the ministerial view, which is one with which some people may not be in full accord. Two main criticisms which have been expressed in some quarters concern the apparent weakening of the responsibilities of the Service Ministers and of the Chiefs of Staff, the former through their loss of control over Service policy, the latter through the elevation of their Chairman to the position of Chief of Defence Staff, who now alone will advise the Minister of Defence. Some have seen in this appointment the germ of the *Oberkommando* conception in that the new Defence Chief can initiate operations which others will have the responsibility of carrying out.

However, as Admiral Hughes Hallett points out, we must give the new organization a chance to prove itself before condemning it. Certainly it has achieved a more compact and efficient central direction of defence policy, which had long been considered desirable and necessary. Whether this has been achieved at the cost of placing too much power in the hands of two men—the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff—remains as yet unanswered. Only time will tell.

* * *

Some readers of the JOURNAL have complained that they have difficulty in finding the table of contents. There are sound economic reasons for placing this page among the advertisements in the front of the JOURNAL, but it has now been given a black corner which, it is hoped, will make it more readily recognizable.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE GAME IN THE CONTEST BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AND THE FUTURE OUTLOOK

By FIELD-MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN, K.G., G.C.B., D.S.O.

On Friday, 24th October, 1958, at 1.30 p.m.

THE RT. HON. SIR JAMES GRIGG, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: I do not think that anything is required in the way of introducing the Field-Marshal, and the best thing that I can do is at once to ask him to talk to us.

LECTURE

I WILL begin this talk by discussing the events which took place in the world during the years following the end of the second World War in 1945. Let us first take a look at N.A.T.O. Europe.

When the German war ended in May, 1945, many of the nations of Europe were in a bad way economically. This was realized in the United States and aid for Europe was authorized by Congress in 1947—known as Marshall Aid. The Russians, however, refused Marshall Aid for themselves or for any of their satellites, although some of the satellites had begun by welcoming it. The Russians clearly did not want Europe to recover.

The cold war, which had been going on for some time, then took a turn for the worse. Certain nations in Western Europe began to get anxious about the growing threat from the East and the need for unity was realized in order to be able to stand up to the threat. Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg) was first formed. This was followed by the Western Union, Benelux being joined by the United Kingdom and France, which was brought into being by the Treaty of Brussels, signed on 17th March, 1948.

Then came the blockade of West Berlin, which began in June, 1948, and which was finally defeated by the tremendous feat of the air lift. This blockade created great tension in the Western world, and considerable alarm, and in September, 1948, it was decided to create a Western Union Defence Organization which would prepare plans for combined action in the case of attack.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, talks had been going on about the need for a single mutual defence system which would include and supersede the Brussels Treaty. These talks resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, known for short as N.A.T.O.—the Treaty being signed on 4th April, 1949. As planning proceeded, it became obvious that the Western Union military organization must be absorbed into N.A.T.O., and this was done. Then, on 2nd April, 1951, General Eisenhower assumed operational control of the military forces of the defensive alliance. I joined him as his Deputy, having been since October, 1948, the Chairman of the Commander-in-Chief's Committee of the Western Union.

Under Eisenhower's command, and that of his successors, our military strength in N.A.T.O. Europe gradually increased. Furthermore, the progress of science gave us nuclear weapons in ever increasing quantity, making us all the stronger. The advent of the nuclear weapon had a marked influence on our strategy in two ways.

First, the nuclear weapon gave us the power to destroy to an extent never before envisaged. That power could be developed into such a powerful offensive weapon

that it was clear that no profit from war could come to any nation. An aggressor nation could inflict tremendous destruction on Western civilization, but would itself suffer equal or even greater damage. Here then was a new key to our strategy, the deterrent influence of the nuclear weapon. By adopting this strategy, our object now became to prevent war rather than to wage it.

Secondly, before the advent of the nuclear weapon we had been building up conventional forces with which to defeat an enemy attack. It gradually became clear that if we relied only on such forces, then we could never match the conventional strength which could be deployed against us by the Communist bloc. The only alternative was to state publicly that if we were subjected to a major attack we would use the nuclear deterrent *as a weapon* to help in our defence—even if nuclear weapons were not used against us in the first instance. And that is how we stand today.

It is interesting to consider whether we are today in a sound position. We have a good deterrent against war. And as a result we can say that on this account, because of what has been achieved in N.A.T.O. during the past years, Europe is now where the danger of all-out war is least. The present dangers lie elsewhere—particularly in Africa and Asia.

Of course, there is still the question of what happens if the deterrent fails and we are attacked in Europe with all the weapons which Russia possesses, including nuclear weapons. Have we a good defence against this? If you will allow me, I will reserve my answer to this question until later in my talk.

THE COLD WAR BALANCE SHEET: 1958

Now let us look at the rest of the world: It is high time that the N.A.T.O. Council regarded the struggle against international Communism, led by Russia, as a world-wide struggle and not one which can be confined to the N.A.T.O. area. Up to date they have failed to view the problem in this way, and because of this lack of foresight we are badly placed at the present time.

Let us examine this matter more closely. The best way to do it will be to draw up a balance sheet—a cold war balance sheet—showing our gains and losses in the struggle since the end of the second World War.

Map 1 shows the line-up of countries about the end of the last war, in 1945. The Western Allies are shown in white, Russia, Yugoslavia, and Albania black. Some countries are shown shaded, as not yet committed to the coming struggle. You notice that some of the shaded countries are marked with double shading (Manchuria, North Korea, East Germany, and the Russian satellite countries between the Baltic and the Black Sea) because these countries were occupied by the Russian Army in 1945.

Now compare this map with Map 2, which gives the situation today—in 1958. The double shaded countries are now black. Tibet has disappeared behind the Iron Curtain. China has become black, with her population increasing at the rate, I am informed, of some 25 a minute—which is 36,000 a day or over 13,000,000 a year, a formidable total. For the moment China is occupied with her own internal affairs; but, united with the economic strength of Russia, she is likely to become a menace to the countries of the Pacific and South-East Asia. It is possible that Mao-Tse Tung may become more dangerous than Khrushchev; this will need to be watched.

Now look at South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean. Indonesia, Indo-China, Burma, Ceylon, India—lost for all cold war purposes to the Western cause. Here is

an area where Russia, and the Communist world generally, is making a sustained political and economic effort. It is an area of great strategic importance to the Western cause, particularly Indonesia and India.

Now look at the Middle East. The maps reveal what has happened. Much of what was white in 1945 has become shaded. The United Arab Republic of Egypt, Syria, and the Yemen, is double shaded—perhaps it should be black. The position of Iraq is not clearly defined. The map shows only too clearly the confusion to our cause brought about in this area by Western disunity, jealousy, and shortsightedness.

Here Russia has no legitimate interests. Her aim is to deny to the West an area which is economically and strategically essential to us. As a result of Russian intrigue the Middle East is split into hostile groupings.

We have the United Arab Republic, which I have just mentioned.

The Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan was formed as a counter-poise to the United Arab Republic. But Iraq has now left the Federation and her attitude is uncertain. The upheaval in Iraq tended to make the position of Jordan and Lebanon precarious, and upset the equilibrium of the Middle East. The whole Arab movement is hostile to Israel. Indeed, the preservation of the integrity of Israel is now more important than ever before.

Then there is Saudi Arabia, trying to keep a foot in each of the conflicting Arab camps.

The present troubled situation in the Middle East underlines the importance of Aden as a naval and air base for the West. There is clearly a possibility of grave trouble between the Yemen and Aden.

Now look westwards along the north coast of Africa. The Sudan and Libya, formerly white, have both become shaded. There is grave unrest in what was formerly French North Africa. The French have a terrific problem in Algeria, which is flanked by the states of Tunisia and Morocco—whose position is not clear.

Overall, the map is an example for all to see of how the Communist world, led by Russia, has been creating trouble for the West outside the N.A.T.O. area for many years.



And lastly, look at Europe. Here our losses have been great. Eastern Europe, black and shaded in the first map, is now all black; it is lost to the Western cause.

Germany is divided.

The Communist tide has advanced to within a day's car drive from Paris. But there have been gains. The North Atlantic Alliance has been formed. Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey have taken their place with other countries of the Western Alliance. Federal Germany has remained steadfast in spite of many temptations.

Yugoslavia, black in 1945, is today shaded; she has succeeded in keeping free of control by the Kremlin and is now a neutral country.

So, in our balance sheet, only Europe shows a profit. And the reason is N.A.T.O. In the first few years after the end of the war we lost ground everywhere. Then we got ourselves organized in Europe and we have had no more losses there—indeed we have had some gains in that Yugoslavia has broken away from Russia, and certain other nations have indicated that they prefer the Western way of life.



an area where Russia, and the Communist world generally, is making a sustained political and economic effort. It is an area of great strategic importance to the Western cause, particularly Indonesia and India.

Now look at the Middle East. The maps reveal what has happened. Much of what was white in 1945 has become shaded. The United Arab Republic of Egypt, Syria, and the Yemen, is double shaded—perhaps it should be black. The position of Iraq is not clearly defined. The map shows only too clearly the confusion to our cause brought about in this area by Western disunity, jealousy, and shortsightedness.

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

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But while watching all the 'trees' in the N.A.T.O. area, the N.A.T.O. nations have in my opinion failed to see the global 'wood,' and because of that we are badly placed in what is essentially a global problem.

However, we can take comfort from one thing. As I said a few minutes ago, because of what has been achieved during the past ten years in building up the military strength of the Western Alliance, N.A.T.O. Europe is now the area where the danger is least.

WHERE LIES THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE TROUBLES ?

I suppose the historians will eventually decide how all these things came about. But to make this lecture complete, I would like to give you my opinion. It all stems from the fact that, although we won the second World War strategically, the Western Allies lost it politically *vis-à-vis* Russia. When it was clear that we were going to win the war, Britain and the United States failed to take the necessary steps to ensure that they finished it with a political balance favourable to win the peace ; because of this we have been struggling ever since. We did not understand that the Clausewitz doctrine (war follows peace) operates also in reverse—peace follows war.

The only Western leader who understood what was at stake *vis-à-vis* Russia was Churchill, and he was discarded by the British people when the war was over.

I would cite three main reasons for our troubles today.

First, the first post-war British Government concentrated on our own internal affairs and declined to put its foot into Europe or to look outwards at the world. Its energies were directed chiefly towards creating a welfare state, to bringing about a reorganization of British industry moving towards nationalization, and to raising the school-leaving age at a time when there were not enough teachers or buildings for the increased numbers attending school. A distracted world wanted British leadership ; it did not get it. The world looked with amazement at what was going on in Socialist Britain in the immediate post-war years. So we British take the first blame.

Next, I think the United States will have to bear much, perhaps most, of the blame. After the war, world leadership, declined by the British, passed to the U.S.A. How was it exercised ? Her foreign policy was inconsistent. She appeared to have one policy in the Assembly of the United Nations and another when her own national interests were involved. She supported the ex-'Colonial' Powers in Western Europe but worked to destroy their influence in Asia and Africa. As a result of this inconsistent foreign policy we witnessed the decline of the Dutch, French, and British Empires, which should all have been stabilizing influences in the rough and tumble of post-war years.

It must now be clear to all, except the very stupid, that if the United States had not sabotaged the Suez operation, and had joined the Baghdad Pact earlier, the situation in the Middle East would be very different today.

The truth is that the United States has always been at least two years behind in her understanding of Europe and its interests. It was two years before she joined the first World War, two years before she joined the second World War, two years before she realized the full implications of the Suez operation in 1956, and more than two years before she fully supported the Baghdad Pact.

Of course there has always been conflict between the policies of Britain and the United States in Asia, and particularly in the Middle East. I suppose there have been faults on both sides.

A major British error was to try to persuade Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact.

A major United States error was to reckon that the Arab nations would combine together to fight international Communism and could be brought into the Western camp. This was very wishful thinking. The lesson of history is that the Arab countries will combine only to fight Israel and to prevent the expansion of the Jewish State. They will never join the Western camp.

Furthermore, it seems to me that the United States, while realizing clearly the need for European recovery after the war and while giving generously to aid that recovery, has in the past failed to understand that Europe depends for much of its prosperity on areas *outside* Europe—particularly in the Middle East, and on free transit through that area. The United States has also yet to learn that Africa is essential to Europe and to the Western Alliance.

Lastly, I would put the complete inability of the nations of Western Europe to co-operate whole-heartedly for the common good of all. There is no doubt that as the threat of armed aggression against N.A.T.O. Europe lessened, and fear began to disappear, so Western unity began to weaken. Today, allied co-operation and interdependence, which are really the complete answer to all our troubles, are little more than political phrases. Most nations are allies only in name. I will have more to say on this matter later on.

FUTURE RUSSIAN POLICY

But do not think that having been deterred from starting a 'hot' war by the growing strength of the West, the Communists would on that account decide to call off the 'cold' war. In my opinion Soviet pressure on the West is steadily increasing.

What do the Russians really want? To make all-out war on us? Never, so long as we retain our nuclear retaliatory capability.

Why should they risk annihilation? They have other plans, more subtle and less dangerous for themselves, but terribly dangerous for us.

Russia will now plan to bring about the collapse of the economic system of the free world so that she can point to her system as the right one to adopt.

During the past ten years we have been fighting a battle to stop a war; that battle has been won. A major war is now unlikely, provided we do not become complacent and throw away all we have achieved until some form of general disarmament has been agreed. This qualification is important.

The battle of the next ten years will be very different; it will be political, financial, and economic. Russia will plan to stir up the countries of Asia and the Middle East against the Western nations and will encourage them to rise up and sabotage our interests. Indeed, Russia has already begun to operate this policy, and with all too much success, I fear. It is not always understood that if we are to combat this threat successfully, we must organize ourselves on a global basis. Fundamentally, the problem can be defined as follows.

Western Europe, including the United Kingdom, is an area on which depends a world-wide economic system. But in that area there is a shortage of raw materials, particularly oil; possibly coal is the only raw material which exists in quantity. Also, large quantities of food have to be imported to feed the big populations. The sources of raw materials and food, and the transit areas through which they come to Europe, have to be protected, together with the bases and communications necessary to control them. Failure to do so would lead to the collapse of the economic system

and, ultimately to the loss of N.A.T.O. Europe to international Communism, Russia thereby gaining a bloodless victory.

Russia will strive for success in this direction rather than by a direct onslaught against the N.A.T.O. area.

THE ACTION WE MUST TAKE NOW

We must understand that the Western Alliance is not geared to handle successfully the political, financial, and economic battle of the next few years. To succeed, we must have unity in our political aims and policies. But this alone is not enough. We need also unity in our economic policies, in order to ensure that our joint resources can be used to the best advantage to defeat a centrally directed enemy.

It is impossible to exaggerate this need for common policies. How can a large group of nations tackle successfully this threat from the East without unity in policy? There is no unity in policy among the nations of the Western Alliance—none.

A boat-load of oarsmen will pull together to some purpose only if they are confident that they are being steered in the direction in which they all want to go. The nations of the West are all agreed as to the direction in which they want to go. But they appear to me to lack agreement as to the best course to steer.

We face a global problem; but our outlook in N.A.T.O. is not global. We have in N.A.T.O. two distinct groups of Powers. One group of nations have purely parochial interests, which are confined to the N.A.T.O. area. The other group is of Powers with world-wide interests. It has been impossible to hammer out a common policy between these two groups; indeed, the world Powers have not even been able to agree a common policy among themselves.

The truth of the matter is that the United States and its European allies have completely failed to work out a common policy on a global basis, one which links N.A.T.O. with the world outside N.A.T.O.

We cannot continue in this way; it is just crazy. The N.A.T.O. countries must agree a common policy, and this must be practised on a world-wide scale. The 1949 concept must be broadened. It is ridiculous to suppose that we can be allies to the north of a certain parallel, and at the same time pursue our contradictory national policies to the south of the same line. Yet this is what we do, and have done ever since the late war ended in 1945.

The nations of N.A.T.O. Europe which have only parochial interests must somehow be made to realize the vital importance to themselves of the world outside N.A.T.O.—and particularly of Africa and the Middle East. Too many seem to think that so long as we have the United States on our side all will be well and nothing else matters. Never was there a greater error. The United States is indeed essential to the West. But if Africa and the Middle East are lost to the West, and disappear behind the Communist curtain, the world is split in two and that is the end for us all—including the United States. The integrity of Europe, and therefore of European interests in Africa and Asia, is vital to the United States.

Next comes the question of the initiative. We have lost the initiative outside the N.A.T.O. area, i.e., in Asia (which includes the Middle East), and in Africa. We have been on the defensive since the war ended in 1945. Our actions have all been negative. It may have been difficult to avoid this, since a democracy will not go to war except to defend itself against aggression; and the Russians and Chinese have

used the threat of violence, and even of war, to such an extent that we have had to dance to their tune. Also, our foreign policies are based largely on military agreements and warnings, and these are all defensive.

In war, without the initiative you cannot win, as all here know very well. And my experiences since the war ended have proved to me that the same principle applies in peace. Having ended the war with an unfavourable political balance *vis-à-vis* Russia, the Western Allies have been badly placed ever since.

THE NEXT BATTLEGROUND IN THE COLD WAR

The battleground in the next phase of the cold war lies in Asia and Africa. Europe is now the area where the danger is least. We must understand this. Militarily we must re-group and re-deploy. Politically we must regain the initiative which we have lost. Propaganda will be an essential weapon in this battle. Communist propaganda is far better than ours; they are experts at putting over their ideas to the mass of the people.

We cannot allow the Middle East to come under the effective control of the Communist bloc. We want to trade with it and to be able to move through it—nothing more. We want it to be free and independent. We want to hammer out an agreed policy with the nations of the Middle East so that we can live peacefully with them for the benefit of all mankind, including the Russians.

THE PROBLEM OF N.A.T.O. DEFENCE

Now let us have a look at the problem of N.A.T.O. defence. Having averted a global war, at any rate for the time being, our political leaders should now work for some form of disarmament, with a proper control and inspection system. This may, indeed will, take a long time; and until such time as success is achieved we must maintain a weapon which will make wanton aggression a very expensive undertaking for the aggressor.

What sort of weapon is needed? Today, I doubt if we have a good defence if the deterrent fails.

Experience has taught me that a commander whose flanks and rear are secure is well placed for battle. An enemy can always penetrate a defensive front; his difficulties must then begin. If my front is penetrated, I at once strengthen the flanks of the penetration—having reserves available for the purpose. But before the battle ever begins I ensure that the flanks of my whole area of operations will hold secure.

Against this general background let us have a look at the N.A.T.O. area.

I am now going to take you to a viewpoint in the air over Moscow. From it you will see this view of N.A.T.O. Europe, shown on Map 3.

We observe at once that N.A.T.O. Europe is one large peninsula. Our flanks and rear are the sea. These must be absolutely secure, beyond any possibility of doubt.

We also have an air flank. We must closely co-ordinate the action of all the agencies which operate in the air flank.

On land we see the enormous importance of six areas of land, marked with black lines: Scandinavia (Norway and Denmark); The United Kingdom islands; The Iberian peninsular (Spain and Portugal); French North Africa; Italy; Turkey (particularly Anatolia). These six areas must not be lost. They are essential to the overall security of our sea flank, and if *that* goes we would be in grave danger of defeat.

From our vantage point over Moscow we see that if in N.A.T.O. Europe we try to hold the whole area with a rigid defence—spreading the land forces evenly like you spread butter on a piece of bread, and aiming to be strong everywhere—we would merely be weak everywhere, and then be in danger of losing everything. We must hold securely the vital areas, the lynch pins of the whole structure, and elsewhere fight the mobile battle. The art in war is to be able to move yourself, and to prevent your enemy from moving.

If you can achieve this desirable situation, then you win. But your ability to manoeuvre freely will depend on the absolute security of certain vital areas. In our case, if these are lost, then the sea flank is in danger, the air flank is weakened, the land defence disintegrates, and we are at once in grave trouble.

Now look at Map 4, which shows the whole N.A.T.O. area.

We see at once the enormous importance to N.A.T.O. Europe of the Atlantic Ocean, and of the North American support area behind it. We observe at once that unless the N.A.T.O. area is considered as one entity in defence planning, with a properly co-ordinated effort for *the whole area*, we cannot get any good results.

A study of these maps will show at once the enormous influence of the sea in our defence structure. If we cannot ensure the free use of the major oceans and seas, we could not survive in a major war.

To put it shortly—sea power will be vital for the Western Alliance in any future all-out contest between East and West.

The matter is really very simple. We must confine Russia to a land strategy. From the days when we humans first began to use the seas, the great lesson of history is that an enemy who is confined to a land strategy is, in the end, defeated. This has been true from the days of Carthage. In more recent times, there is the example of the French in the Napoleonic wars, and of the Germans in the Kaiser's war and in Hitler's war. Another example can be found in the Russo-Japanese war in 1904. Japan had sea control; she fought Russia at the end of long communications, with her own short, and won.



The second World War was, fundamentally, a struggle for control of the major oceans and seas—the control of sea communications—and until we had won that struggle we could not proceed with our plans to win the war.

Today our strategy must be based on confining Russia to a land strategy, by retaining control of the seas in our hands and by preventing Russia from interfering with our use of the air flank. Any other strategy is useless.

It will be clear that, having now completed our first task of preventing a major war, we must carry out a reorganization of the Western defence organization. The aim should be to get an equally good defence for less cost. We can achieve this only if we reach agreement to have collective balanced forces in the Alliance as a whole, rather than having self-sufficiency in each nation, as at present. So far we have been able to make practically no progress in this direction. We would also achieve economies if we could eliminate the present duplication and waste.

Now let us have a closer look at the air flank.

For the next five years, and more likely ten, the main agent for delivering accurate nuclear fire power against an enemy country will be the manned aircraft. After that time the number of manned bombers may well decrease. But I do not agree with those who say that the manned bomber will go out of business. In my



opinion there will always be a need for manned strategic air forces—to give flexibility to the overall plans and in order to locate interior targets in the enemy country. For forward planning over the foreseeable future, it should be assumed that at least 25 per cent. of our total firepower delivery capability will be the manned bomber, the piloted aircraft. In air defence I believe that the best ratio for our defence forces will be found to be approximately three-quarters missiles and one-quarter manned aircraft.

The more one considers the problem of N.A.T.O. defence the more obvious it becomes that it must be organized within a global framework. There cannot be just a N.A.T.O. war; if war is imposed on us it will be global. We have no global framework for the defence of the free world. A global framework is particularly needed with regard to all the activities which go on in the air. We now have short range and long range ballistic missiles with ranges up to 5,000 miles and more, with nuclear warheads; man-made satellites circle the earth. The nuclear offensive, and all defensive problems, need to be viewed globally. We must have a global early warning system, and centralized global planning for air defence. The need is urgent for some central agency or organization which is above the level of the present Supreme Commanders to plan and direct all these activities, and to control the sputniks. Every day that passes without such a higher organization merely decreases the value of our deterrent.

THE PROBLEM OF SURPRISE ATTACK

There is a good deal of muddled thinking about surprise. Total readiness on the part of all our armed forces to meet a surprise attack at any time would mean enormous defence budgets. But, in fact, such a degree of readiness is unnecessary. An enemy could, of course, obtain a measure of surprise by confining himself to air and missile attack in the first instance.

But provided our early warning and air defence is organized in the way I have indicated, the enemy would receive devastating retaliation. Furthermore, any such surprise attack will be followed by unlimited war, with intensive operations in the air, at sea, and on land. A nation which plans aggression must be ready for these operations before it strikes, otherwise it may never be ready. This means that the aggressor nation would have to take certain measures to get ready for unlimited war; these measures could not be hidden. For our part, if we are to be able to survive a surprise air and missile attack, we must have some form of centralized global planning for our early warning and air defence systems, and this we have not got.

The question of surprise leads on to the problem of mobilization.

THE PROBLEM OF MOBILIZATION

I am convinced that we must overhaul our mobilization plans. Mobilization as known to us during the last two years looks archaic against the background of nuclear war. The word brings to mind an entirely erroneous picture, one portraying an effort spread over days, weeks, and even months before completion. Perhaps we need a new word for mobilization in a nuclear age. We need a system which is effective in a matter of hours, following national radio warnings. It must not be dependent on vulnerable communications systems. It must be founded on a body of men and women, all of whom know in peace-time exactly where they go in war and what they do. The system must include civil defence workers. The whole question requires a new look. We are not paying sufficient attention to this vitally important part of national and allied defence.

THE NEED FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCES

The conventional forces of the West must be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, for these alone can give us the fire power at least equal to that of the Communist bloc. Indeed, the tactical nuclear weapon of today will become, in due course, the conventional tactical weapon of tomorrow.

To understand the real need for conventional forces we must think clearly about the nuclear deterrent, and about the position which will arise when there is nuclear sufficiency on both sides, East and West. This situation will arise sooner than some of us think, and when it has arisen Russia will be in a position to bombard the United States effectively. We must remember that Russia could bombard the United Kingdom effectively *now*. And the Western Alliance could devastate Russia *now*. So in due course we shall have reached complete nuclear sufficiency on all sides.

What happens next? Some think that we will then be on the brink of the third World War, an all-out nuclear war. I do not agree. Let us have a closer look at this problem.

I assume that the West will never be the aggressor. In the event of minor Russian aggression with conventional forces, do you believe that the West would use its nuclear deterrent *as a weapon* against the cities of Russia, and receive in return Russian retaliation which would put the U.K. and the U.S.A. out of business? For us to act in this way would be to commit national suicide. I do not believe it will happen.

When both sides have nuclear sufficiency, the deterrent will merely serve to deter each side from using it as a weapon. Russia does not want her country destroyed any more than we do.

The West must, of course, maintain the nuclear deterrent until some form of general disarmament is agreed, which will prove difficult. But it should be a 'Western' deterrent, and be mainly supplied by the U.S.A., the richest and most powerful nation in the Western Alliance. No other nation can afford to maintain an effective *independent* nuclear deterrent, nor is this necessary—so long as we have a good 'Western' deterrent. The U.K. should, of course, contribute to the 'Western' deterrent.

In the event of a major act of aggression which directly threatened to overrun the home country of any N.A.T.O. nation, the full weight of the Western deterrent would be brought into action *at once* against the home country of the aggressor nation.

We must now face the fact that Russia understands all this very well. She is maintaining vast conventional forces and will pursue her aims and policies with them; she will not commit national suicide, and run the risk of having her country devastated by starting an all-out nuclear war.

And so the Western Alliance has now worked itself into a position where an all-out nuclear war is unlikely—so long as we maintain a 'Western' nuclear deterrent. In fact, I would put it more strongly: preparation for an all-out nuclear war between East and West can be put at the bottom of the priority list.

If this is the situation—and I believe it is—it is obvious that we must review our strategic thinking and adjust our priorities.

Britain must, of course, continue to manufacture nuclear material and to possess the nuclear weapon; we cannot allow Western Europe to become a sort of hedgehog between two great giants who alone have the latest weapons. The British nuclear

capability can be small; but it must be large enough to contribute to the Western deterrent and to produce tactical nuclear weapons.

The first priority for the N.A.T.O. nations is to be able to tackle quickly and effectively cold war activities, and to play their full part in limited wars. This means the provision and upkeep of efficient conventional forces—Navy, Army, and Air Force—armed with proper equipment, which must include tactical nuclear weapons. In the air it will be important to maintain an adequate bomber capability, which in Europe should be supplied mainly by the United Kingdom.

If any N.A.T.O. nation expands its own nuclear programme too much, at the expense of conventional forces, it will be playing into the hands of Russia. Defence will become so costly that that nation will not be able to make, in addition, a first-rate contribution to N.A.T.O. of conventional forces armed with first-rate equipment. It is this which is now the first priority, once the contribution to the Western nuclear deterrent has been made by certain selected nations.

THE CRUX OF THE WHOLE MATTER

Let us now sum up the whole matter.

Having averted war in the N.A.T.O. area, we must now check up on our organization, and do some new thinking.

Let us admit at once that the achievements of N.A.T.O. have been terrific. We have stopped a major war in Europe. We have learned to work alongside each other. And all too slowly we are beginning to realize that we must look outwards if we are to win the next round of the struggle—and not just inwards at ourselves. But if we are to do this effectively, we must have an agreed policy which links N.A.T.O. with the world outside N.A.T.O., and this we have not got.

If N.A.T.O. is to survive and become the vigorous and healthy organization we all desire, there must be changes. Above all, two things are necessary—truth and courage. These would bring progress. There are some who think that progress is inevitable; this is not the case. Change is inevitable. Progress depends on courage to speak the truth, and then to make sound decisions based on the truth.

The fact is, we are not really an alliance. Too many of us are allies only in name. We lack unity. We are a group of nations unable to agree how to get where we want to go. Instead of a clear N.A.T.O. lake, with pipes carrying the agreed common policy, and the consequent doctrine, to all the nations, we are more like a group of 15 national puddles.

If we are to progress, the whole N.A.T.O. organization must be drastically overhauled. It is complicated, cumbersome, and grossly over-staffed. There is an enormous waste of money and effort. It takes far too long to get anything done, because of the interminable arguments about unimportant details that go on in the committees of the N.A.T.O. Council, which number over 100. A simple organization is needed. The Council should decide policy; and a sort of General Manager is then needed to carry out the administrative needs based on the policy—a man who has the drive to get things done, and who is not the servant of committees.

The strategical thinking is muddled and confused. The global aspect of defence is totally disregarded.

The military structure in particular needs revision. It is fundamental in all planning that the political and military bodies should work closely together, side by side. But in N.A.T.O. the Council is in Paris and the Standing Group (the military

body) is in Washington. All work suffers accordingly. How can two bodies work closely together when they are 3,000 miles apart?

Because of the absence of the Standing Group in Washington, the Ambassadors of the Permanent Council in Paris, and the Defence Ministers of the N.A.T.O. Powers, go to S.H.A.P.E. for their military guidance, lobbying the Supreme Commander. This is a gross abuse of the proper channel of command and responsibility. It has resulted in S.H.A.P.E. becoming a political centre. This has not been the fault of successive Supreme Commanders. Indeed, it has put them in an impossible position and is most unfair to them. General Norstad is one of my greatest friends, a man of great integrity and patience. He has a frustrating job.

All this should cease. The Standing Group should be ordered to Paris. S.H.A.P.E. must be left free to carry out its proper functions as a virile military headquarters, radiating truth and courage.

In Appendix "A" will be found a suggested and simple Command organization for N.A.T.O. and the free world, together with explanatory notes.

A great danger today is complacency, thinking we can now relax and not bother any more. That way leads to disaster.

What we must now do is to overhaul the whole organization, political and military, design a more simple and more effective structure for N.A.T.O., and eradicate waste and duplication; planning an adequate and good defence for far less cost, which in my opinion is definitely possible.

The time has now come to do these things; to re-organize, to re-group, to re-design where necessary, to regain the flexibility we have lost. The object will be to achieve an organization which is less complicated than the present set-up, is less costly, which works better, and is more effective. A first step should be to prune ruthlessly the present enormous headquarters staffs.

The problems we must face up to in N.A.T.O. are all too clear. Drastic measures are required now to solve them. These measures might disturb the placid waters of the N.A.T.O. pond, and would certainly stir up the mud in some of the national puddles. But the alternative, to embark on war with our present thinking and organization, would be disastrous for the Western Alliance.

But none of these things can be done without unity, and that we have not got. The Russians fear one thing more than anything else—that is Western unity. All their plans are linked to one fundamental object, to prevent it. And they don't find their task very difficult. If we want to defeat the Communist threat to the entire free world, we must have political unity among the N.A.T.O. nations. Given that, we can provide the military strength within the limits of financial possibilities. Without it, we cannot; in fact, without it the task is impossible.

Interdependence, which is of course the only proper answer to our problems, is not the reality it ought to be—and could be. But the nations do not trust each other.

Political 'lobbying' goes on behind the scenes in order to get national viewpoints accepted. There is too much manoeuvring for position in the N.A.T.O. Council in Paris.

When some sensible N.A.T.O. plan is suggested which is politically unpopular in certain nations, up go the 'smoke screens' and the suggested plan is stifled. I have watched it with interest for ten years.

I put true unity as the first and fundamental need of the Western Alliance. It would solve all our troubles. Somehow we have managed to get along without it during the past ten years, but it has been a frustrating business. The need for it will be far greater during the next ten years. And unless we can achieve it the result of the contest between East and West will be in doubt—indeed the Communists may well win.

And the solid rock on which the unity of the West must be built is Anglo-American friendship. That friendship has had to stand up to some severe stresses and strains in the post-war years, and has been badly shaken once or twice. But it has survived. Nonetheless, I am alarmed at the ease with which anti-American feeling can be whipped-up in Britain, and anti-British feeling in the U.S.A. We must not allow this to continue. If that link of friendship snaps, the future outlook would indeed be black. Clearly we have both made mistakes; let us admit it. But let us learn from the mistakes. I put Anglo-American friendship as first of all the needs in the Western world.

Then I consider that those N.A.T.O. nations which are world Powers, with interest and responsibilities spanning the oceans, must agree a common policy on a global basis, both politically and strategically. There are three such nations—the United Kingdom, the United States, and France. If these could agree a common policy among themselves, the other N.A.T.O. nations would accept it, knowing the grave danger to them all if they refused. But the global policy must be an agreed policy, without any qualification or compromise; and France cannot be left out, as some seem to think. It is not possible to have a global policy without France. Indeed, a strong and prosperous France, and of course, Britain, are just as necessary for the peace of the world as is a strong United States; none can do without the others, and this is not always understood by the U.S.A.

And lastly, these three world Powers must agree and create some small organization for planning global policy and strategy and for directing it when the need arises. It is impossible to tackle the global problem which confronts the Western Alliance without such an organization. Further delay is dangerous. Indeed, the time has come for all those nations who are free, and who wish to remain free, to line up solidly and demand the creation of an organization to plan and direct their common interests. Unless they have the courage to sink some of the present national sensitivity in this matter, and to act as I advocate, the West will not be able to halt the onward march of international Communism.

APPENDIX "A"

SIMPLIFIED COMMAND ORGANIZATION FOR N.A.T.O. AND THE FREE WORLD

AREA	COMMAND HELD BY
<i>Supreme Commander</i>	} U.S.A.
Atlantic, and all seas surrounding	
N.A.T.O. Europe.	
<i>Supreme Commander</i>	} U.S.A.
Pacific, and China Seas	
<i>Supreme Commander</i>	} France.
N.A.T.O. Europe	
C-in-C., North Europe	U.K.
C-in-C., Central Europe	Germany.
C-in-C., South Europe	U.S.A.

Supreme Commander	}	British Commonwealth.
South-East Asia, Australasia, Indian		
Ocean, and territories and seas east of		
Suez		

Note.—All commands are international.

NOTES TO APPENDIX "A"

1. This suggested organization of command on a global basis gives to the U.S.A. the responsibility for deploying in Europe, Africa, and Asia (Far East and Middle East) the military power and economic strength of the North American Continent, for supporting from the sea all military operations carried out in those continents, and for command of all the forces engaged in carrying out those responsibilities.

2. It gives to a United States officer responsibility for control of all the water areas of N.A.T.O., and for command of all the forces employed on that task. The Channel and Mediterranean Commands become subcommands of SACLANT.

3. The responsibility for holding N.A.T.O. Europe belongs primarily to the nations which live there, and one of those nations must hold the Supreme Command. Command of all the forces employed on this task is given to France, the nation vital to the cohesion and integrity of N.A.T.O. Europe.

4. The command of the Central European Sector is given to Federal Germany, whose territory covers the whole of the forward zone of the sector and whose intimate co-operation is essential for a forward strategy.

5. The British Naval C.-in-C. Mediterranean gives up his N.A.T.O. status and becomes a national commander. He is then visualized as a C.-in-C. British Forces in Libya and in the Levant, a single inter-Service commander with an integrated joint H.Q., responsible for all British cold war or other activities in North Africa and the Middle East, and being given the proper forces for this task as necessary, e.g., carrier-borne aircraft and Marine Commandos, together with all the necessary landing craft and equipment. The key to the security of Africa lies in the Middle East.

6. The British Commonwealth assumes responsibility for South East Asia and the Indian Ocean, together with the seas and territories east of Suez. Here also will be required carrier-borne aircraft and Marine Commandos, together with all the necessary landing craft and equipment.

7. Under this scheme the Royal Navy leaves the Atlantic to the Americans, and is employed in home waters, in the Mediterranean, and east of Suez.

8. It is important that an international commander should not concurrently hold a national appointment. We have suffered greatly from this mistake and it must cease.

9. A small but very high-powered organization to be created to plan the defence of the free world and to direct and co-ordinate the activities of the Supreme Commands. This to be located in Canada, to avoid crowding too many organizations into Washington. Linked to this organization should be some authority which will direct and control the air activities of the free world.

DISCUSSION

THE CHAIRMAN: The Field-Marshal has indicated that he is ready to answer any reasonable questions that are put to him, and the meeting is now open for that purpose.

COLONEL N. DE P. MACROBERTS: Have British troops ever been exposed to the blast of tactical nuclear weapons, or, for that matter, have the Russians? We were told two years ago that the Americans had sent their troops to within two miles of a blast. Have we any plans in that direction?

THE LECTURER: I would not know; I am an international commander. You will have to ask somebody at the War Office. General Stratton is here, but I gather he is

not speaking. If you ask me, I can only say that I do not know. Write a letter to the War Office!

LORD BOOTHBY: I should like to ask the Field-Marshal whether, in view of the collapse of the Council of Europe in the absence, to which he referred, of British leadership since the war, he thinks that we should now concentrate on N.A.T.O. as the main Western unit. If so, what sort of political Council does he have in mind to frame and implement global policies? The present political Council in Paris is not powerful enough for this purpose.

THE LECTURER: By the Council of Europe you mean, I take it, the talking-place at Strasbourg. I have often thought that it was quite useless. I agree with you. I would go for N.A.T.O. I think that the time has come to disband these small bodies; I believe that they are quite unnecessary. If you have N.A.T.O., you have the whole thing. We should strengthen the N.A.T.O. Council and get them to see that this contest with international Communism cannot be confined to the N.A.T.O. area, but is global. The Council contains some very good men—the Prime Minister of Canada, for instance—but I would disband these smaller Councils.

GROUP CAPTAIN C. M. CLEMENTI: Arising out of the Field-Marshal's statement that the first priority should now be to create first-rate conventional forces, should not we face the logical continuation of that, that these forces will be very expensive, particularly so far as the air is concerned? The Field-Marshal referred to adequate bomber capabilities. In conventional warfare there is always a call for more and more bombers and, if we are to contribute to it adequately without using nuclear weapons, we shall need many more bombers than we have today. Have we not, therefore, to accept the fact that there must be no wavering in our support of the deterrent policy, and even of nuclear sufficiency, as being the only means that we can afford of ensuring our national survival, unless and until there is a far greater degree of interdependence between the nations than exists today?

THE LECTURER: I believe that the preservation of the deterrent is essential until our political leaders have brought about some form of disarmament with a proper control and inspection system, but I also believe that the danger now lies in cold war activities and limited wars and so on, which will be started by the other side with conventional forces. As regards air power, in that type of combat you want piloted air attacks.

If the deterrent is regarded as an independent national thing, which I feel you want to do, we cannot also afford proper conventional forces, and so I would make this deterrent a Western deterrent, for the Western world, the major part of which should be supplied by the United States of America, who are by far the richest and most powerful nation in the alliance. We should contribute to it, but, having contributed to it, we should not also try to make ourselves a great nuclear power or we shall not be able to afford these other things.

The conventional forces which we have must be highly mobile, and that means that their equipment has to be looked at. If they are not mobile they are no good, because these 'fires' start up quite suddenly in different places and it is necessary to get there quickly. The only mobile force which we have at present which can get anywhere quickly is the Parachute Regiment, but that is not enough. We want everybody to be mobile.

I would make the deterrent a Western one. If the other nations contribute towards it it is O.K., but let them also have conventional forces—ships, aircraft, troops.

CAPTAIN E. HINTERHOFF: I should like to ask the same question that was asked by Marshal Juin two years ago, for which he was put on the carpet. The question is this: why is one nation which inhabits this western part of Europe, Spain, kept outside N.A.T.O. and not integrated, whereas the smaller and weaker Portugal is?

THE LECTURER: You say that Marshal Juin asked that question and was put on the carpet. He got away with it, I imagine! It is an entirely political question. It is obvious that Spain should be shown white on my map and not shaded. I am not a politician.

You must put that question to some Foreign Secretary, and he will give you the answer. My own feeling is that it would be a very good thing if Spain came into the party. Is that what you wanted-me to say?

CAPTAIN HINTERHOFF: That is what I was waiting for.

COMMANDER G. G. PUGH-COOK: Where do you draw the line between conventional and nuclear warfare? If an otherwise conventional force has artillery which fires shells which have nuclear exploders, is that nuclear warfare?

THE LECTURER: I did say that our conventional forces must be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons—things fired from guns, and so on. That is essential; it is only in that way that we can get sufficient fire-power to defeat superior conventional forces. I do not believe that the use of those nuclear weapons, guns firing shells with nuclear warheads, will bring on an all-out nuclear war. I do not think so, but I may be wrong. My feeling is that it would not. We want the tactical nuclear weapons and the big deterrent.

GROUP CAPTAIN K. A. MEEK: It has been said that if the home front collapses, all is lost. Would the Field-Marshal care to comment on the part that civil defence will play in the next ten years?

THE LECTURER: I do not think that it would be suitable for me to do so. You ought to get somebody here from the Home Office. I agree with your opening statement; if the home front collapses, what can you do when you are hiding in the hills? We have had experience in the late war of certain countries where that happened. The home front is most important, but what is being done about it in this country, I do not know. Write to the Home Office!

GROUP CAPTAIN L. C. MAXTON: I believe that the Field-Marshal studied the characteristics of his opponents in the late war. The Communist attack seems to have a sort of pattern of sabotage, young people starting riots and that sort of thing. Has he any idea of who is the real brain behind the Communist set-up, who he is and where he is?

THE LECTURER: I do not know. You will have to get on to some Intelligence guy. I did say that I thought that, looking to the future, we might find that Mao Tse-Tung would be more dangerous than Khrushchev, but who the guy is in the centre of the spider's web I have no idea.

CAPTAIN E. A. S. BAILEY, R.N.: Does the Field-Marshal envisage that we in the West, if we applied his priorities, would be able to match the Soviet bloc conventionally?

THE LECTURER: I do not think that we could match them conventionally in Europe without a tactical nuclear weapon, but given the tactical nuclear weapon, I think that we could do something in Western Europe. Elsewhere, I do not think that the Soviet bloc will be anxious to commit its own forces for these cold war activities. They are very good at committing other people's and pushing at the back. If, then, we cannot match them, since the Free World vastly outnumbers the Communist world in scientific manpower and in economic strength, we do not deserve to be here.

MR. MICHAEL HOWARD: The Field-Marshal said that Britain must make a contribution to the nuclear deterrent. Is that a 'must' because the Americans are incapable of providing sufficient nuclear power deterrent themselves, or is there some other military reason for our making that contribution? If it is not a military reason, is it a political one?

THE LECTURER: I am not a politician. I believe that this deterrent should be Western and not a matter of each nation having its own. I start from there. I believe that the greater part of it should be provided by the richest and most powerful nation, the United States. I am not prepared—it would not be a matter for me, because I am not a political leader—to say that we can leave this matter entirely in the hands of the Americans and the Russians. No; I think that we have to have, somewhere in Europe, this thing too. We must. That is why we must make a contribution. I am not prepared

to see our nation sitting in the middle like a hedgehog between two great giants ; but whether that is military or political, I do not know.

Mr. G. T. RAIKES : Apart from vested interests, what are the obstacles to a unified forces hat ?

THE LECTURER : You mean that we should have one Service ?

Mr. RAIKES : In one of your past lectures you advocated a unified forces hat for our land, sea, and air forces.

THE LECTURER : What I have said in the past is that I think that as time goes on we shall eventually move towards a more central direction of our defence effort, which I think that we are doing. It is being done very slightly and quietly now, because we do not want to offend too many people at the same moment. I am entirely opposed today to merging the three fighting Services into one ; but I think that after the next war—which I do not propose to see myself—it may well happen. Today it is out of the question.

Mr. RAIKES : The main obstacle being vested interests ?

THE LECTURER : You can name any obstacle you like. It just would not work. You must do what is possible. If you tried to do it today you would upset too many people all at the same time.

THE CHAIRMAN : Perhaps you will bear with me if I try to summarise the lecture and discussion which we have had. The Field-Marshal started by describing very briefly the stages by which after the war the West reached its full realization of the Communist danger and of what had to be done to counter it, which led up to the creation of N.A.T.O. They were pretty slow in arriving at this, because General Eisenhower took command at S.H.A.E.F. only in April, 1951. Nevertheless, with the developments of atomic weapons and the declared willingness to use them in the last resort against a major aggression, we have reached the stage, as the Field-Marshal says, when Europe is the area where the danger of all-out war is least.

The Western Alliance has suffered fearful losses in Europe and Asia. China, with its 600,000,000 people and its almost infinite rate of progression, is in the Communist camp ; Indonesia, Indo-China, Burma, Ceylon, and India are all lost to us for cold war purposes. In the Middle East we have had to give a great deal of ground, and at the present moment there is something very little short of confusion there. All this fits in with the Russian policy of not attempting an aggressive war in the West, but confining themselves to weakening us elsewhere, both politically and economically, in the expectation, as their doctrine teaches, that ultimately the fruit will ripen and rot and drop off the tree without the expenditure of a single Russian soldier.

The Field-Marshal then went on to ask what had caused this blindness to what is going on, and he mentioned three contributory factors : first, the preoccupation of this country with the welfare State ; secondly, the preoccupation of the United States with the destruction of the British, French, and Dutch empires in Asia and Africa ; and thirdly, the inability of the Western Alliance to see the global wood for their own indigenous trees, and to formulate and adopt a common policy.

About the more predominantly military aspects of the Field-Marshal's lecture, I am not competent to speak. I understood him to say that we must work for disarmament, but that in the meantime we must preserve the atomic deterrent and the willingness to use it in the event of major aggression against us, that that deterrent must be Western rather than national, and that although this country must make its contribution, particularly in the sphere of tactical atomic weapons, the main burden of the atomic deterrent must fall on the U.S.A.

His second point in this military sphere was that we must all base our plans on confining the Russians to a land strategy, that we must have highly trained conventional forces to deal with minor aggression and cold war, and that these conventional forces must be armed with tactical atomic weapons. Above all, we must have a great, global

policy and an efficient but simple and less costly organization than N.A.T.O. to carry out a unified strategy within this global policy.

In reply to a suggestion that conventional forces plus the nuclear deterrent must be very expensive, he said that the deterrent is essential until disarmament, but he repeated an argument which he has used on more than once occasion, that it will be extremely expensive if all the nations aspire to be self-sufficient in every aspect of conventional forces.

On Spain he gave a partial reply, and I think that we had better leave it there. On the line to be drawn between nuclear and conventional forces he answered the question by repeating what he said in the lecture, that the conventional forces must be armed with tactical nuclear weapons. At the end of it all, the Field-Marshal emphasized that unity is the vital necessity and that we have not got it. That we must get it soon was really the theme running throughout his lecture.

Let me add a word of my own on this matter of unity. I do not think that unity has anything to do with one hat. Perhaps I may be forgiven for recalling to you a story which went the rounds during the war, about an old lady in Whitehall who asked a policeman which side the War Office was on, to which he replied, "Ours, I hope." Today I cannot help wondering whether there are not in this country persons and organizations which cannot possibly be on our side; but if we are incapable of securing an internal unity, and from that proceeding to an outward unity throughout the Western world, our state is parlous indeed. I would conclude by reminding you of another *cliché*, that if we do not hang together we shall assuredly hang separately.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE ERSKINE: It is my very pleasant duty to propose a vote of thanks to our lecturer and to our Chairman. I should like to say how delighted we are to see the Field-Marshal looking so well and as fresh as ever, and giving us the stimulating lecture to which we all looked forward so much. I wish also to thank Sir James for taking the Chair and doing it so well and handsomely. (*Applause.*)

THE CENTRAL ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENCE

By VICE-ADMIRAL J. HUGHES HALLETT, C.B., D.S.O., M.P.

ALTHOUGH the central organization for Defence has for long engaged the attention of statesmen and senior officers, the widespread public interest, which culminated in the issue of a White Paper in July, was most unusual. There were several reasons for this, which were brought out in the House of Commons debate on 28th July.

When the present administration was formed, and Mr. Duncan Sandys became Minister of Defence, his appointment was accompanied by a directive from the Prime Minister giving him greater authority *vis-à-vis* the Service Departments and the Ministry of Supply. Moreover the Prime Minister made it clear that if necessary he would introduce legislation to strengthen the position of the Minister of Defence still further.

A few months later came the 1957 White Paper on Defence, which announced important changes of policy, accompanied by far-reaching economies and reductions in all three Services. Rumours of resistance and obstruction on the part of the Service Departments followed, and it was widely believed that Mr. Duncan Sandys was seeking yet further powers with which to impose his will upon the Service Ministers. A further cross-current in the general atmosphere of speculation and intrigue was provided by the personality of the First Sea Lord. Obviously Lord Mountbatten was most qualified by seniority and achievement to be the next Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, and equally obviously a man with his great record when Chief of Combined Operations would make a formidable combination with a Minister determined to achieve real unity in Defence policy.

It was thus hardly surprising that those who were opposed to change—and this included that large body of devoted officers and civil servants whose loyalty has never extended beyond their own Service—were genuinely alarmed. Scares were started (whether maliciously or not it is hard to say), among which was the rumour that Mr. Sandys was determined on the creation of a single, combined fighting Service. Indeed, this particular scare had to be formally contradicted by the Prime Minister.

Perhaps one point should be made before going further; the central organization for Defence need not be directly connected with the problem of whether or not there is to be an actual merger between two or more of the fighting Services. While the co-ordination of military effort would become easier if, for example, there was a single Service, it is perfectly possible to devise effective machinery even if there are three, four, or even more independent Services. As things stand, widely varying views are held concerning the feasibility and urgency of integration between the Services, but most civil opinion is agreed that some measure of integration is sooner or later both desirable and practicable. This being so, it is important that any changes in our present central organization should pave the way, as it were, for such progress towards actual integration as may eventually be decided upon. The important changes set forth in the White Paper most certainly fulfil this condition.

Before examining these changes a short historical résumé may not be out of place. The modern history of the problem began with the creation of the Committee of Imperial Defence shortly after the Boer War. This Committee provided a remarkably efficient piece of machinery for co-ordinating the effort of the military and civil departments in the event of war, but it was not concerned with specific

military plans or operations. In 1911, when the Agadir crisis brought us to the brink of war, Mr. Asquith made the startling discovery that the Admiralty's plans and strategy were profoundly different to those of the War Office, to which the country had already been committed at General Staff level in conversations with the French. Accordingly an elaborate Naval Staff was imposed upon the Admiralty, together with machinery for joint staff planning with the War Office.

During the first World War the co-ordinating machinery at Whitehall was much elaborated, but chiefly by *ad hoc* arrangements which lapsed after the Armistice. One thing which remained, however, was the greatly expanded C.I.D. Secretariat, whose chief, Sir Maurice Hankey, had by then become the Secretary to the Cabinet as well.

Between the Wars the story is one of ever-growing complexity in the form of innumerable C.I.D. sub-committees, some permanent and some *ad hoc*, but all tending to become satellites of the Chiefs of Staff sub-committee. This latter was itself a sub-committee of the C.I.D., at least in theory, although the C.I.D. itself gradually became a more or less fictitious body which never met. Created in 1924, the C.O.S. sub-committee consisted of the three professional heads of the Services, sitting under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, with the Secretary of the Cabinet as its secretary. In practice the Prime Minister rarely attended in person and the chair was taken by the Chief of Staff longest in office, but the minutes were seen by the Prime Minister and their circulation was controlled by the Cabinet Office. There is thus nothing new in the exclusion of the Service Ministers from military planning at the highest level, or for the professional heads of the Services having direct access to the Prime Minister in their collective capacity.

Although sound on paper, the inter-war machinery was too complex, and in consequence too indecisive, to be really efficient. Admittedly some improvement was effected when Sir Thomas Inskip was appointed as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, and even more when Lord Chatfield succeeded him in that office, though no sufficient public recognition has yet been accorded to Lord Chatfield's great work in the immediate pre-war years.

Nevertheless, it is worth pausing to ask why the problem of co-ordination had grown so much more difficult in the space of a single generation. The main reason was the emergence of the Royal Air Force as a separate Service. If you add a third Service, it is a matter of arithmetic that you multiply the amount of co-ordination needed by three. Furthermore, whereas the Army and Navy had in the main been tactically independent even during the first World War, by the time of the second World War no fleet could sail and no division could attack without detailed consultation and co-ordination with the appropriate Air Command.

When Sir Winston Churchill became Prime Minister in 1940, he at once set up more elaborate and formal machinery for joint planning. The Joint Planning Committee was supported by three subordinate tiers of planners who worked together in the War Cabinet offices and had no other responsibilities within their own Service Department. There was the Strategical Planning Section, or S.T.R.A.T.S., sometimes called the 'Stratospherical Planners.' They worked on a high plane. Then there was the Future Operational Planning Section, or F.O.P.S., popularly called the 'Futile Operational Planners.' This was a little unfair, since there seems to be no record of any of their plans ever being carried out, so they may have been very good plans. Thirdly there was the Executive Planning Section, usually termed 'Eeps.' This section did invaluable if somewhat dull work. A special

Combined Operations Headquarters was established at much the same time. While this was an understandable innovation for the planning and mounting of raids, its activities were eventually extended to embrace the whole field of amphibious warfare. There is striking evidence of the shortcomings of the inter-war committee system in the fact that all the technique of the great landing operations whereby the war was won, all the provisioning of the vast fleets of landing craft on which they depended, all the training of the tens of thousands of men who took part in the landings, and most of the immense logistic arrangements for their embarkation in this country, were conceived, planned, and inspired within C.O.H.Q.

But the greatest change brought about by Sir Winston came from his being his own Minister of Defence. Throughout the critical period when Britain fought alone he was, for all practical purposes, a Supreme Military Commander. It was little short of a miracle that a statesman should have arisen with the knowledge and experience to combine this role with that of a great Prime Minister and a great national leader. Let no one be tempted to forget this, and thus to draw false and easy conclusions from our victory.

After the war was over it would have been impracticable for a peace-time Prime Minister to continue as Minister of Defence. Mr. Attlee was therefore faced with the choice of creating a new office or reverting to pre-war practice. He chose the former alternative and Mr. A. V. Alexander became the first Minister of Defence in his own right, with duties and powers defined in a White Paper. These powers, which were stated in the broadest and most general terms, were capable of being interpreted in a most sweeping manner. Indeed they overlapped both the statutory powers of the Secretaries of State for War and Air, and the prerogative powers exercised by the Board of Admiralty. Moreover for nine years the Minister of Defence had no formal instrument, other than a small secretariat, with which to enforce his policy upon the Service Departments. His strength lay in the fact that he was a member of the Cabinet and the Service Ministers were not, and the power he exercised depended in practice on his personality. Successive Conservative Ministers of Defence are known to have been dissatisfied with their position, and although Mr. Shinwell recently claimed to have wielded power comparable to that now accorded to Mr. Sandys, there was little evidence of this at the time.

Thus the lack of effective co-ordination, so evident before the war, continued into the post-war years. Its bad effects were magnified by a bewildering succession of technical developments, which not only changed the entire concept of war but threatened the very existence first of the Navy and later of the Air Force. As a result the Service Departments became intensely preoccupied with their strategic roles; the idea being that by staking out a claim for a particular task, your Service would continue to perform it even if the appropriate weapon changed its element. In one sense the process can be said to have begun when the Navy gained sole control of the Fleet Air Arm, but there was more logic behind this decision than behind the infiltration of the Army into the Tactical Air Force, or the manning of missile bases on the ground by the R.A.F. However this may be, it seemed to the outside observer that the attention of the Services was concentrated as much on their own future as upon the needs of the country. Evidence of the resulting inefficiency was to be seen in unblushing waste of public money and of manpower, and also in the absurdity of partial mobilization in August, 1956, to cope with a long-foreseen threat from Egypt, of all countries.

When the present administration was formed in January, 1957, the Prime Minister entrusted Mr. Duncan Sandys with the task of reshaping the Services in

accordance with current needs, including the overriding need for economy. Simultaneously his powers in relation to the Service Departments and Minister of Supply were redefined, and all this was announced in a formal statement to Parliament by the Prime Minister. According to the introductory paragraphs of the White Paper of July, 1958, the latest changes do little more than give formal confirmation of what was done 18 months ago. Even so, the White Paper is of great importance, partly because it establishes the machinery for reaching top-level decisions with some precision, and partly because it also establishes the predominant position of the Minister of Defence in a way which could not properly be changed in future without informing Parliament.

The composition of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet is first described, and flexibility is ensured by the provision that the Prime Minister will in future decide which members are to be invited to attend any particular meeting. This is a reversion to the practice in the time of the old Committee of Imperial Defence, and it has the merit of obviating the need to set up *ad hoc* Cabinet Committees to meet changing circumstances.

The remaining paragraphs are chiefly concerned with the powers of the Minister of Defence and the machinery whereby they will be exercised. To understand their full implication, those which deal with operations should be read separately from those which deal with general policy, administration, and provisioning. The latter comprise paragraphs 7, 8, 11, 12 and 13, and taken together they clearly establish the authority of the Minister of Defence subject to the constitutional right of the Service Ministers to make submissions to the Cabinet. Of particular interest is the closing sentence of paragraph 13, which allows the Minister of Defence to transfer to his own Ministry, if it will promote efficiency, any function common to two or more Services. The way is thus open for the establishment of a common works department, or a central victualling department, or a joint Service medical organization if and when the Minister of Defence is satisfied that such changes would be advantageous.

The instrument through which the Minister will carry out this part of his duties is the newly created Defence Board, which is defined in paragraph 9. Under the chairmanship of the Minister of Defence, it is made up of the three Service Ministers, the Minister of Supply, the Chief of the Defence Staff, the three Service Chiefs of Staff, the Chief Scientist, and the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. Although somewhat similar bodies have been set up in the past on an *ad hoc* basis, there is all the difference in the world between them and the Defence Board as now formally constituted. If it achieves nothing else the new organization will stop the element of diarchy which was inherent in the old system. An ambitious staff officer, seeking to push some pet project, had two alternative courses. If it was something unlikely to get past the finance department of his own Ministry, he could feed it into the Chiefs of Staff machine; with luck it would come back in due course as something approved by the Ministry of Defence. If, on the other hand, it was something more likely to appeal to his own Service than to the other two, then he could seek approval within his own Ministry, and in many cases the Ministry of Defence might never hear of the project unless perhaps the Treasury brought it to their notice.

The remaining paragraphs of the White Paper are concerned with military operations. In paragraph 10 we read that the Minister of Defence is ministerially responsible to the Prime Minister for the execution of approved military operations. There may be nothing new in this, but it is certainly news to Parliament and public.

Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 18 and 19 deal with the machinery for the exercise of this responsibility. Thus the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff now becomes the Chief of the Defence Staff and is responsible for tendering military advice to his Minister, with the specific duty to represent any conflicting views of individual Chiefs of Staff on occasions when agreed collective advice cannot be tendered. The Joint Planning Staff in their collective capacity now become responsible direct to the Defence Chief of Staff, and a small part of the joint staff will apparently be housed in the Ministry of Defence.

These are important changes which should go a long way towards greater speed and efficiency in the planning and conduct of operations. During the debate in the Commons they were criticized from more than one quarter as savouring too much of the German O.K.W. In point of fact the O.K.W. did not manage too badly and, as one Member unkindly pointed out, our final victory may have been due to the help we received from Russia and America rather than to any superiority of our system of command! Moreover, the much-criticized divorce between planning and execution is inevitable under any system, to the extent that broad strategic plans made in Whitehall have to be entrusted to Commanders-in-Chief to carry out. The real vice in the German system lay in the tendency to appoint officers to the Staff while they were quite young, and to let them rise to high rank without insisting upon alternate appointments in command of ships or formations, as is the British practice. In short the O.K.W. bogey proved on closer examination to be a red herring.

Looking at the White Paper as a whole, one is bound to admit that it goes much further in placing the Services under the effective control of the Minister of Defence than might appear at first sight. The question is, does it go far enough? I suggest that the answer is, "Yes—for the moment." It would be foolish to run too far ahead of current Service and political opinion, or to ignore the great weight of reactionary, but none the less sincere, opposition to reform which is to be found in every great public Service. Yet there are three further steps which should be kept in mind.

The first concerns finance. Now that the political responsibility for Defence has been placed fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the Minister of Defence, it might be better if he were made financially accountable to Parliament for the vote as a whole. Effective Parliamentary control of Defence expenditure will not be easy so long as there is a divorce between political and financial responsibility. However, it is unlikely that any such change will be made save under pressure from Parliament, and in the meanwhile a heavy responsibility falls upon the Treasury who are left as the only effective guardians of the taxpayers' interests in this important field.

Secondly, there is the future of the Ministry of Supply. Both Mr. Nigel Birch and Mr. Shinwell have come down in favour of outright abolition, and both speak with authority. It may be that a compromise would be better. The case for the Ministry rests partly on the argument that so much war matériel is common to two or more Services that it would be wasteful to allow each to carry out its own research and development, and partly on the past failure of the War Office and Air Ministry to cope with the huge expansion in output that was necessary in both World Wars. The latter argument no longer applies if we accept that any future global war would be fought with nuclear weapons. It would thus seem that weapons and equipment which are mainly used by one Service, e.g. armoured fighting vehicles by the Army and aircraft by the R.A.F., might with advantage be dealt with by the Service Department concerned, as has always been the case with warships and naval equipment. On the other hand rocket missiles and radio equipment should continue

to be handled on a joint Service basis, but by a supply section of the Ministry of Defence under a Minister of State rather than by a separate civilian ministry.

Thirdly, there is the possibility of rehousing the three Service staffs within the Ministry of Defence. According to rumour this was at one time contemplated, and strong views both for and against such a change have been expressed. Here, too, there is room for compromise. It is sometimes overlooked that the Naval, General, and Air Staffs each fall into two distinct parts. There are divisions which deal with planning, operations, and operational intelligence; that is to say with the higher direction of war. There are other divisions which deal with tactics, with weapon development, and with training; that is to say with matters which are primarily the domestic concern of their own Service. Day to day contacts between officers of these two parts of the Staffs are seldom necessary, but the tactical and training divisions do need day to day contact with the personnel and material departments of their own Ministry. It would thus seem wrong to move them.

On the other hand, a strong case can be made for extracting the Planning and Operational divisions from the Service Ministries, and rehousing them as a single integrated staff within the Ministry of Defence. The fact that this would mean that the professional heads of the Services would move to the Ministry of Defence is not quite so revolutionary as is sometimes suggested. They could, after all, retain their seat on the Board or Council of their own Service, and they could retain a room and an office within their own Service Department. Indeed, a reform on these lines might even obviate the need for a separate Chief of the Defence Staff.

These are all speculations for the future. In the meanwhile the Government are to be congratulated on having taken a great step forward and, what is equally important, an agreed step forward. At last the country has a central Defence organization which is easy to understand and in which the chain of command is clearly defined. Let us leave it alone for the time being, and wish all success to those responsible for making it work.

THE NATURE OF THE COMMUNIST THREAT

By MAJOR A. GWYNNE JONES, M.C.

IT is a frightening fact of our daily life that all that lies between us and a total war of unimaginable desolation is the 'balance of terror'—the possession by the great Western nations of weapons which, by the dark threat of universal annihilation, deter the Communist nations from an attempt to impose their will and their system of government upon the world by armed force. In building up the power necessary to constitute such a deterrent, we have brought into being a force which, in the event of war by miscalculation, would destroy so much of the world that any thought of 'winning' such a war can only exist in the minds of academic strategists or of megalomaniacs of the Hitler school of *Weltmacht oder Niedergang*.

The policy of the deterrent, with all its implications, has in the past been widely misunderstood; but with the Government White Paper of February, 1958, came the uncompromising and explicit statement: "the strategy of N.A.T.O. is based on the frank recognition that a full-scale Soviet attack could not be repelled without resort to a massive nuclear bombardment of the sources of power in Russia." Thus a stark fact, long fully appreciated by Service planners, has finally been unequivocally declared. The reaction has been a climactic frenzy of controversy—much of it ill-informed, some of it profound and reasoned. On the one hand there has been a good deal of self-conscious casuistry about the exact moment in the pattern of aggression at which the 'massive retaliation' would be unleashed; and on the other the passionate reasoning of Earl Russell, the flamboyant propaganda of Mr. J. B. Priestley, and the ballots at the universities—a tremendous upsurge of frightened revulsion against the weapon which was used to end the last world war and which to many people now threatens an end of the world itself.

The most tragic aspect of the balance of terror is that it has been brought about by a basic misconception, by an obsession on the part of Western politicians and strategists that the threat from Soviet Russia was, and is, one of overt military action. The reaction to the danger of Communist expansion has been governed by an outmoded concept which has related the threat of Marxism to the conventional threat of military dictatorships—a concept which cannot be supported by a study of the Soviet Union or of the theories and ideologies which lie behind it.

There are indications now that there exists a growing realization that the only hope of escape from the burden of fear lies in courageous and imaginative diplomacy, in using the nuclear stalemate to seek a lessening of tension and a *modus vivendi* which will enable us to 'co-exist' in peace and with a measure of co-operation. There are those who believe that this realization is long overdue. Indeed, as long ago as 1948, Dr. Charles Malik, in a speech delivered on 23rd November before the Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, said:—

"But if the clash is coming, as Communist dogma has been teaching for 30 years, postponement will serve only to allow both sides to prepare better. This is the frightful meaning of the present arms race. Postponement has significance only if it is utilised to induce those fundamental changes in position which may avert the clash."

In the intervening years, in spite of the death of Stalin, little progress in "inducing fundamental changes in positions" seems to have been made. The policy of 'brinkmanship,' the obsession in the West with Russian military strength,

and the international fencing match on the subject of a 'summit' meeting, have brought us to a position where we are faced with the alternatives of continuing a lunatic arms race to its logical conclusion of total, annihilating war, or of seeking, by all means at our disposal, some sane and civilized way out of the apparent *impasse*. The process of removing tension and mistrust will be a long and difficult one, and in planning it those responsible will have the advice of many authorities and experts on the future policy of the Soviet Union. It is, therefore, of interest to examine the foundations upon which such advice may be based.

From the time of the Revolution until March, 1953, the policy of the U.S.S.R. in internal and external affairs was, to all intents and purposes, based on the Stalinist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. Up to the time of the death of Lenin, the brief interlude of Trotsky, and the subsequent accession to power of Stalin in 1925, Russia had been too occupied in the urgent business of consolidating the Revolution to formulate a coherent national policy.

Stalin's view of the aim of the Revolution was set out in a series of lectures on the foundations of Leninism delivered at Sverdlov University in the beginning of April, 1924. In one of these lectures, dealing with strategy and tactics, he delineated the three stages of the world revolution. The first and second stages occupied the period from 1903 to October, 1917, and they were concerned with the overthrow of Tsarism in Russia and the withdrawal from 'the imperialist war.' The third stage, from 1917 onwards, is the one which now particularly affects us. Stalin said that the objective of this stage was: "to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a base for the overthrow of imperialism in all countries."

The Stalin concept further postulated that the establishment of world Communism could only be achieved by a policy of armament, constant international tension, particularly tension between the West and the peoples of Afro-Asia, and the provocation of a split amongst the Western nations. This concept was based on a belief that the West would be unable to stand up to a period of prolonged international tension, the burden of armament expenses, and the pressure of public opinion, especially amongst the people of Afro-Asia.

To Stalin, as to Lenin and Marx, war was not an intelligent instrument of policy, and it was to be employed only as a last resort. As Lenin wrote, and Stalin quoted in his lecture on strategy and tactics: "To carry on a war for the overthrow of international bourgeoisie, a war a hundred times more difficult, protracted, and complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states, and to refuse beforehand to manoeuvre, to utilise the conflict of interests (even though temporary) among one's enemies, to refuse to temporize and compromise with possible (even though temporary, unstable, vacillating, and conditional) allies—is this not ridiculous in the extreme?"

The basic concept of Leninism was one of infiltration. The aim was to strengthen the Revolution in Russia and then, by the employment of flexible Marxist tactics, to draw the remainder of the world into the Communist orbit. "The victorious proletariat of one country, having expropriated the capitalists and organized its own socialist production, would stand up against the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in these countries against the capitalists . . ." Only in case of extreme necessity was there to be resort to armed force.

When Stalin died in 1953, many people in the West expected some miraculous change in the policy of the Soviet Union, forgetting, as Dr. Malik has said, that "*to ask of Communism to change its nature, without satisfying the need to which it is a response, is to offer the world not bread, but a stone.*" The Malenkov faction, although they made certain changes in outward appearances, such as the amnesty to criminal offenders, the promises of penal code relaxations, and the adoption of an apparent 'new look' in foreign policy, were, in fact, not departing in any essential from orthodox Stalinism.

The arrival of Mr. Khrushchev and his rapid advance to a position of pre-eminence may have brought a change of tactics but, if so, it is likely to develop into nothing but a return from the intransigent dogmatism of Stalinism to the flexibility and tactical resilience of true Leninism. This may represent an astute appreciation by Mr. Khrushchev of the value of the Lenin myth as a political expedient or it may represent a true reversion to the first principles of Leninism—a possibility which is supported by the continued influence in the Central Committee of Mikhail Suslov, the fanatical doctrinaire who is believed to be especially responsible for controlling the activities of foreign Communist parties. Whatever the reason, it must be clear that we should expect the policy of the Soviet Union to follow the pattern of Marxism-Leninism even more closely in the future than in the past.

Indeed, the conditions for the successful implementation of such a policy have been created by the Western Powers themselves. Their obsession with the military threat has led them into a programme of armament and nuclear weapon development at the expense of the resources which would enable them to withstand a political and economic offensive. While creating a formidable military machine in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other regional collective pacts, the West has increased its vulnerability to the spread of world revolution by 'peaceful' methods.

For Mr. Khrushchev, the ideological reluctance of Marx and Lenin to use war as an instrument of revolutionary policy is now reinforced by considerations of expediency. The development of nuclear science and the parity of nuclear weapons has made war not only an unwise course but an act of abysmal folly which can only result in universal devastation.

Soviet Russia still has as her ultimate goal the domination of the world by Communism, but the third stage of the Revolution can now go forward, protected from armed interference by the nuclear stalemate. Already the first signs of this are evident inside Russia and throughout the world, and it is not difficult to estimate the way in which Russian policy may develop. There are schemes to raise the standard of living and the material and cultural welfare of the people of Russia; the process of strengthening the hold of the Communist Party on the machinery of government continues; and together with this consolidation of the Revolution at home there exists a policy of political and economic offensive designed to exploit the weaknesses of the free world in these fields. At the same time, while posing as the champions of peace and co-existence, the Russians will always be prepared, in the event of war by miscalculation, to inflict immense destruction on the countries of the West. In order to trace the possible trends of such a policy, let us see how they are taking shape in the internal and foreign policies of the Soviet Union.

The main aim of domestic policy must be to increase the material and cultural prosperity of the country. This was, of course, the original basic aim of the Revolution. In the original Marxist concept the Revolution was to be a sudden and rapid development, with initial success in a highly organized industrial state—

Germany—followed by the spontaneous spread of its success throughout the rest of the world. In the event, the cradle of revolution was Russia, a vast, undeveloped peasant community. As Lenin himself said: "In Russia, the dictatorship of the proletariat must inevitably differ in certain particulars from that in the advanced countries, owing to the very great backwardness and petty-bourgeois character of our country . . ."

The industrial development of the Soviet Union has been restricted by economic limitations and by the intervention of a world war, and by the suspicious dogmatism of Stalin. In the future one can expect a renaissance of the Leninist dynamic, beginning with rapid developments in industry, technology, agriculture, and social structure.

The measure of industrial progress in any State is the rate of production. Productivity is increasing rapidly in the Soviet Union and is now second only to that of the United States. Agriculture, too, is making dramatic progress. In spite of, or possibly because of, the agrarian collectivization of the first decade of the Revolution and the brutal 'liquidization' of the *Kulaks*, the immense agricultural potential of the U.S.S.R. is still largely undeveloped; but there are vast schemes afoot in Russia to increase production still further and to remedy the disastrous state of agriculture.

The three most important measures are the decentralization of economic control, the deployment of industry by regions, and the opening up of hitherto undeveloped areas. The centralized system of control was designed for an under-developed economy, and Khrushchev has been quick to see that it is obsolete. The deployment of industry on a regional basis comes as no surprise after Khrushchev's speech to the XXth Congress. He has appreciated that the organization of industry is unbalanced. The great preponderance of raw materials lies in the east of the Soviet Union. It is wasteful and uneconomic to transport these raw materials to existing industrial areas in the west. The centre of gravity of industrial development is therefore moving to the east, where self-supporting areas are being developed. Here, too, in Siberia, a vast 'virgin lands' agricultural development programme has begun with a drive for wheat production. Khrushchev has promised, some think rashly, that by 1960 the Soviet Union will have caught up with the United States of America in the production of meat and milk. The measure of Soviet potential in agricultural development is clearly indicated by a report of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, published in February of this year, and reporting, since 1950, great strides in mechanization, a 30 per cent. increase in the area of land under cereals, and an increase of 19,000,000 tons in the milk yield.

Increase in industrial and agricultural productivity will bring its own immediate benefits to the people of Russia. Their material standard of living will be raised, an improvement which the Soviet Government aims to underline with a policy of shorter working hours, increased wages, an extension of the '*Stakhanovite*' system of incentives, and improvements in housing and health services. In this way the Government of the U.S.S.R. hopes to achieve a standard of living which will stand out in sharp contrast to that of the workers in the 'capitalist' countries, threatened by inflation and the intolerable burden of armament. The contrast will serve to underline for the people of Russia the alleged advantages of the Communist way of life, and to provide for the peoples of the uncommitted and under-developed countries a significant and unmistakable example.

For the cultural welfare of the U.S.S.R. there appears to be in present day Russia an equal concern. Since the death of Stalin the people of Russia have become

intellectually conscious and critical. The educational system has always been geared to providing a basic education to millions of people who would previously have been left to wallow in illiteracy. The recent emphasis on scientific and technological training has had results for all the world to see.

Observers who have visited the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin—men such as George Sherman and Edward Crankshaw—have been impressed with the new-found enthusiasm of the Russian people for reading—and if the literary diet of a nation is any index to its cultural level, the progress in this sphere has been as rapid as that in more material aspects.

As Mr. George Kennan has pointed out in his Reith Lectures on the internal Soviet scene, the West has no need to quake before the spectacle of Soviet economic progress. We should indeed view with pleasure and relief any measures in the Soviet Union which lead towards mature political institutions, cultural development, and civilized standards of living. In any case, even if it were desirable, there is nothing that we can do about the internal processes of the U.S.S.R. What we can do is to react intelligently and with vision to the behaviour of the Soviet Government when, secure and progressive at home, it turns its attention towards the next item on the Communist agenda—the spread of its doctrine throughout the world.

The pattern of Soviet expansion is already clear, programmes of economic aid, subtle political offensives, and everywhere intense exploitation of the inability of Western Powers to offer to the uncommitted countries of the world an alternative to the materialist philosophy of Communism.

One of the main articles of their foreign policy is disarmament. They attempt by psychological warfare, by intense diplomatic activity, and by a series of appeals to the bewildered emotions of ordinary people, to bring about abolition or control of nuclear weapons. The removal of the nuclear weapon as a threat would return Soviet Russia to a position in which her superiority of manpower and conventional forces would be decisive in any conflict, limited or global. The natural sequel to such nuclear disarmament would be a further campaign aimed at dismembering the Western military alliances (N.A.T.O., S.E.A.T.O., the Western European Union, and the Baghdad Pact). The Russians may safely advocate such a policy, since the Warsaw Pact is simply a commonwealth of Communist-dominated States, and its nominal renunciation would have little or no effect upon the solidarity of the Communist republics. The effect of such dismemberment to the West, however, would be to lay each free country open individually to economic and political offensives.

The political offensive in foreign affairs follows two main themes: sympathy for the nationalist aspirations, real or imagined, of small countries, and encouragement for 'progressive' or extreme left wing movements in democratic and uncommitted countries. The encouragement of nationalist aspirations, and implied or explicit condemnation of Western 'colonialism,' enables Soviet Russia to pose as the champion of small countries seeking to be free from capitalist domination. Already this policy has been successful in Egypt and Syria (the new United Arab Republic) and there can be little doubt that the influence of Soviet foreign policy will be a decisive factor in the future of Indonesia, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Cyprus, Malta, and Kenya. There will be, too, attempts to foster and inflame the nationalist susceptibilities, at present non-existent or latent, in the peoples of Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq,¹ Iran, the Philippines, and the South American

¹ This article was written before the recent revolt in Iraq.—*Editor.*

States, and to detach these countries from the Western sphere of influence. The success of Russian diplomacy in Egypt and Syria has shown clearly the menace of the words of Lenin, "the way to destroy the West is to alienate it from Asia."

In those countries where nationalism is not a potential ally of Russia, Communism itself may be made to take its place. In many of the countries within the Western orbit there is a strong Communist movement; and in most countries there is a Communist movement of some sort. Where Communism is strong the Soviet policy is to encourage the active development of revolution by subsidy and political infiltration. Some of the effects have been seen in France and Italy. Where the Communist movement is weak and unsupported, the aim is extensive penetration of trade unions and other workers' organizations, and not directly applied political pressure.

Simultaneously with political infiltration the U.S.S.R. aims to extend its influence by economic means, by capital investments all over the world, and by floating loans to uncommitted countries. In addition to the obvious advantages to Russia of an extension of her world trade and financial influence, every economic success for the Communists is a reverse for the West. This is particularly true of oil. The oil supplies of Russia are now, and are likely to be in the future, sufficient for her needs and those of her satellites, but Britain, America, and France, in spite of the Sahara development, are bound to rely to an increasing extent upon oil from the Persian Gulf and the Arabian peninsula. Nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is too far away to affect this issue materially, and the dependence of the Western Powers on Middle East oil presents Russia with an opportunity to disrupt our economy by gaining control, through economic infiltration, of those Middle East countries which either produce oil or provide facilities for its transit to the West.

Wherever the interests of Communism and the free world clash, this single-minded process will continue. In Malaya, Indonesia, North Africa, in Little Rock, Arkansas, in Sakiel and Valletta, in Cairo, Qatar, and King Street, London, the Communist offensive is on—now. This is the vital fact which we must all absorb. The possibility of war by miscalculation is a real one; the policy of disengagement is no academic irrelevance; the students of Oxford and Cambridge are right to be concerned for their future; but amidst all the traffic of ideas about graduated deterrence, the validity of the nuclear threat, and the establishment of 'nuclear-free zones,' we should remember that the real of work Communist expansion is done with ideas and not with bombs.

There are those who, sickened and appalled by the possibility of a world laid waste, now say that they would sooner live under Communism than fight a nuclear war. Unless we lift our eyes from the shadow of the bomb and look clearly at the real dangers, they will have no choice—we shall one day find ourselves living under the shadow of slavery, with our expensive and much discussed missiles pointing uselessly and mockingly towards Moscow, which is not only the capital city of Russia but the dynamic centre of an idea that can destroy us all without a single megaton explosion.

THE NAVAL CRISIS OF 1909 AND THE CROYDON BY-ELECTION

By G. J. MARCUS

THE decade preceding the first World War was distinguished by rising tension between the powers, ominously recurring international crises, and warlike preparations on a scale unprecedented in history. It was the last phase of the era which has become known as the 'armed peace.' With each successive crisis the powers accelerated and intensified their preparations.

The ubiquitous fear and suspicion which then overshadowed Europe like a thundercloud had originated in three main causes: the irreconcilable Franco-German antagonism which was the legacy of 1870-1, the rivalry of Russia and Austria for the hegemony of the Balkans, and—a crucial factor from 1908 onward—the naval shipbuilding race between Germany and Great Britain. Through the operation of these three factors the Continent had become a powder-magazine which a spark might presently ignite. Any of the ensuing crises might well have supplied that spark, and the last of the series actually did so.

It had been a cardinal principle of Bismarck's foreign policy that friendly relations with Great Britain were not to be jeopardized by any challenge to her sea power. These counsels of caution were now rejected by his successors. The goal of Tirpitz's ambitions was the creation of an immense German fleet which one day would be able to dispute the mastery of the seas with the British. The German Navy Bill of 1900 provided for a huge shipbuilding programme extending over a period of 20 years. Such a programme, if carried out in its entirety, would make Germany at least the second naval power in the world. Its purposes was plainly set out in the preamble to the Bill: "In order to protect German trade and commerce only one thing will suffice, namely, Germany must possess a battle-fleet of such a strength that, even for the most powerful naval adversary, a war would involve such risks as to make that power's own supremacy doubtful." The challenge to Great Britain was unmistakable; and though at the outset no great alarm was felt in this country, the British Admiralty in the next few years took steps to meet the new situation arising in the North Sea.

The German Navy Law of 1900 marked a turning-point in the history of European relations; slowly but surely the rift between Germany and Great Britain widened. Other developments, like economic jealousy, played their part in producing this estrangement. But the crucial factor was the growth of the German fleet. The work was pressed forward with unrelenting energy. Not since the days of Colbert had a European government set to work steadily, systematically, and effectively to develop a great sea power. At the same time the rapid expansion of the coastal fortifications, harbours, docks, canals, arsenals, factories, plant, and machinery of the Reich kept pace with the intense activity of the shipyards. The gigantic German steel industry, centred mainly in Essen and Dusseldorf, advanced from strength to strength. Within a very few years Anglo-German naval rivalry had become one of the major issues in international politics. No longer was our greatest political danger the combination of the French and Russian navies but, as Winston Churchill was later to declare, "a very powerful homogeneous navy, manned and trained by the greatest organizing people of the world, obeying the authority of a single Government and concentrated within easy distance of our shores."

The early 1900's witnessed a revolutionary advance in the design of battleships. Hitherto capital ships had mounted a mixed armament of heavy and medium calibre. The development of long-range firing necessitated a uniform 'heavy gun' armament, hence the all-big-gun ship. The *Dreadnought* (17,900 tons), constructed with unprecedented speed and secrecy at Portsmouth in 1905-6, represented a radical departure from the accepted practice. She carried no secondary armament of medium calibre and her main armament comprised ten 12-inch guns, mounted in pairs in hooded turrets. She could fire eight of these heavy guns on the beam against her predecessors' four; ahead or astern she could fire six, her predecessors only two. Not only could she outrange in the heaviest guns every existing type of battleship, but she also had the advantage of superior speed (21 knots). This high speed had been made possible by the introduction of turbine engines.

The same era saw the advent of a new type of capital ship. The *Invincible*, like the *Dreadnought*, was largely Fisher's¹ creation. She was designed on similar lines but, sacrificing armour to speed, represented the first of the battle-cruiser class, fit to lie in the line of battle. She carried four turrets only instead of the *Dreadnought's* five and was protected by 7-inch armour instead of 11; but she had a speed of 26 knots.

The German Admiralty was taken completely by surprise. From the summer of 1905 until July, 1907, the keel of not a single capital ship was laid in Germany. Then four dreadnought battleships, the *Nassau*, *Westfalen*, *Rheinland*, and *Posen*, and one battle-cruiser, the *Blücher*, were laid down. The naval armaments race between Great Britain and Germany entered upon a new and more critical phase. In 1908 the Reichstag voted an increase of about 20 per cent. in naval construction. Public opinion in Great Britain was becoming anxious. "The real cause of the political tension," the German Ambassador, Count Metternich, had observed to the Wilhelmstrasse in 1906, "is not commercial rivalry, but the growing importance of our Navy." The struggle centred around the strong personalities of Tirpitz and Fisher.

The programme laid down under the Cawdor-Fisher régime—four dreadnoughts a year—should have secured an ample margin of superiority for Great Britain. It was estimated that before the end of 1909 we would have nine dreadnoughts—six battleships and three battle-cruisers—while Germany would have only three. This would give us a lead which it would be practically impossible for our rival to overtake. By departing, however, in July, 1906, from this programme, Campbell-Bannerman's Government had lost us the comfortable margin of safety which we would otherwise have enjoyed. As Great Britain reduced her naval construction, so Germany increased hers. In 1905 we had built four capital ships, and Germany two; in 1906 we had built only three, and Germany had increased her programme to three ships; in 1907 we had further reduced our programme to two ships, and Germany had further increased hers to four ships. By the time of Campbell-Bannerman's death in April, 1908, it had become apparent that the policy of slowing down our rate of construction, in the hope of inducing Germany to do likewise, had signally failed.

The year 1908 witnessed something like an epidemic of German spy stories. The entire British Press appeared, indeed, to have the espionage peril badly on its nerves. Up and down our east coast inoffensive German waiters and commercial

¹ Admiral Sir John Fisher was First Sea Lord from October, 1904, to January, 1910.

travellers found themselves regarded with sour suspicion, the correspondence columns of most of our leading newspapers were full of highly coloured reports, and credence was being given to the most extravagant alarms. The following year there were to be similar rumours of German airships. Towards the end of September, 1908, Loulou Harcourt² complained in a speech at Lancaster about the "half cowardly, half chauvinist" tone of the popular Press. At Wyndham's Theatre the following January *An Englishman's Home* was playing to packed houses. Later there appeared a play called *Invasion*. As a few years earlier, fear of a German descent on England was agitating the public mind. Field-Marshal Lord Roberts declared publicly that such a project was quite practicable. "Everyone talks of the possible invasion of England by the Germans," the Princess of Pless wrote in her diary that year. "Some believe it, and some call it hysterical rot."

The gravity of the international situation in the winter of 1908-9 did nothing to allay these apprehensions. In October Austria, with the support of her German ally, suddenly and without warning announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia, the champion and protector of the southern Slavs, was peremptorily called upon to recognize this high-handed action. Confronted with the prospect of imminent war with both the Germanic powers, the Russians were constrained to submit to the Austrian demand. In addition to the Bosnian crisis, there were the Casablanca incident and the German Emperor's notorious *Daily Telegraph* interview to heighten public anxiety.

In consequence of certain disquieting evidence which reached the Admiralty during the winter months, McKenna, the First Lord, early in 1909 demanded a larger shipbuilding programme. There was reason to believe that the Germans were preparing to accelerate their 1908-9 programme.³ Some of the facts were common knowledge and freely discussed in the Press. It was well known in engineering circles that the productive capacity of Krupps and other great German firms was expanding; also contracts had been allotted in advance of the vote in the Reichstag. There was, moreover, a continuous flow of secret reports from our agents on the Continent pointing to an acceleration in German shipbuilding. Such explanations as could be extracted from the Germans were regarded by the Admiralty as unsatisfactory. Our margin of superiority had now become so narrow that the possibility had to be faced that Great Britain might be taken by surprise and actually outstripped by her rival.

Already at Scarborough, the previous autumn, Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, had spoken plainly of the vital importance of our naval superiority. "There is no half-way house," he observed, "as far as we are concerned, in naval affairs . . . between complete safety and absolute ruin." "As to Navy Estimates," Grey later reminded Morley, "do remember that the critical time must come about 1912. If we err at all we must err on the side of safety: we must be in advance rather than in arrears; for the former error is repairable, the latter is not."

During the first three weeks of February, 1909, an absolute deadlock prevailed in the Cabinet. For, while the country was becoming increasingly alarmed about what was beginning to be widely recognized as the German peril, and the Conservative press was clamouring for a larger shipbuilding programme, the left wing of the Liberal party and the bulk of the Liberal press simultaneously criticized the

² First Commissioner of Works (1908-10).

³ For an assessment of the evidence furnished by H. H. Mulliner, of the Coventry Ordnance Works, see Woodward, *Great Britain and the German Navy* (1938), pp. 481-4.

Government for building too fast. McKenna was strongly opposed in the Cabinet by Lloyd George⁴ and Winston Churchill,⁵ with Morley⁶ and Loulou Harcourt in support. After much discussion and a threat of resignation from both McKenna and Grey, a compromise decision was reached on 24th February and embodied in the Naval Estimates which McKenna presented in the House of Commons on 16th March.

"We do not know," the First Lord declared, "as we thought we did, the rate at which German construction is taking place. . . . We anticipated that work on the 1908-9 programme would begin on four ships in August, 1908. The preparation and collection of materials began some months earlier. We now expect these ships to be completed, not in February, 1911, but in the autumn of 1910." Further, McKenna went on to observe, the collection of materials, and the manufacture of armament, guns, and mountings, had already begun on another four vessels belonging to the programme of 1909-10, and the Admiralty would have to take stock of a new situation, "in which we reckon that not nine but 13 ships may be completed in 1911, and in 1912 such further ships, if any, as may be begun in the course of the next financial year or laid down in April, 1910." The Government was therefore bound to take steps to meet the possibility that Germany might have 17 dreadnoughts in the spring of 1912, and not 13, as in the official schedule. In the circumstances it had been decided to accumulate materials for four additional ships during 1909. These four additional ships would be laid down in April, 1910, if there were evidence of German acceleration during the winter of 1909. That would give us a strength of 20 dreadnoughts in March, 1912, as against Germany's 17. If there were no acceleration of the German programme, the four 'contingent' ships would not be laid down until a later date.⁷

Formerly the attendance at Parliamentary debates on the Naval Estimates had been small and naval questions generally had aroused little interest, but of late there had been a marked change. That day the chamber was crowded in every part and members on both sides were keyed up to a high pitch of expectancy as they sat tense and silent, with grave and anxious faces, intently listening to McKenna. The First Lord was followed by Arthur Balfour, the Leader of the Opposition, who declared the programme submitted by the Government to be utterly inadequate. He was of opinion that Germany might have, not 17, but 21—perhaps even 25—dreadnoughts in 1912. The next speaker was H. H. Asquith, the Prime Minister, who supported the estimate made by the Admiralty. His tone and manner deepened the impression made by the previous speakers. When the Prime Minister sat down a strange silence fell upon the shocked and anxious House.

On the day following Arthur Lee,⁸ who was the Opposition's chief spokesman in defence matters, pressed home the attack. He maintained that the Government had only themselves to blame for the position in which they found themselves. They were now reaping the results of their own parsimony and procrastination. Their policy had been one of deferring expenditure and piling it up for the future in

⁴ Chancellor of the Exchequer (1908-15).

⁵ President of the Board of Trade (1908-10).

⁶ Secretary for India (1908-10).

⁷ Hansard, *The Parliamentary Debates*, 16th March, 1909.

⁸ Lee, when Civil Lord of the Admiralty, had in 1905 made a truculent speech in the course of which he declared that the Germans ought to be forbidden any further expansion of their fleet and, that if it came to war, the German fleet would be wiped out "before they had time to read the declaration of war in the newspapers."

the hope that something might turn up. And in his belief it had been both the inspiration and the justification of this supreme effort by Germany with which we were confronted today. (*Cheers.*) In the early years of the existence of the present Government there was an almost complete lull in shipbuilding, produced largely by the advent of the *Dreadnought*. That lull was spent by us in pilgrimages to The Hague and in travelling through Elysian fields dreaming of universal disarmament. But in Germany it was spent in creating, organizing, and perfecting the greatest system of ship-producing plant which the world had ever seen, and which would enable the Germans to catch up all past delays and launch themselves upon a revolutionary period of acceleration. Towards the end of this historic debate, on 23rd March, the Opposition tabled a vote of censure, and Asquith restated the Government case in a speech of surpassing lucidity and power. "On behalf of the nation," he said in conclusion, "I make this appeal to believe that, whatever party is in power—I do not care which it is—the first care of every British statesman who is worthy of the name is to maintain intact, unassailable, unchallengeable, that naval supremacy on which our independence and our freedom depend."⁹

"A wave of consternation swept the country. It was widely recognized that we were faced with a crisis of the first magnitude. "Yesterday's debate on the Naval Estimates," said the *Irish Times* on 17th March, "was, perhaps, the most important which has taken place in the House of Commons within living memory." By the *Daily Telegraph* the situation was compared with 'Black Week' of nearly 10 years before. "Seldom has so profound an effect been so instantly produced," said *The Times*, "as has been produced throughout the country by Tuesday's debate in the House of Commons." "We had believed," *The Times* leader continued, "with no qualm or disturbing doubt, that our Navy, and our capacity to build and equip ships for it more rapidly than any other power, justified that confidence. The figures cited by Mr. Lee in yesterday's debate were not only disquieting, but positively startling. They show that, should Germany go on accelerating her already accelerated programme, there is no obstacle to her doing this, as one had formerly supposed there was, in the limitations of her manufacturing resources."

The important and influential group of newspapers controlled by Lord Northcliffe—*The Times*, *Observer*,¹⁰ *Daily Mail*, *Evening News*, *Globe*, and *Mirror*—were well to the fore in what the Ministerialists described as 'the propagation of fear.' The *Daily Telegraph*, *Scotsman*, *Western Morning News*, and other Conservative journals expressed hardly less alarm; but the *Yorkshire Post* and *Glasgow Herald* were more restrained. It was not only the great national dailies and the major provincial journals which devoted entire pages, columns, paragraphs, and leading articles to the Government's statement and the ensuing debate; but also a whole host of minor county and suburban papers, and distant organs like the *Cornish Echo* and *Shelland News*. Robert Blatchford's *Clarion* lived fully up to its name and reputation, and *Punch*, as usual, rose to the occasion.¹¹ The Opposition press was

⁹ Hansard, *The Parliamentary Debates*, 17th and 23rd March, 1909.

¹⁰ The *Observer* at one point seemed to be leaning perilously over towards the advocacy of a preventive war.

¹¹ On 24th March a cartoon appeared in *Punch* entitled "Copyright Expires," showing an argument between an Englishman and a German dressed as seamen. *German tar*. "'We don't want to fight, But by Jingo, if we do, We've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money, too.'" *John Bull*. "I say, that's my old song." *German tar*. "Well, it's mine now."

unanimous in supporting a large shipbuilding programme, and not a few of the Ministerialist papers were shocked by these revelations. "We may take it as proved," the *Daily News* admitted on 17th March, "that Germany has contrived to hasten her building and to advance her programme." "The prospect is enough to fill economists and social reformers with despair," said the *Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury*, "but the force of Mr. McKenna's plea that national safety must be ensured at all cost is not to be denied." The *Manchester Guardian* hoped that the four 'contingent' ships could be included in the 1910-11 programme.

As the distinguished German historian, Erich Brandenburg, has declared, "a great many exaggerated and inaccurate statements had been made in the English Press and Parliament as to the strength of German armaments." Certain journals of the 'yellow press' had fairly let themselves go and these had done a good deal to inflame public feeling; also the Conservative leader, Arthur Balfour, was certainly not at his best when dealing with intricate statistics. But even by the Government's own showing a most alarming situation had arisen. The struggle centred for the most part on the matter of the four 'contingent' ships, or what the *Daily News* called "the accelerated quartette." Soon the war-cry of the navalists, *We want eight and we won't wait*, ran from end to end of the kingdom. "The panic about the Navy does not subside," the *Daily News* commented on 22nd March, "it is rising more and more loud." Even the little children were singing in the streets:

"Eight, eight, eight!
We won't have less than eight!
So we'll smash 'em flat
If they won't give us that!
WE WILL HAVE EIGHT!"

The naval crisis was endlessly discussed in buses and railway carriages, in West End clubs and country pubs, in theatre foyers and on factory floors, at football matches, trade union meetings, and market ordinaries, in the common-rooms of schools and Universities, in messes and canteens, at house-parties and race-meetings, on city pavements and on village greens—in a word, in all the diverse groupings and gatherings of society which go to make up British public opinion. "Till this moment," Gooch sums up, "the *Flottenpolitik* had been an anxiety; henceforth it was a nightmare."

The crisis in Parliament coincided with another in the Navy, which for some years past had been reft by a violent schism. Both Sir John Fisher's reforms¹² and his *Dreadnought* policy had been adversely criticized. His methods had not infrequently aroused bitter resentment. To belong to Fisher's following—or, in the language of the wardroom, "to be in the Fishpond"—was regarded as indispensably necessary for promotion. The opposition to the Fisher régime was headed by Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, a most popular and distinguished officer who was also, at various periods, an M.P. In 1907 there occurred a number of incidents, of which

¹² Fisher's major reforms, apart from his educational innovations as Second Sea Lord, comprised the introduction of the nucleus crew system, the scrapping of obsolescent warships, and the re-distribution of naval forces.

the most serious was the famous 'paintwork' signal.¹³ This brought the feud between Fisher and Beresford and their respective partisans to a head. By the summer of 1908 it was known that the First Sea Lord and the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet were no longer on speaking terms,¹⁴ and the vendetta between the rival factions had reached such proportions that it threatened to undermine the discipline of the Service. On 23rd March, in accordance with the Admiralty's order, Beresford hauled down his flag at Portsmouth and proceeded to launch an unbridled attack on his old chief.

The naval crisis of 1909 was accompanied by an intensification of the Press campaign against Fisher. "The sole responsibility for the fact that in a few months Great Britain will be in a more vulnerable position than she has been since the battle of Trafalgar belongs to the First Sea Lord," said the *Daily Express* on 20th March. "... If he had threatened resignation when an unsatisfactory naval programme was being prepared he would have forced the hands of the economaniahs." "We do want to ask very clearly where 'Fisherism' is leading us," the *Spectator* remarked a week later, "and whether its latter developments have had a good effect upon the Navy. Though we say it with deep regret, we can hardly doubt that the fierce controversies which have raged in the Navy for the last four or five years have done a good deal to injure the *moral* of the force."¹⁵

It is interesting and instructive to trace the course of the naval issue in the Croydon election campaign,¹⁶ which covered the fortnight or so that elapsed between the debate on the Naval Estimates and the Conservative vote of censure on 29th March. When the naval crisis first arose the candidate adopted by the Croydon Conservatives, Sir Robert Hermon-Hodge, had been absent in Madeira. On his return to England, on hearing of the disclosures made by McKenna and the ensuing debate, Hermon-Hodge added an allusion to the urgency of maintaining our naval supremacy as a postscript to the statement of his political views which he had prepared for the information of the Croydon electors. The introduction of the naval question was not of his seeking, he afterwards declared, but he added, "It is idle to imagine that a question of this tremendous and paramount importance, which is discussed in every newspaper every morning and in every Englishman's home every night, could be excluded or ought to be excluded from the consideration of those who have placed upon them the responsibility of expressing their opinion by their votes."

¹³ On 4th November, 1907, Beresford, then in command of the Channel Fleet, had ordered the curtailment of exercises so that ships could be painted and generally made spic and span for the forthcoming visit of inspection by the German Emperor. Sir Percy Scott, the gunnery expert (then Rear-Admiral of the 1st Cruiser Squadron) promptly cancelled all gunnery exercises and made a signal to the captain of the *Roxburgh*: "Paintwork appears to be more in demand than gunnery, so you had better come in, in time to make yourself look pretty by the 8th." For this Scott was publicly reprimanded by Beresford on board the flagship; but he was not superseded by the Admiralty—a fact which Beresford attributed to Scott's being 'in the Fishpond.'

¹⁴ As Lee observed in a letter to *The Times* on 6th July, 1908.

¹⁵ *The Morning Post* and *Standard* were also strongly anti-Fisher. On Fisher's side were ranged most of the Ministerialist press, as well as *The Times*, *Daily Telegraph* and *Observer*, and the two influential Service journals, the *Army and Navy Gazette* and *Naval and Military Record*.

¹⁶ The seat was rendered vacant by the sudden death of the member, H. O. Arnold-Foster.

On Croydon there presently converged all manner of societies, leagues, and movements, representative of almost every known shade of political, economic, social, and even religious opinion—the tariff reformers, the Conservative Association, the League of Young Liberals, the Fabian Society, the Imperial Maritime League, the Liberal Association, the Primrose League, the woman suffragists, and the Navy League, as well as such picturesque freelances as Messrs. Hunnable and Stewart Gray. The Liberal candidate, J. E. Raphael, though personally well liked in the borough, found himself severely handicapped by three major factors. In the first place, though he was himself a convinced supporter of women's suffrage (and Hermon-Hodge a determined opponent of it), Raphael was at once made the target for virulent abuse of the suffragettes, headed by the indefatigable Mrs. Pankhurst, in accordance with their policy, "Keep out the Liberals." Secondly, the decision of the local Labour party to nominate a candidate was a serious blow for the Liberals. Above all, the nation-wide outcry concerning British security at sea weighted the scales heavily against Raphael.

On 18th March, F. E. Smith, the rising hope of the Conservative Party and one of the most brilliant debaters in the House, opened Hermon-Hodge's platform campaign before a large and enthusiastic audience. He declared that the Government's proposals for dealing with the present naval crisis were totally inadequate. It had fallen to Croydon, he said, to be the first to pronounce on the difference of opinion which had arisen as to the shipbuilding programme, and he offered the electors a short and simple motto for the election, "eight more dreadnoughts this year." This advice was received with loud cheers, and the speaker then passed on to the advocacy of tariff reform.

The Liberal *Croydon Times* deprecated this "dragging the Navy into the cockpit of politics." This was a favourite charge of the Ministerialist press. *The Times*, however, adopted a rather more realistic approach to the matter. "However doubtful responsible men may be of the wisdom of introducing the Navy among the ordinary topics which are discussed at by-elections," said the paper, "the present signs indicate that, with or without their countenance, it is going to be a very considerable issue in the Croydon fight The people themselves demand that the Navy shall be discussed on the platform and at the street corner meetings, and tariff reform itself would seem to be in danger for the moment of falling into second place."

The prognostication of *The Times* was justified in the event. Though the tariff reform poster might be prominently displayed in the 150 miles of streets comprising the borough of Croydon, it was the naval issue which invariably aroused the keenest feeling. Forcing itself inexorably to the front, it made this particular election campaign the most fiercely contested, the rowdiest, and the most exciting in the history of the borough. "We all wish to see the Navy placed outside the sphere of party politics," Hermon-Hodge observed on his arrival at Croydon on the 21st, "but the Government by their failure to maintain our naval supremacy have forced it upon us as a party issue, and therefore Croydon is bound seriously to consider the naval question and to vote upon it." Day after day organized bands of youths paraded the streets, chanting, "We want eight dreadnoughts," instead of the usual slogan, "Tariff Reform means taxing the foreigner." Over and over again Liberal meetings were interrupted by the familiar invocation, "*Dreadnoughts, Dreadnoughts, Dreadnoughts!*"

In vain the Croydon Liberals struggled against the current. "I will be no party to extravagance, panic-mongering, or stirring up strife among nations," Raphael had declared on 19th March. Ministerialists soon found whether they liked it or not that they were obliged to dwell more and more on the naval issue. At the Public Hall, Croydon, on Saturday, 21st March, Masterman¹⁷ vigorously defended the Cabinet's naval policy against its critics. "At the present moment this country is absolutely invulnerable from invasion," he argued. "We have got a fleet which in essentials is very nearly equal to those of all the powers of the world put together." Speaking on behalf of the Liberal candidate on the following Tuesday, Macnamara¹⁸ likewise devoted a large part of his speech to the Navy. "You are asked," he declared, "to believe that the trident—the sceptre of sea-power—is slipping from John Bull's grasp. It is not slipping from his grasp, and we Radicals do not mean that it should." The Croydon Liberals eventually gave up trying to play down the naval crisis. "The Navy, and tariff reform, continued to be the principal, almost the exclusive, topics," the *Croydon Times* reported on the 24th. "All the parties have been obliged to recognize that the Navy is certainly one, if not the chief, of the issues upon which the electors mean to vote."

Throughout the campaign the conduct of the candidates and their respective agents was exemplary, but the same could scarcely be said of some of the partisans skirmishing on the wings. Raphael in particular suffered severely from the recurrent sallies of these irregulars. On the evening of Friday, 26th March, a big Liberal meeting held at St. Peter's Hall, South Croydon, nearly broke up in disorder. A gang of men and youths had stationed themselves at the back of the hall and systematically interrupted the speakers. In the end a dozen or more were thrown out into the street, and the meeting was able to continue.¹⁹ Towards the end of the week the rowdiness increased. It was apparent, too, that a good deal of money was being spent in various undesirable directions in the course of the campaign, though not by the official party organizations.

"The whole borough reeks with oratory of the wildest character," declared the *Croydon Advertiser*. "Bands of boys have marched up and down Croydon streets for a stricken week with everlasting uproar, groaning, cheering, and hooting; babes and sucklings have thronged the pavements distributing 'literature'; paid stumpers have yelled themselves hoarse and almost speechless." Every available square yard of hoarding, wall, and fence was plastered over with pictorial posters extolling the rival merits of Free Trade and Tariff Reform, Old Age Pensions and a strong Navy; the pavements were scrawled with chalk inscriptions, "Votes for Women" and "We want eight and we won't wait"; in the town-centre prudent proprietors had boarded up their shop-fronts. Katherine Street, it was observed, presented a spectacle more like that of a country fair than the quiet thoroughfare which it usually was. Large crowds wandered nightly from pitch to pitch seeking amusement and entertainment, with numerous pickpockets busy in their midst.

On Saturday nights in the early 1900s the principal streets of Croydon and the neighbouring suburbs were a mixture of market and music-hall where, in the light of flaring naphtha torches, stalls were set out with a wide range of commodities and all kinds of variety turns from fortune-telling to sword-dancing. But on this particular week-end the usual street carnival was altogether eclipsed by the most

¹⁷ Under-Secretary of State, Home Department (1909-14).

¹⁸ Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty (1908-16).

¹⁹ *The Croydon Guardian and Surrey County Gazette*, 3rd April, 1909.

fascinating show of all—a political ‘free for all.’ The Suffragettes had brought down a number of ex-prisoners from Holloway gaol, among them the redoubtable Mrs. Pankhurst and her daughter Christabel, whom they embarked in a smart motor-charabanc, and, with drags and motor-cars, paraded triumphantly through various parts of the constituency, marching with colours flying and drums beating to an enthusiastic rally at the Empire Palace Theatre in the afternoon. On this Saturday evening, 27th March, Katherine Street, “the cock-pit of Croydon,” was a scene of “wild and whirling disorder,” the turbulence of Thursday and Friday culminating in a perfect orgy of rowdiness. In the course of the proceedings an unfortunate Free Trade speaker was bundled in a dustbin and deposited in a Tariff Reform van amid the exultant yells of a war-band of hilarious youngsters sporting Conservative colours.

As the evening wore on the noise continued to increase until Katherine Street was one continuous roar of oratory, cheering, and booing, accompanied by the ceaseless squealing of penny trumpets, clatter of rattles, and ringing of handbells. “Late in the evening,” the *Croydon Times* observed, “the ‘storm-centre’ shifted to the corner of George Street and Park Lane, where were situated Mr. Raphael’s Central Committee Rooms. Here for two hours a great crowd swayed and shouted, booed and yelled, while party colours rose and fell like flotsam and jetsam on the waves of the sea.” There had been no such night as this, as the *Daily News* remarked, since Mafeking night. It was calculated that at least 300 meetings were held in the constituency on the Saturday. Hermon-Hodge’s final meeting was held that night at the Public Hall before an enthusiastic audience. It was certain, the candidate declared, that had the election been fought on Tariff Reform, the Licensing Bill, the alien question, or the upholding of the British Constitution, Croydon would have been won by the Unionist Party. “But beyond that,” he went on, “I appeal to you, not only as a Conservative, a Unionist, and an Imperialist, but as an Englishman to Englishmen, to let every Englishman outside Croydon know what you think about the action of the present Government in neglecting our first line of defence.”

On the afternoon of Monday, 29th March, in a packed and expectant House of Commons, Lee rose, amid loud Conservative cheers, to move the vote of censure. He maintained that, if only the Government had adhered to the “moderate and reasonable shipbuilding programme laid down in the Cawdor Memorandum,” this danger which was alarming the whole nation would have been avoided altogether. The German Government, he declared, had built up in an incredibly short time, “by long premeditation, forethought, minute organization, and immense financial sacrifices,” the greatest shipbuilding plant perhaps the world had ever seen, and he ended a strong and closely reasoned speech by demanding that “at all times and at all costs we shall maintain a complete and even a crushing superiority over the one power which alone of all powers has the means to overwhelm us in these islands if it is able to challenge our superiority in home waters.”

Sir Edward Grey replied for the Government with one of the greatest speeches of his career, and one which created a deep impression on the House. He began by saying that the House and the country were perfectly right to view the situation as grave. A new situation had been created for this country by the German programme. Whether that programme was carried out quickly or slowly, the fact of its existence made a new situation. When that programme was completed Germany, a great country close to our own shores, would have a fleet of 33 dreadnoughts. That fleet would be the most powerful the world had ever yet seen. “There is no comparison,” Grey declared, “between the importance of our Navy to us. Our Navy is to us what their Army is to them. (*Cheers.*) To have a strong Navy would increase their

prestige, their diplomatic influence, their power of protecting their commerce; but as regards us—it is not a matter of life and death to them as it is to us. No superiority of the British Navy over the German Navy could ever put us in a position to affect the independence or integrity of Germany (*Cheers*), because our Army is not maintained on a scale which, unaided, could do anything on German territory. But if the German Navy were superior to ours, they, maintaining the Army which they do, for us it would not be a question of defeat. Our independence, our very existence, would be at stake." Grey passed on to the general question of armaments and spoke of the immense sums which were being spent by the powers on what were, after all, "preparations to kill each other." Yet they could find no way of escape by the unilateral disarmament of Great Britain. "If we alone among the great powers," he declared, "gave up the competition and sank into a position of inferiority, what good should we do? . . . We should cease to count for anything among the nations of Europe, and we should be fortunate if our liberty was left, and we did not become the conscript appendage of some stronger power."²⁰

Meanwhile at Croydon polling was in full swing. Since nine o'clock that morning a continuous procession of motor-cars, carriages, waggonettes, and other vehicles of every size, shape, and condition had been winding to and from the 26 different polling-stations in the constituency. Everywhere were to be seen the party colours—the Conservative orange and violet predominating over the Liberal blue and white.²¹ Parties of Suffragettes drove around in motor-cars scattering clouds of handbills. Wherever one of the rival candidates appeared in the streets he was loudly cheered. "The gaiety of the scene was enhanced by the elaborate decorations on many of the vehicles," observed the *Croydon Guardian*, "and a somewhat novel feature consisted of cyclists—singly and in groups—carrying long sticks with pennons attached, using what influence they possessed to awaken voters to a sense of responsibility. Every now and then a dog with neck and tail adorned according to his owner's political views trotted unconcernedly in and out of the throng. As the day went on the crowds in the streets increased, and the town assumed the appearance of a public holiday. Hawkers came down from London selling party favours in the form of parasols, enormous rosettes, and nosegays, together with ticklers, hooters, confetti, balls on elastic, and paper caps; and these were bought eagerly by a public thoroughly imbued with the holiday mood."

From six o'clock onwards, North End, the High Street, George Street, and Katherine Street were filled with a crowd of steadily increasing dimensions. The weather was rather showery at first, but later on it cleared up. Both parties appeared to be frantic with excitement. Cheers for Hodge were followed by counter-cheers for Raphael, while gangs of rowdy young men paraded up and down chorussing "Hodge, Hodge, Hodge!" or "Eight more Dreadnoughts!" What with these cries and the ringing of bells, blaring of trumpets, and blowing of whistles, Katherine Street was a pandemonium.

After dark a searchlight began to play upon the crowds from an upper window in the High Street. For a while its rays fell upon a strange, incongruous figure, dressed in a white smock, with long dark hair falling upon its shoulders, and with gesticulating arms, which reared itself above the heads of the multitude on a stool. It was the eccentric Mr. Hunnable, whom the *Croydon Guardian* later likened to "Peter the Hermit preaching a last Crusade." For several minutes this apparition

²⁰ Hansard, *The Parliamentary Debates*, 29th March, 1909.

²¹ It is to be noted that by 5 p.m. the hawkers were confidently offering the Conservative favours as "the new M.P.'s colours."

swayed to and fro, "bending now this way, now that, in fierce, fanatical exhortation and entreaty." He was roughly handled by the crowd and was eventually led off out of harm's way by the police.

As the time approached when the result was expected the concourse became thicker and thicker and the excitement reached its climax. It is calculated that outside and around the Municipal Buildings there was collected a crowd of more than 20,000 people. Above the ear-splitting discordance of penny trumpets, rattles, whistles and handbells rose an insistent chorus, "Dreadnoughts, Dreadnoughts—eight more Dreadnoughts!" chanted in unison to the chimes of the Town Hall clock. The poll was declared at about half-past ten. The Mayor then appeared on the balcony over the entrance to the Town Hall. What he said was quite indistinguishable in the hubbub except the one word "Hodge." It was quite sufficient. Upon the word hats and caps were thrown into the air, sticks and umbrellas were waved, cheer upon cheer rang out into the night. A tremendous shout of "Hodge, Hodge, Hodge!" went up from thousands of throats. When the successful candidate came out on the balcony he was received with frantic cheering which went on uninterruptedly for half an hour to the accompaniment of *Rule Britannia*. The Conservatives had nearly doubled their majority.²² "Croydon's verdict," said the victor, "shows that the constituency stands, above everything else, for Tariff Reform and a strong Navy." In an interview with the Press his opponent declared that he attributed his defeat to "the wholesale working up of the naval scare," which had produced "a kind of 'mafficking' spirit throughout the constituency."

At Westminster the debate on the Opposition's motion continued. Late that evening Asquith supplemented the arguments which Grey had already put forward in a strong speech summarizing the Government's case. It was not, he maintained, a case for anxiety, but a case for precaution. But he thought he would have been lacking in his duty both to the House and to the country if he had not on such an occasion pointed out the emergence of two new and grave factors, both of them phenomena of the last 12 months—in the first place the acceleration, which was not disputed, of the German programme, and in the next place the enormous increase which had taken place during the same time in the productive capacity for ship-building purposes of the German nation.

Balfour pressed for a larger shipbuilding programme. He said he did not believe that the Admiralty could know all that went on in Germany and it was therefore madness to trust to a small margin of dreadnought power for our national safety. At this point the news of the Croydon election result ran along the crowded benches, and Balfour was interrupted by loud Opposition cheering. Resuming, the Leader of the Opposition demanded that power should be obtained to lay down the four 'contingent' ships without delay. The Government were dependent upon small margins. Although their information was, by admission, inaccurate, not blameably, but necessarily inaccurate, although they knew the capacity of Germany for building was as great as ours that we could not be sure of what they were doing, they yet depended on a margin of one in this year, a margin of two in another year, and a margin of three in a third year.

When the House divided the motion was lost by 353 to 135, a Government majority of 218. While the Ministerialists were congratulating one another the Opposition replied with cries of "Croydon!" and "Go to the country!"²³

²² Hermon-Hodge polled 11,989 votes, Raphael 8,041, and Smith (the Labour candidate) 886.

²³ Hansard, *The Parliamentary Debates*, 29th March, 1909.

The Conservative press was jubilant. "The voice of England has spoken at Croydon," said the *Daily Mail*. The *Times* spoke of the "decisive victory of Croydon," and the *Morning Post* of the "magnificent victory of Sir Robert Hermon-Hodge at Croydon." "Croydon was fought mainly on the issue of our naval supremacy," the *Irish Times* observed, "and on that issue the English working-man is sound." "The time for shilly-shallying and soft speeches has gone," the *Daily Express* declared. "We must have the eight Dreadnoughts, and we must have much more. Sir John Fisher must go, and all that Fisherism means. That is what Sir Robert Hermon-Hodge's magnificent victory at Croydon means—a mighty, complete British Navy that can face any possible combination and any possible danger."

The attitude taken by the bulk of the Liberal press was to deplore the fact that the Navy had been dragged into the cockpit of party politics. "In their eagerness to discredit the Government the Tories played upon the credulity and passions of the mob," said the *Daily News*, "and did not hesitate to throw the Navy into the party conflict." The Conservative *Daily Telegraph*, however, also saw much to regret in the fact that "for the first time for many years the Navy has been made the subject of direct antagonism between the two great political parties in this country." The consternation expressed by the British Press was echoed by that of the Dominions and Colonies. Already the people of New Zealand had volunteered to bear the cost of at least one dreadnought, and shortly after a similar offer came from Australia. When the Naval Estimates were voted on 26th July McKenna announced that the four 'contingent' ships would be included in the 1909 programme. This had a reassuring effect upon public opinion. As the *Annual Register* remarked, "All but the most extreme economists on the Liberal side were silenced." It is significant that less than 100 members voted against this programme.²⁴

The year 1909 was one of unprecedented activity in the British shipyards. The *Neptune* was laid down at Portsmouth in January; the *Indefatigable*, at Devonport in February; the *Colossus*, at Greenock, and the *Hercules*, at Jarrow, in July; the *Orion*, at Portsmouth, and the *Lion*, at Devonport, in November. The *Orion* was the first of the so-called super-dreadnoughts, with a waterline belt of 12-inch armour, mounting ten 13.5-inch guns in pairs—two pairs forward, two pairs aft, and the fifth pair right amidships—in superimposed turrets at different levels. For the advance from the 12-inch to the 13.5-inch gun Fisher was largely responsible. The *Lion*, which like the *Invincible* was a hybrid, was the latest and most powerful of the battle-cruisers. Her size was greater than that of the *Orion* (26,350 tons to 22,500), and her cost was £2,000,000 as against the *Orion's* £1,900,000. She was protected by a waterline belt of 9-inch armour and mounted eight 13.5-inch guns. Gun-power and armour were thus sacrificed to speed, 28 knots as against the *Orion's* 21.

In each of the two succeeding years McKenna had five dreadnoughts laid down, and the naval supremacy of Great Britain was thereby assured. The fact that in the first few critical months of the war of 1914-18 the Navy enjoyed an adequate

²⁴ The *Economist* continued doggedly to oppose the 'Big Navy' policy. On 24th April it spoke of the "artificial naval scare"; in March, 1910, it declared an Anglo-German understanding to be impossible while our Naval Estimates continued to show such great increases, and the following November observed that, "The German fleet which has struck such panic is largely imaginary, and the supposed danger is entirely due to the fact that our Admiralty invented the *Dreadnought* and fostered the impression that this type of ship had superseded all others."

margin of superiority over the High Seas Fleet was due in the last resort to the inclusion of the four 'contingent' ships in the 1909 programme.²⁵

The week before M. Blériot, the first aviator to cross the Channel, landed safely on the cliffs of Dover—i.e., from 17th to 24th July, 1909—a huge fleet of warships, comprising nearly 150 vessels, lay moored in the Thames from Southend to the Houses of Parliament. Below, in the estuary off Southend pier, lay the *Dreadnought*, flying the flag of Admiral Sir William May, and astern of the flagship the three dreadnought battleships *Bellerophon*, *Superb*, and *Téméraire*, the *Lord Nelsons* and the *Formidables*, and the three *Invincibles*. Huge crowds lined the wide pavement of the Embankment and Westminster Bridge to gaze at the submarines and torpedo-boats moored almost in the shadow of the Houses of Parliament. It was beyond question one of the most imposing spectacles which Londoners had ever beheld. On the 20th the Lord Mayor paid a civic visit to the Fleet, and on the following day 1,200 naval ratings marched through the thronged and cheering streets to a luncheon held in their honour at the Guildhall.

On the 27th, when the House went into Committee of Supply on the Navy Estimates, there was further discussion on naval affairs between the Government and the Opposition. The shadow cast by Blériot's successful flight over the sea two days earlier was too faint yet to make any impression on maritime affairs.

At the General Election of January, 1910, the Navy formed one of the main topics of discussion. At Haddington, on 3rd January, Asquith defended the Cabinet's policy of Imperial defence. The Navy also figured prominently in Balfour's speeches. At Hanley, on the 4th, the Conservative leader devoted a large part of his speech to the Navy. "We exist as an Empire only on sufferance unless our Navy is supreme," Balfour declared, "and I for one am not content to exist on sufferance." At Edinburgh, on the 10th, Grey devoted the greater part of his speech to the Navy and foreign relations. At Wolverhampton, on the 11th, Austen Chamberlain observed that, "Our naval supremacy had encountered such risks and perils such as have not been known within the memory of living man." "Liberal and Labour speakers argue that the Navy has been introduced as a stalking-horse," the *Spectator* commented a few days before, "but it is enough perhaps to point out that facts are facts and they do not cease to be true because they are put forward with some ulterior motive." The whole nation had, in fact, become Navy conscious as never before or since in time of peace. The age-old instinct of an island people warned them that the maintenance of their naval supremacy was for them a matter of life and death. From this time on the idea began to be widely held of an inevitable war between Germany and Great Britain.²⁶

The naval question was now the leading factor in Anglo-German relations. It was, indeed, the main and fundamental cause of a worsening of those relations. The naval debates in the House of Commons had been followed with absorbed and watchful interest by the *Tägliche Rundschau*, the *Berliner Tageblatt*, the *Kölnische Zeitung*, and other leading German papers. At an important conference held in Berlin on 3rd June, 1909, Bülow declared that judging from all the accounts he had

²⁵ In the early months of 1909 five 2nd class cruisers of the *Bristol* class were laid down—the *Bristol*, *Gloucester*, *Glasgow*, *Liverpool*, and *Newcastle*. These were followed by the four improved *Bristols* of the 1909-10 programme—the *Dartmouth*, *Falmouth*, *Weymouth*, and *Yarmouth*. Under the same programme 20 destroyers were also laid down.

²⁶ "I saw George Wyndham in Park Lane. He is pessimistic about the prospects of a German invasion, and thinks it is certain to happen in a few years. The only thing we can do is to go on building ships." (W. S. Blunt, *My Diaries*, 1883-1914: 18th March, 1909.)

received, "popular opinion in England is very seriously inflamed against us. People who must be taken seriously in England are predicting a war with Germany."

This was later confirmed by Metternich. He reported that though relations between the two countries had deteriorated through the Kruger telegram and the German attitude to the Boer War, "British feeling had not become thoroughly and seriously inimical till the moment when our [German] naval programme and public agitation on its behalf had given the English the constantly increasing impression that our fleet would mean a serious menace to England, for whom absolute security and supremacy at sea were matters of vital importance." Unfortunately for the future peace of Europe, the German Emperor as usual totally failed to understand the British attitude. On 11th June William II told Bülow that "the alleged English agitation about our new programme was simply bluff, for reason of English domestic policy. Such is the opinion of Admiral von Tirpitz, and His Majesty is in entire agreement."²⁷

In point of fact no acceleration of the German programme after the alarm of 1909 ever materialized. No more shipbuilding contracts were allotted in advance of the votes in the Reichstag, the German dreadnoughts of the 1908-9 and 1909-10 programmes were completed in accordance with the published time-table, and the fears which had been entertained for our naval ascendancy during the critical period of 1912-13 were not fulfilled in the event. Nevertheless, viewed in the light of certain statements which were made shortly after by Tirpitz and others, it would appear that the British apprehensions had not been without foundation.²⁸

Finally, from the British standpoint, a highly important by-product of the naval crisis of 1909 was the fact that the new programme substantially increased the Naval Estimates and, together with the recently introduced Old Age Pensions, was mainly responsible for Lloyd George's 'People's Budget.'²⁹ The then enormous total of £16,000,000 had to be found by new taxation, which imposed burdens hitherto undreamed of on income and property. In the violent controversy which followed, the Budget was thrown out by the Lords, which occasioned the dissolution of Parliament and the historic 'Peers v. People' campaign. The rapidly increasing expense of the Navy was a standing embarrassment to a Liberal Government anxious to implement its plans of social reform.³⁰ Tension both in the Cabinet and Parliament over these costly naval increases continued to recur during the last few years of peace.

²⁷ Prince von Bülow, *Memoirs* (1931), III, pp. 420, 426-7. See also *Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914*, xxviii. 97.

²⁸ *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, ed. Gooch and Temperley, vi. 244-6. "Count Reventlow, in the *Tägliche Rundschau* of 19th March, spoke of acceleration in the rate of building the ships of the 1908-9 and 1909-10 programmes as a 'matter of common knowledge'" (Woodward, *Great Britain and the German Navy* (1935), p. 229). This is confirmed by the reports of our Ambassador and Naval Attaché in Berlin: see *British Documents*, vi. 555-6, 581-3, 656-7. See also Woodward, *ibid.*, Appendix vi, pp. 489-94.

²⁹ In his famous Limehouse speech of 30th July, 1909, Lloyd George referred with telling effect to the exigencies of the shipbuilding programme. "We started building," he declared; "we wanted money to pay for the building; so we sent the hat round. We sent it round amongst the workmen and winders of Derbyshire and Yorkshire, the weavers of High Peak, and the Scotsmen of Dumfries who, like all their countrymen, know the value of money. They all dropped in their coppers. We went round Belgravia; and there has been such a howl ever since that it has completely deafened us."

³⁰ In 1901 the Naval Estimates had amounted to just under £31,000,000; by 1911 they exceeded £44,000,000, and still heavier increases were considered likely for succeeding years.

FORWARD THINKING IN THE BRITISH ARMY

By BRIGADIER SIR MARK HENNIKER, BART., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (RETD.)

THERE is danger lest complacency overtakes the British Army in regard to forward thinking. This possibly springs from the conditions that prevailed some years ago but which no longer prevail today. Formerly, almost any military expedient could be tried out in B.A.O.R., and a tendency grew up in those days to leave tactical experiments to them. People elsewhere were inclined to content themselves with the job in hand. That tendency was undesirable then, even though understandable, but it is wholly unacceptable today.

Today, manœuvres in Germany are much restricted by German civilian rights and sanctions. It is no longer possible to drive tanks and guns wherever one wants. Conditions, moreover, are likely annually to get more difficult. Some facilities in B.A.O.R. are excellent, but these facilities are becoming less and less a British monopoly; they must now be shared with an increasingly large German Army. Soon we shall find ourselves a junior partner in allotments of training areas, ranges, bridge camps, and so on.



While there are drawbacks in being a junior partner in the allotment of training facilities, there are far greater dangers inherent in being a junior partner in N.A.T.O. strategy. We find the British Army in Europe located by N.A.T.O. in a particular area and allotted a particular role. British Army thinking in Germany must therefore be conditioned by N.A.T.O. thought; and our genius for originality in methods of waging war is in danger of becoming atrophied.

A simple example will illustrate this tendency. Imagine a British Army in Europe located in Normandy instead of in Germany; four divisions held in N.A.T.O. reserve as a *mass de manœuvre*. Anyone can see how quite a different slant would be put on our military thought. There would be, for instance, the long approach march—by air perhaps; independent action on an enemy flank; perhaps a left hook by sea and air. All kinds of possibilities which cannot be contemplated today would reveal themselves.

From this example it can be seen that B.A.O.R., as at present deployed, is only a suitable setting for forward thinking in a limited tactical and strategic field. Moreover it is a field more suited to Continental 'man-power' armies than to our own.

One finds, too, that some weapons that are commonplace in other British commands find no place in B.A.O.R. This is, of course, no reflection upon the men at the top, for many of them are the very men who exploited these weapons elsewhere. It is an inevitable consequence of a British Army serving in Germany as a junior partner in a N.A.T.O. strategy.

Before making any suggestions, let us consider what arms there are for which we find no place in B.A.O.R. in peacetime. Here are some of them: airborne troops,

Special Air Service troops, Long Range Penetration forces, Royal Marine Commandos, frogmen, partisans, psychological warfare personnel, and so on. Then there is also the inter-Service element, so ingrained in an island race. The reader will readily think of more examples when once he frees his mind of trammels engendered by the land mass of Europe, even though that is where the fighting may occur.

New means of waging war abound in the Anglo-Saxon mind, but in the present B.A.O.R. setting it is difficult to see how many of them, except atomic medium artillery, can play a useful part. This is the really dangerous attitude into which we may find ourselves drifting.

If progress cannot be made in B.A.O.R., the reader may well ask the question : "Then what can be done ?"

Three thoughts occur. First, the British Army in Europe might be moved bodily from its present location to some more suitable place. This is probably politically unacceptable at the present time, though it might be possible later. The second possibility is to form an Experimental Force in (say) East Africa or in the deserts of Australia. This has the drawback of locating the force too far from London. London is the hub of the British Commonwealth, and it is from London that power derives and to London that most big decisions have to be referred. Moreover the climates are not temperate outside European waters and the effects of this are enervating. The third possibility is to form an Experimental Force in Britain.

There are drawbacks to experiments in England too obvious to mention here. But there are advantages as well. First, we have in existence in Britain elements of every conceivable arm, some of them T.A. Secondly, we have in Britain the centre of gravity of British military thought. Thirdly, our thought in England is uninhibited by N.A.T.O. Finally, the small size of training areas in Britain is not really such a drawback as might at first appear. In the last analysis the actual fighting area of any part of an Experimental Force cannot be very large. A few miles each way is not a bad size for one single battle to be fought by one single part of a smallish force. The deployment for battle and the manoeuvres may be done by sea or air ; and even when done by road it is not a fatal hazard to civilian life if the force is not too big. The actual firing of cannon was never done in the same place as the manoeuvring of troops and need not be now ; it can and must be done elsewhere. Moreover, if the commander is prepared to inoculate for battle only one part of his force at a time, the area required is not stupendous.

This seems to be the line on which to work.

Let no one think that this suggestion is in anyway an attempt to back out of our N.A.T.O. duties. Far from it. We are pledged to N.A.T.O. and in it our salvation lies. But while other nations can outnumber us in army manpower, they cannot contribute the amphibious and resilient forces which we from our island position are so well equipped to use. Ultimately it is envisaged that N.A.T.O. would appreciate the unique contribution that Britain could make in this way, and as a result B.A.O.R. would be released from its present role. It would once more take on the role that, until 1914, was regarded as traditionally British. This is the contribution which, it is suggested, we should make to N.A.T.O.

The suggestion, therefore, is to assemble an Experimental Force in Britain. It should be built on the existing command structure of, say, Salisbury Plain District.

It need not be very large, indeed it cannot be, but it should contain elements of every conceivable weapon and arm, whether Regular, T.A., or Reserve. It should think in the winter and perform in the summer. It should work in close conjunction with the Royal Navy and the R.A.F. It might occasionally be transported in whole or in part by sea by the Royal Navy for an autumn cruise, to do a landing and operate in a North African desert. When, and if, this is not possible, one part of the battlefield must be taken in isolation from the rest of the battlefield and located for purposes of training on an existing training area in England. The rest must be assumed to be going on elsewhere.

In the 1930s an Experimental Force was formed. It led the world in turning to warlike use four elements which few had seen how to combine before. Tanks, aeroplanes, lorries, and wireless sets were put into the hands of conventional troops, and the final product was the (then) irresistible *blitzkrieg*. Of course it would have been easier to have done all this under a Hitler, manœuvring over the heathlands of Silesia; but in fact it was done on the narrow roads of southern England. The Experimental Mechanical Force of the 1930s gives us an example. It is an example which brooks no delay in the following.

SOLDIER TO CIVILIAN

By

"O.R."



I

1947.—More explosions during the night. Am getting rather tired of this restricted existence behind barbed wire and the uneasy feeling when walking in the streets that the fellow behind may shoot you in the back.

Rather a disturbing mail today. After seven years of living in mother's house Jane wants one of her own and an end to this constant separation. We have only been together at odd intervals during one year out of the last seven. I can retire next year on a full lieutenant-colonel's pension and be my own master after 25 years of "Please, Sir" and "Yes, Sir."

Have tried to cheer Jane up with a long letter about retiring next year to the country to grow fruit. Why fruit I don't quite know. I have been reading everything I can get hold of on apples and they sound pretty easy on the whole. Some rather long, complicated chapters on diseases and spraying with extremely unpleasant chemicals, but have skimmed through these as I am sure care and good cultivation will render spraying quite unnecessary. Have even told Jane she can have a look round for a possible property of about four acres, although it would, of course, be quite crazy to think of buying anything without very careful inspection and vetting by an expert.

A much more disturbing mail this morning. Jane's sister has seen and strongly recommended a small property in Norfolk. The sellers want £1,000 more than I have said we can afford. But once Jane gets an idea she acts. I gather that she has persuaded her mother to lend her £1,000 and hopes to get the £400 deposit required from an aunt.

There is no going back now. Against all commonsense I have had to agree to the purchase of the Norfolk property as the sellers insisted on a quick decision as there were other possible purchasers. Or so they said! Am back behind the barbed wire again but only for some six months as I have sent in my papers.

My fruit farm to be is very attractive in many ways although I am sure we paid too much for it. A comfortable, convenient, thatched Tudor farmhouse with good outbuildings and a pleasant garden; about one and a half acres of sparsely planted old orchard (mostly cider apples) and a field of similar size which can later be ploughed up and planted with more apples.

* * * * *

1948.—This must be the hottest, driest summer since 1940. I have spent most of it digging holes for the 120 apple trees I am planting this winter in the old orchard. I wish I could afford machinery or labour to do the job, but consider my small

capital must be preserved as far as possible to tide us over the next three or four years. Have suffered much from thirst and blisters!

Great excitement! The apple trees have arrived and the weather is possible for planting. Some of them hardly resemble the drawing in the books of 'a good three-year-old,' but being no expert I do not like to send them back.

The weather has been frosty and the rabbits have started to de-bark some of the newly planted trees. I have read that two strands of specially treated string on short pegs put round an orchard will keep them out. Have already made and placed the pegs and wound the string, which came in skeins, into balls.

The anti-rabbit stuff smells awful. I tried dipping the string into it and then fixing it to the pegs but got into an indescribable mess. Decided to paint it on to the string after fixing and to make this easier heated some in a tin on the Aga. The tin leaked! If the rabbits dislike the smell as much as Jane we shall have no more trouble with them!

Finished making the orchard rabbit-proof yesterday. This morning saw a rabbit hop over the top string, and another I disturbed dashed straight through the two strands! About £4 and a lot of work completely wasted. Must now spend about £40 on netting, for rabbits can kill a number of young trees in a night.

* * * * *

1949.—The instructions in the books about pruning seemed simple. Standing in front of the tree with a pair of secateurs it seemed extremely complicated. Can only hope I have made a reasonable job of it. The lawns and garden are taking a lot more of my time than I expected.

The new apple trees are throwing out new shoots but a great number are being broken, or nearly cut through, by something. But cannot find this entirely unexpected pest in any of my books.

Some of the apple trees in the old orchard should bring in a few pounds, but apples will produce little additional income for three or four years. A neighbour having some plums to sell cheap, I decided to try bottling. After a lot of hard work, and some hard words with Jane about the mess in the kitchen and the impossibility of producing meals with somebody constantly interfering with the Aga, I produced some dozens of successful-looking bottled plums which I sent to my sister who is married to a housemaster at a large public school.

According to the books the orchard grass should be kept cut. I have tried to do this with a scythe but without much success. Geese are supposed to be wonderful grass croppers and can practically live on it. So I bought 20 at eight weeks old.

The orchard grass does not seem to suit the geese. They all lost weight rapidly so I have had to feed them on potatoes and some mash. They are now doing well but stripping the bark from any young apple tree they can get at and taking little interest in their main job of cropping the grass.

Distressing letter from my sister this morning. Many of the bottled plums I sent have blown their lids off and their contents all over the larder. Bitter complaints from her staff who are not prepared to clean up such messes in the future. Have written abject apology and have promised free replacements with different plums next year. Apparently bottling fruit is not such an easy money maker as I thought.

Have sold the geese for the Christmas market. The profit was about 10s. a bird. Ten pounds for quite a lot of work, and the orchard grass as long as ever. But I was sorry to see them go; they were chatty, friendly creatures.

* * * * *

1950.—Have had some real luck. Met a very pleasant fellow who runs a large fruit and mixed farm only a few miles away. He will let me have all kinds of fruit for bottling at grower's prices and will help me in every way he can. I could sense that he was pretty shaken by my old orchard; the trees too far apart, far too many different varieties, and last year's pruning not nearly severe enough. He insists that I must buy a mechanical grass cutter and a sprayer if I am to have a hope of success, and that the field must be planted as at present it is just a wasted asset. Obviously he is right, but what will all this cost?

The field has been deep ploughed by a contractor and the apples and gooseberries for it ordered. I don't like Cox's as they seem notoriously hard to grow but my expert friend insists that they are the most paying apple, especially for the small man.

Have decided that I ought to be able to make some profit with bottled fruit and have bought two stoves and sterilisers as it is quite impossible to do large numbers in the Aga. I calculate that I ought to be able to make 1s. profit on a 2 lb. bottle of preserved fruit. It sounds quite a lot, but not nearly so much when one realizes that 1,000 bottles must be sold to make £50.

We both, Jane especially, loathe the sight of an apple tree! We have planted 300 in the field. The lines are supposed to be straight; the kinks should not be so obvious when the trees are bigger. Now we have about 1,000 gooseberry bushes to plant.

I could afford only a hand-propelled Rotascythe (with engine-driven blades), but it does a marvellous job of work. The orchard grass is vastly improved already and both old and new apple trees seem to be thriving. Like all two-strokes it has its moods but one soon learns the cure for most of them.

Have sold 2,000 bottles of fruit so far but cannot be sure yet about the 1s. profit. Wastage is high with each variety of fruit at first as the temperature and time of heating for a good-looking result are different for every fruit, and even for different varieties of the same fruit.

An encouraging year on the whole. I can now get expert advice when needed; I have started to mechanize myself and make more use of the acreage; and the bottling looks like helping me along until the apples come in quantity. But I have had to draw on my small capital, and living expenses rise every year.

* * * * *

1951.—We now hate the sight of a gooseberry bush! But they are all in. We have been lucky with the weather and rather to my surprise I found I could average about 100 bushes a day while Jane could do between 30 and 40.

The field will have to be kept clean for the next three or four years so I have had to buy a small tractor for hoeing the weeds, and the necessary attachments for spraying. It is only one and a half horse-power. I hope it will be able to work this heavy land. I would have liked more power, but these unforeseen expenses are running my small capital down at an alarming rate.

This seems to be a bad season for scab. My apple trees are covered. The

spraying attachment works quite well, but it is slow, tedious work and the machine frequently bogs down when the land is really wet. It would take me three to four days to spray all my trees but the weather very seldom remains suitable for so long. In consequence essential spraying does not get done at the right time, and sometimes not at all.

The tractor hoes the weeds well but we have to do close to the gooseberry bushes and trees by hand. It takes a lot longer than I expected.

The apple trees now have some red spider as well as scab. It was obviously a great mistake to skimp the chapters on apple diseases! I have managed to keep the red spider in check with spraying but this very wet summer has been appalling for scab and it is going to be very difficult to keep it under control. There has been quite a good crop of apples on the old orchard trees and I have been lucky in finding buyers at fair prices.

The bottling is going well. I have sold about 4,000 bottles and the average profit is 1s. Lucky I thought of it.

On the whole an encouraging year, but all the money coming in has had to be paid out again on machinery and sprays, etc.

* * * * *

1952-53.—Two difficult years during which I have managed to produce enough gooseberries and apples to pay expenses, but little more. Scab and some rather inexpert pruning have led to canker, which is a most damaging disease and difficult to cure.

The young apple trees in the old orchard have started to bear but I made a bad mistake in planting so many different varieties. In spite of the book recommendations some sorts are unpopular in the market, and it is difficult to find buyers for small quantities.

The little hand tractor works well under reasonable conditions but is a 'man-killer' when conditions are difficult. A wet autumn and winter produces a mass of weeds which are really too much for a small machine. By adding my own small horse-power to that of the machine for short spells I have managed to clear the weeds each spring, but at considerable wear and tear to the machine and myself. The hand hoeing under the trees and gooseberry bushes has taken more time than we can spare, so I have had to employ two local women for this. They have worked very well and enjoyed it.

I now have seven hives of bees, built up by swarms from the original three hives I bought locally. In a good year they produce quite a lot of excellent honey, of which I am very fond and which sells at a fair price. But I do not like bees. Two hives suddenly turned extremely ferocious this summer and I had to beat a hasty retreat while taking off some honey. Bees also hate the smell of sweat, and on a hot summer's day attack me suddenly while I am working 100 yards or more from the hives. This is more than annoying and does not make for friendly relations.

Bees—one's own or the neighbours—help a lot to pollinate fruit blossom and to ensure a good crop but they do not bring in much money unless kept expertly in large numbers. To do this successfully you must really like bees. Mine now nearly look after themselves. If anything happens to them I shall hire hives just to pollinate the fruit blossom. It is a small additional expense, but in my opinion well worth it.

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1954-57.—The really astonishing thing to me is that we are still here. The gooseberries have given a reasonable, steady return and have been well worth growing. The old trees in the orchard which produced saleable apples have averaged fair crops over the years, and the young trees I planted are now giving some return. The bottling, too, has been a fair success, although high transport costs and purchase tax on the bottles is making the time and trouble less and less worth while.

The Cox's on the field have not yet done more than pay for the sprays used on them. Scab and canker, wet summers, and the difficulty of spraying adequately with a machine not really suitable for the job have all been against success. And a quite unexpected enemy has been the birds. Few Service people are troubled by anti-blood sport complexes, but few probably enjoy shooting small birds like tits and bullfinches. Yet these little devils become more and more fruit bud minded every year, and this winter have probably pecked out 50 per cent. of my gooseberry and apple buds. And not because they are hungry; it seems to be just a devilish delight in destruction.

Another quite unforeseen nuisance has been moles. There was no sign of them for the first four years. Then within a few weeks the orchard was a mass of molehills. Except that he eats very large quantities of worms, who are the farmer's best friends, the mole does nothing destructive. But the orchard grass has to be cut every three weeks during most of the summer, and before each cut the molehills must be raked down. This wastes a lot of time and makes a bumpy surface. I have tried poisoned worms and gas, but I am still raking down molehills.

The hand-propelled Rotascythe did a wonderful job on the orchard grass, but it took a long time and was heavy work. Now that the field with the Cox's in it has been put down to grass there are about three acres to be kept cut. So I have had to buy a self-propelled grass cutter, the cheapest I could find, but that is another £60 out of the farm's small profits, and in a year which produced the poorest apple crop since I came here. There is still no reasonably priced solution to the spraying problem.

Except for the bees we have not yet kept animals. In spite of many troubles for poultry keepers—there are even more for pig producers—we are thinking seriously about fowls. We shall have to start small, because there is so little money left, and build up quickly on profits, if any, because one does well to make 10s. per hen per year. That means keeping 200 hens to make £100. But you have got to sell about 4,000 lb. of good apples to make the same amount of money! And one frost in May may mean hardly an apple on the place.

II

Very soon a large number of officers and men from the Services will be starting on a new venture. For many reasons most of the other ranks will probably make a better job of it than the officers. Partly because circumstances will have given them a better background for the job, and partly because most of them will have some trade or skill for which somebody is willing to pay a fair wage. Few of them will have enough capital, or illusions about their own abilities, to risk self-employment in an occupation they know nothing about.

Both officers and men will be able to get more information than they can digest. Many will take it and probably be very glad later on that they did so. Others, especially officers, will have made up their minds just what they are going to do in

spite of any advice, or warnings about probable disaster. If they have a trade or hobby, like carpentry, on which they are really keen and which they have practised in spare time, they will have a fair chance of making an extra income of a few hundreds a year. Only a few hundreds, because one man is limited in his output and if he employs one or two men their extra earnings are almost entirely swallowed up by their wages. It is a case of working alone or running a small factory, and the latter requires a lot of capital and experience.

Lastly there will be a number of officers, to say nothing of their wives, who have a strange urge to do something on the land and a still stronger confidence that they can earn a livelihood on it without any previous experience whatever. There seems to be no logical explanation of this astonishing phenomenon. There always have been Service officers who have plunged light-heartedly into farming, smallholding, pigs, poultry, or apples, and there probably always will be. It will be a poorer Navy, Army, and Air Force when there aren't!

The diary summarized on the previous pages contains little fiction and is based on actual experience. The officer concerned considers that he is reasonably intelligent, reasonably diligent, and very willing to take advice. It is hardly a success story; on the other hand he is still self-employed! Some of the lessons he has learned may make things a little easier for other foolish fellows; the last thing he wishes to do is to dissuade them from their folly.

III

Having been pushed around from house to hut, and lived in lodgings or with relatives for many years, the retiring officer's wife will demand a home and wish to settle into it at the earliest possible moment. Unfortunately this is not usually the most sensible thing to do. If he wants to give himself a fair chance of success the sensible officer will apprentice himself for at least a year to a farmer, smallholder, fruit grower, or poultryman, depending on what he wants to do, and learn something about the job. He will seldom be able to do this where he finally wishes to settle, and in any case it is risky to buy land before knowing the soil or site requirements of the things you want to grow, or the animals you would like to keep. But in a number of cases the wife will win, perhaps abetted by a husband who refuses to go to school again, and the house and land will be bought with the least possible delay. But preferably not without a few precautions and a little thought.

Get the land vetted by the Local Agricultural Executive Committee. Not only will it report on the suitability of the land and buildings for the use to be made of them but they will also give full information on the grants available for converting farm buildings, hedging and ditching, drainage and water supply, etc., and how to apply for them. If you want to knock the homestead itself about a bit you will have to try to persuade the local council to pay part of the expenses.

Old houses are attractive. They appeal to the eye and to the senses; they have character, and an atmosphere which is generally pleasant and friendly. Unfortunately they have very serious snags, especially for those with little money to spare.

If the land is worth vetting so is the house—by a reputable architect. Old beams are very attractive and quite a number of beetles and woodworms love them. Old houses seldom have dampcourses and the ground floors are generally laid on the soil, but they are not necessarily damp. Avoid clay lump walls unless they have been roughcast. They are very expensive to maintain because they crack with changes in temperature, and once moisture gets into them they rapidly disintegrate,

especially during a wet winter with frequent night frosts. They are usually distempered and look very picturesque when newly decorated, but as the cracks must be patched with little delay and the result is most unsightly, this distempering is a recurring expense to the houseproud.

It is sad to have to decry thatch. Good thatch, wired to keep out birds, looks lovely and is a very efficient protection against cold and heat. But it may well prove a ruinous liability. There are a very few first-class thatchers left and their numbers decrease every year. It is also becoming increasingly difficult for them to obtain suitable straw, as the new varieties of corn, generally grown with artificial fertilisers, are too soft and too short for thatching. The best straw thatch will not last more than about 20 years and may well cost £200-£300 to renew. On the other hand good Norfolk reed thatch may last a lifetime and is even more attractive than straw. But it will cost even more to renew.

Strange creepy-crawly things like centipedes often inhabit old houses. They appear from time to time on the ceilings or walls and occasionally they fall off. They are quite harmless. Moths are also very fond of them and so are spiders, which help get rid of flies and mosquitoes but do not seem to catch many moths. Mice love them and will very often refuse to be tempted by cheese in a trap although there appears to be nothing else for them to eat. But never poison them. They die in inaccessible places and are a long, distressing reminder of a dirty deed.

If the land is right and the house sound and to your liking, do not yet make a final decision which is going to mean so much to the whole family. You will be spending most of your time working on the property, but some relaxation outside it will be essential for sanity.

It will be impossible to find out whether you are going to like the people round about, but you can at least check whether there are any by driving round the district and looking at the houses. Some country districts can be very lonely. Also it is a mistake to think that in these days of fast cars distances do not matter. Unless you are exceptionally energetic and sociable you will find it by no means easy to change and go out after a hard day's work on the land, especially if you have to drive very far. But if you start refusing invitations because they are too much bother you are heading for disaster. However happy the home a wife must get out of it sometimes and meet and talk with other people. Gossip in the village shop helps, membership of the Women's Institute and Mothers' Union, etc., helps still more, but they are not the same thing as a day out hunting or at a Point-to-Point, or a dinner party with friends.

The Rector will probably be very willing to tell you something of the social life of the district and also, unwittingly, something about himself. If the family includes young children, or children still at school, it will be more difficult to keep them contented during the holidays if there are no local children to play with. If there is an only child the problem is very much more serious. Schools must also be considered. If you can afford a boarding school and the children are old enough, distance is not very important. But if the nearest suitable school is 10 miles away, this means 40 miles motoring every day and the loss of an hour and a half of working time for somebody five days a week. Petrol for 6,500 miles costs quite a lot, probably more than the school fees. You may be very democratic and feel that the village schools are perfectly adequate. In many ways they are, but it would be only fair to have a talk with the teacher before making a final decision. The child's whole future may well depend on what is learned there.

Before finally deciding to buy, remember that it is almost always easier to grow or produce a thing than it is to sell it. If there is no local market for what you intend to produce, and it is not something which can bear the very heavy present-day transport charges, then it is worse than a waste of time to produce it. Visit the local wholesalers and markets. Talk to the people there and learn a lot in a very short time. Above all, avoid specialized trades unless you can get into the 'racket.'

IV

In spite of all doubts and warnings you are determined to try your luck on the land? Luck will be needed, quite a lot of it, but enthusiasm, hard work, and persistence are the main essentials for success. And, of course, good health. Insure the whole family against sickness. Theoretically you can be ill free of charge in the Welfare State, and draw sick pay, but it may not work out quite like that. In any case, if the inability to work lasts very long it may be necessary to pay somebody to do the essential work, and if animals are kept it will be inevitable.

Make a very careful, pessimistic calculation of your expected living expenses for the next three years, add 30 per cent. for the items forgotten and another 20 per cent. for inflation, and be quite sure that you have that sum in the bank. It must be in addition to the capital and running expenses for the same period for the job that is going to supplement the pension. If the venture is going to be into apples and soft fruit it would be wiser to make the calculations for five years.

If possible do not put all your eggs into one basket, and use all the buildings as well as the land. More money has often been made with pigs, poultry, mink, mushrooms, or rabbits, etc., in the buildings than from many acres of land. But not on the same farm. It is a great mistake to try to do too many different things at the same time because inevitably none of them will be done efficiently. Poultry and/or pigs can be combined well with a few acres of apples, soft fruit, vegetables, or flowers. On no account try keeping mink without first finding out whether you can bear to live with them!

There are very few luxury trades now, especially for the amateur. A luxury trade in this sense is one in which the turn-over is small but the profit on each individual article is large. To make much money now it is necessary to work on the Woolworth principle; a small profit on a large number of articles. This is very unfortunate for the self-employed man with a small acreage and very limited capital because he cannot produce in very large quantities. It also takes away some of the enjoyment from his work. A few hens and geese, even a pig or two, known as individuals by name and character, can be real companions. But 500 fowls in a box-like structure on deep litter, or in cages, are just a—nuisance, although they can bring in a very welcome addition to the pension.

Although it is essential to plan on this Woolworth principle, start small and expand, especially with animals. In this way mistakes will not mean ruination, and if existing buildings are to be converted to new uses you can do the necessary alterations yourself, and experience will probably mean improved design and cheaper construction at each stage. Before leaving the Services a course in building construction and maintenance would be well worth while.

Times change, and the old adage "What you do, do well" would probably now seem merely trite. But it is the golden rule for the small man on the land.

He cannot produce *en masse*; all his produce must be good so that he gains the best possible price for it.

Do not be distressed because the country people will look upon you as strangers for the first 20 years. In spite of this, provided you treat them at least as equals, they will be most helpful and friendly—up to a point. Do not press them beyond that point, and never try to preach to them. They may seem simple folk and know nothing of all the strange places and peoples you have seen in your Service wanderings, but they have a lot of sound commonsense and know much more about their individual jobs than you ever will about your new one. Remember, too, that some of them will have helped pay for that gratuity and pension without which you would never have been privileged to meet them.

You have been warned! You have no intention of altering your decision on that account? Then it remains only to wish you good health, fair weather, and good luck in your new venture.

TRENCH GASCOIGNE FIRST PRIZE ESSAY, 1957

By LIEUT.-COLONEL J. G. O. WHITEHEAD, M.C., R.E. (Retd.)

"The Communist Powers are conducting a determined drive for leadership of the under-developed peoples of the world by economic, cultural, and military influences and pressures. Discuss what they have achieved and give your views on the counter-measures which the free world should now take."

COMMUNISM has caught the free world divided. Its various achievements will be reviewed later, but for initial purposes are sufficiently well known. It has steadily ousted Western influence, from the Far East to the Mediterranean, wherever it has found divided interests and consequent weakness. The tide is still flowing, as witness the August success in Syria with its as yet unsettled effects upon the Arab world. Supersession of Western influence is not, though, to be regarded as a defeat of free world aims; until recently there has been no aim to defeat. Communist success has been infiltration into gaps in the rest of the world's moral front.

Now, at the end of October however, an Anglo-American declaration of common purpose has been made, closing one of the gaps, or partially so. It serves a grave need,¹ but there are other gaps. Moreover, although it provides an immediate aim, 'adequate security for the free world,' it is dealing only with the immediate danger. Security is a transient stimulus; human nature is apt to neglect its safeguards when troubles are past. Indeed, the false lull during what has been called the 'post-Stalin honeymoon' may have contributed to the lack of concert. We must not depend solely upon danger to bring us together. A more durable and ultimate aim is wanted, and one which will appeal to the many conflicting aspirations straining the free world.

Let us examine the Anglo-American declaration—

'Recognizing that only in the establishment of a just peace can the deepest aspirations of free peoples be realized, the guiding purpose of our deliberations has been the determination of how best to utilize the moral, intellectual, and material strength of our two nations (to) bring about conditions in which peace can prosper. One of the tasks is to provide adequate security for the free world. . . . The President and Prime Minister believe that the understandings they have reached will become increasingly effective as they become more widespread between the free nations. By co-ordinating the strength of all free peoples, safety can be assured, the danger of Communist despotism will in due course be dissipated, and a just and lasting peace will be achieved.'

This is a timely display of joint understanding and admirably phrased for the two nations; but before assuming that it will furnish a common purpose for the whole free world, let us look at it from the non-Anglo-American point of view.

¹ Cf. *The Daily Telegraph*, 7th October, 1957: "Divided We Fail"—'There has been a single guiding aim (in the Soviet Union). . . . The western world lacks it. . . . The result is dissipation of effort which is as striking as it is weakening. . . . What could not the Americans, British, French, and their European allies achieve if they were to work together instead of separately in the great military and scientific projects of our time.' *The Sunday Times*, 20th October: 'In the past 18 months international affairs have conspicuously deteriorated. To the causes of this nothing has contributed more than Anglo-American disunity. The machinery of closer unity is not easy to devise. The problem is not in fact primarily one of machinery. . . . It is the will that matters.'

Its tenor is a 'just peace,' which it seeks to attain by co-ordinating the strengths of all free peoples. But, we must ask ourselves candidly, will the free Asian and African peoples want to commit their military strength to maintaining the Western conception of a just peace? Will the Muslim world disregard the Israel problem? Will other Asian peoples endorse the exclusion of Communist China from our councils? Will the African peoples ignore the South African Union's colour policy? The questionable justice of these matters has been in Western hands for years, tacitly condoned; nor in the present Anglo-American common policy is there anything to indicate a greater readiness to modify our ways to meet the Eastern outlook (using 'Eastern' to imply the principal partners in the Asian-African continents). There is no good to be served by deluding ourselves that the neutralization of Russian military strength will bring the uncommitted free world into our fold; some much more understanding attitude towards Eastern aspects is needed—not merely sympathetic, but understanding; because, like it or no, we must admit that the Western point of view is not always right. Thus the wording of the declaration, as it stands, will not rally the Eastern world; some common aim has got to be found in which all can wholeheartedly unite.

Let us accordingly scrutinize a few of the terms often used in voicing free world aspirations. 'Freedom,' 'peace,' 'democracy,' and 'justice' seem to be a fair sample of our hopes. Firstly we will examine freedom and democracy. In Appendix I are extracts from several books giving the experience of Greek democracy and the remarkable parallel of modern ways. Its aim was freedom, under the belief that in that lay the secret of happiness. The fallacy is exposed; from it came the downfall of Greek civilization. Its lesson has been written earnestly—"Self-interest means ultimate disaster. . . . Let education encourage nationalism and even regionalism; but let every individual, every village, every group, every nation, learn to accept the basic truth that the passion for immediate self-interest must be 'quenched'; not necessarily because it is wrong, but because it is always dangerous and frequently suicidal." Hence the paths which we in the West suppose to be common-sense altruism are seen by the outside world as paved with self-interest. Is the outside world entirely wrong? The most vociferous Western elements to clamour for democracy's rights are those who themselves pursue self-interest most assiduously! We cannot expect other free peoples to combine with us over that aim.

Next let us consider peace as our object. Undoubtedly this is what we all want; but should it be regarded as an aim in itself, or as the natural outcome of sensible conduct? If made the aim itself, it is liable to involve the sacrifice of honour, as witness Western behaviour over Hungary and the evasion of applying sanctions before the last war. Some surer aim is called for.

Lastly justice: this perhaps gets closer to something for which all can unite, but as already shown, the Western application of it makes other peoples sceptical; possibly some more fundamental purpose, leading to it, can be found. Over this the R.U.S.I.'s initiative in holding a lecture and discussion on "Ideals the West is defending" deserves notice; it revealed the significant fact that in this country, let alone others, there is no accepted body of opinion 'able to speak with a united voice on the great moral issues of the time.'² Yet Communism is a moral issue.

The theme of this essay is, accordingly, to find a common aim upon which united policy can be built. It is as much a military concern as political, because Communism

² The very Rev. The Dean of St. Paul's, 12th December, 1956.

is an attack on human nature and destroys armed resistance through sapping morale ; it is constant attrition against the free world's way of life, with the ultimate aim of forceful domination instead of peaceful agreement. Every step is related to underlying force ; peace is no more than military strategy under a convenient guise.

There remains, though, another sometimes expressed object, anti-Communism. This must be dismissed as negative ; it defers to Communism's initiative in aggression and retains no positive purpose after any particular inroad has been countered. Nor is it convincing ; for Communism preaches in theory the very altruism the free world wants, it is Communism as practised that is the evil. So, leaving the question of our aim until later, and before reviewing what the Communist Powers have achieved, let us be clear as to what is the real issue between their code and ours in order that there may be no misapprehension over what ground has been lost, or over the measures required for its recovery.

In the first place we will abandon the jargon of -isms and -archies and -ocracies which fog current argument ; they are clouded with misconceptions bearing no relation to the meaning intended. Instead, let us reduce Communism to its simplest denomination. It is unscrupulousness cloaked as the common good. Its professed aims do not matter ; they are neither put into practice nor will they necessarily remain constant because, when their potency to cause unrest has been exhausted, some new fuel for discontent will be substituted. As we know, the Communists' device is to provoke revolt as an excuse for introducing their own armed force, a subtlety which cannot always be condemned because until human nature has changed there will always be occasions when forceful control is justified. It is the unscrupulousness in the Communist Powers' use of it which is the evil. Free world ideals on the other hand, in so far as the free world can be treated collectively, postulate scruple over behaviour ; the unstated aim is that sense shall govern ultimately, not force. And in corroboration the rule of parliamentary sense has been instituted, or the way prepared for it, wherever a Western flag has flown. This concrete action bespeaks the unvoiced ideal ; for it is through parliamentary rule that moral scruples exercise their sway in the opportunity given for public opinion to check injustice. The much maligned Western 'imperialism' has been in reality the moral law and order of parliamentary government (not always granted liberally, maybe, yet altruistically contemplated) and it is this which has been sacrificed to the parrot-cry of 'colonialism.' Its substitute, Communism, conversely strangles public opinion. Such is the background against which the Communist Powers' achievements have to be viewed.

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We will now turn to them. First and foremost comes China, whose 600,000,000 people are aligned with Russia against the West, a most formidable array whose example cannot but influence much of the rest of Asia. The following summary of a series of articles in *The Sunday Times* of August and September is given at some length because it seems to furnish a clue to the whole Asian future. China is now a unified nation under a strong central government which has reawoken in the people a sense of national pride and destiny. Materially they are better off than they were, and the overall picture is one of continuing progress and impressive achievement. It is also incomparably the most honest country in Asia, with the not insignificant sign that tips are not accepted, despite poverty. The rule of physical force has been changed to one of intellectual pressure, wherein perhaps lies the riddle of the future ;

people must conform with the party doctrine or else they are 'sent to Coventry' which proves an almost irresistible penalty. Even women have to forego individuality in dress; and there is no such thing as private life under the regime of supervision.

Against this the average Chinaman is happy to avoid having to take any responsibility, while comparatively few have known the lost pleasure of intellectual liberty. Whether the reputed Chinese love of individuality will rise above this rule of enforced conformity remains to be seen. The probabilities cannot be judged against western ideas; it is a matter of choice between the China of today and that of yesterday. All that can be known, so far, is that Communism is firmly established. The future, though, will not necessarily be Russian Communism; it may be a separate cult of Chinese Communism; because the people in general scorn and dislike the Russians. Peking is becoming the spiritual and dynamic centre of world Communism, and it can be guessed that there is growing respect for its authority and stature among non-Communist Asians, as well as racial satisfaction that an Asian nation should be taking this lead.

Thus, what has gained possession of China under the name of Communism is a powerful national spirit, hostile to the West because of past Western opportunism and lack of sympathy. Pride of race has caused the people to submit to a regime which, salutary though it may be, is not in accord with their natural ideals. Its overwhelming success has been impressive and enlightening; it has touched a note that previously was lying silent; but sooner or later the whole chord seems bound to become resonant again and Chinese Communism will evolve into something closer to the philosophy which has expressed the country's character for the past 2,500 years. That philosophy is identical with Western thought; and had not the West remained superciliously indifferent to the Chinese mode of expressing it, contemptuous of anything different from itself, the drift to Communism might never have occurred. Communism's achievement, it cannot be too strongly emphasized, has been to creep into a gap; the free world's counter-measures must be to regain Chinese confidence.

In South-East Asia the enemy is finding his greatest asset in the ill-advised Western urge for the hasty relinquishment of colonial rule (pressed with not always altruistic motives), and the political instability it has bequeathed, its good features having been withdrawn without being replaced, leaving a vacuum. It is true that standards of physical welfare have sometimes been bettered; but before condemning Western administrators the test of time must be allowed. For they were sensible and humane men: and their irrigation systems, roads, and railways all testify to a genuine desire to improve welfare. By letting the good that men do be buried with their bones, we help maintain the vacuum; and into it flows Communism.

In the Indian peninsula events have followed somewhat similar lines, but with less Communist success. None the less the creed is strongly entrenched in Ceylon and southern India and, should economic conditions develop adversely, there are weaknesses in the present governments of Ceylon, India, and Pakistan which might conceivably let it gain ground. Its existence is not a sign of change in national character, though, for the ancient native ideals are as strong as ever; it evidences insufficient harmony of outlook between West and East, rendering the remaining links with the West precarious. Communism exists there only for expedience; it is repellent to the peoples' natural convictions. But it poses as the champion of Asiatic nationalism, and although we know it to be nothing of the sort, it has touched a yearn which Britain was failing to satisfy. As a result the Communist Powers are

now established as an alternative source of material aid if Western benefits (moral and material) fall short of the desired total. Material requirements inevitably figure the more prominently because Western industry is the main source for them; but equally valuable would be a moral holdfast from which all those countries could draw strength to help internal stability while solving their domestic problems by themselves.

In the Middle East (here being used to designate Muslim Asia, from the Indus to the Mediterranean) Russia faces the most exposed spot on the flank of Western communications with the East, and can thus help raise the price the West must pay for Arab goodwill. What that goodwill comprises will be amplified; a newspaper verdict seems incontrovertible, "Success in the long run will come only to those who work with, and not against, the fundamental instincts and ambitions of the Arabs themselves."³

The four strategic features demanding Arab goodwill are these. Firstly, of geographic necessity European communications with southern Asia pass through the Middle East. Secondly, a large proportion of the fuel oil on which Western commerce depends is drawn from Middle Eastern territory. Thirdly, there is the sensitiveness of Arab nationalism, which is showing itself to be a keener inspiration than gold. The arbitrary imposition of a Jewish settlement upon Arab soil, and on the other side of the ledger the forcible expropriation of European rights in the Suez Canal, are mismanagements that only sober and generous sense can rectify. The fourth strategic factor is the fervour of Muslim faith, best summed up in Professor Arberry's preface to Sir Muhammed Iqbal's *Mysteries of Selflessness*, a Pakistani philosophy that magnificently expounds Muslim ideals and their contempt for Western political insincerity:—

"Islam and Europe stand poised against each other. . . . We live in dangerous times, and may well be heading for the greatest collision since Richard fought Saladin. . . . [But] if the present discord between Christianity and Islam can be so sensibly modified as to [remove dispute] from the perilous arena of emotion to the more tranquil debate of reason . . . it will become apparent that the area of agreement between the two faiths is very much larger than the area of disagreement, generating the reasonable hope that opposition may in time give way to co-operation. More especially is this likely to happen if Christians and Muslims realize soon enough, and clearly enough, that they are confronted by a common enemy able to destroy them together unless they resist him together."

* * * * *

Before leaving Asia let us sum up the position along the Communist Powers' periphery, and remark that Russia's successes in eastern Europe, where she has blatantly flouted the physical might and moral main of the whole free world, have exposed the great nations' disunity and resultant weakness to every people. Her action has also demonstrated her ruthlessness, it is true; but, as experience teaches, a *fait accompli* is quickly forgotten. Around the Communist Powers' borders, generally speaking, although their culture is unwelcome, their political influence is toyed with as a useful offset for Western bargaining; commercial loans or armaments are always available for the disgruntled. The rest of the world can see that the stable

³ *The Sunday Times*, 25th August, 1957.

elements in these bordering countries stand like a dam, holding back a flood of Communism ; but it is plain also that the dam's masonry is weak.⁴

Can the great Western nations produce the material capable of stopping the cracks ? Until now they have relied on gold, and gold has proved a misconception. This is the uncertainty confronting the uncommitted world. As a result it is a moot question for the more distant peoples whether to anticipate a flood of Communism breaking loose, and accordingly to align themselves with the winning side beforehand, or whether to act on the trust that the dam will keep intact. The rest of the world's stability depends very much on that of the Asian periphery peoples.

We will now turn to the African continent. From Egypt there flows a constant stream of propaganda inciting Africans against the Western world. That the Communist Powers could gain for themselves this forward base was due to a free world disunity that was by no means reluctant to watch Britain suffer commercial loss. The Communist bait of 'colonialism' was swallowed (from old grievance or present rivalry ?), resulting in hatred being let loose. What the enemy has achieved is not just the elimination of British and French influence ; it has been a victory for malcontent prejudice over sense.

With Cairo and its radio intact, Communism has been able to pursue its course of sedition in French Algeria, where it is now difficult to judge the local problem without bias, so bitter has been the taunt of 'colonialism' and so different are French ways from our own. Satisfaction can only be reached by both parties submitting to unprejudiced sense ; the problem lies in finding a body that will be trusted to pronounce a genuinely impartial opinion.

In West Africa the unedifying scene began to be enacted of autocracy seizing power under the sham of parliamentary rule, and forcibly silencing the better-minded section of the community. Optimistically these are teething troubles, and at the time of writing extremism seems halted ; but time has yet to tell the outcome.

In South Africa a breeding-ground for it is being created by the ungenerous colour policy of the Union Government. Once again the tale is not so much of what the Communist Powers have achieved as of what a free world people is failing to do, thereby driving its 'have-nots' into the enemy's arms. Here too, impartial sense is the only solution and the one which will answer the many divergent demands with the greatest justice and least hurt to anyone.

In East Africa the Communist inspired reversion to pagan superstition as an incitement to lawlessness has been checked, but presented to the world the plausible fallacy of land being wrested colonially from its rightful owners. Communism has cleverly detected a gap in the free world's moral front in that there is no agreed principle over what constitutes legitimate initiative in developing land being allowed to run to waste. In its absence, policy has been left to the conscience of individual nations ; and their accomplishments, no matter how beneficial to the folk of the land or to the world at large, have come exposed to the slur of selfish 'capitalism' or 'imperialism.' It scarcely needs remark that unbiassed sense can be found through history, applied with scholarship ; Communism's achievement has been to exploit the unmade study.

⁴ Jordan and Saudi Arabia have both discarded previous links with the West ; while in Iraq, "the number who still support the West is dwindling fast." *The Sunday Times*, 3rd October, 1957.

The course of this African survey has brought us back to the area where Asia and Africa meet, one which if it fell under the influence of a Communist Power would enable a stream of hostile corruption to flow into the latter. A map comparing the military situation of 1948 with that of today in that area has been published, accompanied by the observation, "The physical presence of Western forces has now been largely replaced by a network of agreements."⁵ In view of the fact that respect for agreements is hardly on the increase it would be wishful thinking not to suppose that the Communist Powers have made a militarily strategic gain in this quarter, and by the simple contrivance of denouncing 'imperialism.'

No sketch of Communism's achievements on the American continent will be made. United States' influence there is the stronger. The countries on which attention needs to be focused are those lying on the periphery of Communist Asia, and in particular on those at the gateway to Africa; any progress or retrogression of the Communist Powers' influence in them will be reflected further afield. The undeveloped peoples will take their cue from the Asiatic nations with traditions of ancient culture, whose resuscitation in the modern era of mechanical science will be followed with respect.

* * * * *

This, then, is the problem facing us. Communism's success has lain in infiltrating where free world interests are at cross-purposes; its aim is forcible domination, its spirit unscrupulousness. Against this the free world has no positive aim over which to unite, other than freedom which, as practised, is freedom for discord. An integrating aim has got to be found.

We will take a look at some of the principal matters over which there are divergent interests. There is competitive initiative over industrial production and commerce, in the capacity for which peoples vary by nature, thus giving rise to different levels of prosperity and arousing jealousies. There is the Western vogue of luxurious living in contrast with the Eastern principle of simplicity (nor is the West necessarily right).⁶ There is the rightful Indian ambition that India shall play "her historic role as the vanguard of higher knowledge in Asia."⁷ There is the equally rightful Muslim ambition for a Middle Eastern Islamic community. And there is the Western imposition of a Jewish colony on to Eastern soil in response to a questionable claim of creed. All of these bring about conflicting policies, disappointment, and bitterness; yet if the free world is to face Communism in concert, some common and over-riding aspiration must be found in which East and West, religions of all kinds, the socially austere or voluptuaries, capitalists and workers, everyone can unite.

Fortunately such an aspiration has by chance been bequeathed by the much maligned British imperialism. It is the word 'gentleman.' There is probably not a people or person today who does not claim the right to be considered a gentleman

⁵ *The Sunday Times*, 21st July, 1957.

⁶ Consider the following Persian sentiments: "Let us struggle for the sake of a happy life. Let us devise remedies to win ease, but not to the point where our body is given to the service of our greed. Do justice to every breath you draw. Sacrifice money, and fashion your ease; it is cheap to buy ease for nothing." (Nizami, 12th century.) See also the opinion voiced on modern Indian 'civilized simplicity' in *The Listener*, 11th March, 1954, in "The Indian Way of Thought."

⁷ Sir S. Radhakrishnan, *The Heart of Hindustan*.

or who would not be insulted if the epithet were denied him ; the word commands a peculiar respect. It ought not, however, to be conceded so freely as it is because, correctly, the privilege of being called a gentleman entails the obligation of behaving like one.⁸ The obligations carried with it are the very antithesis of Communism : they are scrupulous behaviour over the literal meaning of the word, a gentle regard for other people's feelings, yet without being imposed upon. It is easy to recognize that the word, if clearly defined, represents a cause in which it would be possible for all the conflicting free world aims to unite.

It so happens that the definition has been made, ages ago, and is traditional to most of the countries and communities with which this essay is concerned. To Western ears it is familiar as "to do unto all men as I would they should do unto me," the context of which is identical with the Indian Purana definition of 'The Best Man,' and is echoed curiously enough from China, where "perfect virtue is . . . not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself." Here, then, is an honoured concept over which East and West are at one, and which will assuredly in time modify Chinese Communism. Furthermore, what we wish done to ourselves is likewise contained in a traditional social code, common to both East and West ; it amounts to being treated as creatures of reason and to behaving as such.

Although distorted through the course of time, everywhere in the survivals of this social code can be identified a common original set of eight principles, which can be set out as : practical ideals, knowledge, impartial judgment (for using knowledge aright ; it includes justice), selflessness, goodwill (which includes love), health and strength, simple livelihood, and determination (which includes security). They constitute a simple social code, to uphold which all decent minded peoples could be expected to unite.⁹ Freedom is comprehended, as it is a matter of common-sense justice. But it is a code of obligations—the obligation to submit to reason, to study knowledge constantly, to forego all prejudice in opinion, to forego unfair advantages, to be generous towards other persons' opinions as well as with money, to keep healthy (social welfare), to be content with a simple standard of living, and to be firm over all of these in spite of obstacles. The code delineates a gentleman, and is the upbringing of another characteristically British figure, the umpire.

The first measure to be taken by the free world, therefore, or by those countries who are sincerely determined to abide by this way of living and to establish it throughout the world, is to teach it in their state education and to band themselves together, declaring it as their common aim and pledging themselves to uphold it. That ought not to be a difficult step, seeing that the principles are plain common-sense and are already preached by all the great religions. Nor is the code controversial dogma, it is pure social philosophy. Hence the essential condition that nothing must be added to it or taken from it ; it must be retained in its historic form as the foundation from which all the great civilizations of the world have risen, and on which any new structure can be built with equal pride.

⁸ Compare the need to respect obligations, spoken by H.M. The Queen to the United Nations, 21st October, 1957 : 'We are still far from the achievement of the ideals (of the founders) . . . But . . . when justice and respect for obligations are firmly established, the United Nations will the more confidently achieve the goal of a world at peace, law-abiding and prosperous.'

⁹ The substance of the code and its universality in international thought are in Appendix II.

The intellectual step must of necessity precede physical measures. We must have an acknowledged aim, for without one there cannot be unity. Also, without a deliberate will for developing impartiality in national decisions there cannot be mutual trust, and without mutual trust there cannot be military strength. The extraordinary remark of a neighbouring Secretary of State that, if it came to war, he would rather not be alongside British soldiers, does not betoken good understanding. Hence the first practical step is to remedy internationally the defective mutual trust; conversely, to put faith in military or economic organization which has not cohesive strength is to gamble with national trusteeship.

Notice to the appendix on democracy must be called, self-interest and prejudice are widely recognized as the curse of current behaviour; some form of education against them is needed. But where is such education given? Schools and universities teach knowledge but scarcely the way for applying it to problems of everyday life. The Church teaches moral rules but does not concern itself with the human faculty of reasoning. The writer once asked this question of Professor Rex Knight (whose name in connection with the study of thought is familiar through the B.B.C.). His answer was, curiously enough, that the best education for sound judgment he had met was at a military staff college, during his war service, in the solution of military problems by appreciations. He regarded the standard sequence of setting down the aim, followed by a review of circumstances and means, with then the balancing of alternatives, all leading up to a logical decision and plan, as being the clearest form of rational thinking.

It is gratifying to think that the armed forces should lead in teaching the practice of common-sense; but it is staggering to realize that the rest of the land is devoid of any comparable general education for impartial thinking. And when the similar state of the many other populations who constitute international life is considered, the precariousness of reaching reasoned agreement is plain, as is the scope opened for hostile interference. Hence another serious measure needed in the free world is for a revised outlook on education, demanding a system that does not merely teach knowledge, but the sense of wise judgment that will use it properly.

Here let it be made clear that it is adult education, far more than child education, which is wanted. The appendix on democracy does not fill a page, yet how many of the populace have ever read the reiterated pleas quoted in it against running full tilt into disaster? To want to do his duty by his neighbour, through fitting himself to vote wisely on current affairs, ought to be graven on every youth's mind at school, so that in later life the parasites of the sensational press would instead be writing sober sense, maybe not lucratively but with public spirit.

Every means by which public opinion can be influenced, Press, theatre, advertisement, broadcast, Church, and the many other ways known to publicity agents, must be invited to help in spreading this code of unbiassed sense. Apart from state education, the work should be voluntary, because thereby a movement keeps its life; but, as will be seen, a special staff is being envisaged to stimulate and co-ordinate effort. Foreign propagation, and particularly within enemy countries, should on the other hand be heavily subsidised. But on principle the interest must be made to flourish first in the home country, so that it will flow outwards by natural attraction like any other good product. For this purpose citizenship, of which this code forms part, must be made a subject of the G.C.E. examination, and not be left for honour more in the breach than the observance. While if, as a continuance in later life,

influential movements such as the Trades Union Congress were to preach studied and impartial voting as one of the duties of membership, a world-wide benefit could be served.

With the two advocated measures brought into being—with countries openly pledged to a common aim and with their peoples manifestly being educated to a higher degree of public spirit—a further much needed step for strengthening the front against Communism can be taken. It will consist of a select group of countries, those who can trust one another and be trusted, binding themselves still more closely together into a body that will respect one another's freedom over domestic affairs but whose members undertake to conform with a common policy over matters affecting them mutually. It implies a kind of federation, but on what might be called an aristocratic principle; it would be one in which members are trusted on a gentleman's understanding to conform with the fellowship's agreed views, though without formulated methods; but their independent actions would be subject to *ex post facto* criticism, and their bond would pledge them to accept whatever judgment were passed on them afterwards, and to remedy shortcomings. It would be much the same as our Commonwealth system of trust, but carried a stage further to the extent of acknowledging a gentlemanly obligation to conform with the wishes of its own fellows. There would be no surrender of sovereign rights (other than the right to misbehave) because the accepted aim is to obey sense, and ideally each member would act as honestly conceived unselfish sense dictated, and if subsequently considered wrong would undertake to rectify the mistake. Could more be demanded of freedom? Of course in practical life lesser motives will intervene; they would be handled as is done now under our current loose system; but the ideal constitution of a gentlemen's fellowship, with the moral influence it would command, could be expected to act as a spur to decent conduct.

It is to our country's credit that we have demonstrated to the world that it is possible for a nation to respect its friends' *ex post facto* judgment, even in the heat of battle. At Suez, with every reason for confidence in our cause and with the tactical situation in our hands, we nevertheless surrendered our advantage and withdrew simply in order to set an example of respect for the United Nations' voice. Whether we were right in so doing is not a matter for this essay; in point of fact the peoples to whose verdict we bowed were neither wholly friends nor impartial, while the more select fellowship being proposed here is designed for sincere impartiality. What is of immense importance is that two countries with very great interests at stake took the initiative in showing themselves willing to sacrifice all in order to uphold the concept of gentlemanly conformity with their neighbours' susceptibilities. In the cold war against unscrupulousness, Suez was a strategic victory.

Thus a gentlemen's fellowship of sincere and resolute nations in the free world is a practicable proposition. With its inauguration, and with the steadying sense of reliability generated, a stronger economic and military front could be organized and, what is more important, the knowledge of this enhanced strength would encourage wavering countries to cast in their lot with ourselves. The existence of such a system would also strengthen the free world by enabling it to cure some of its crippling abuses. For example, very much more powerful moral persuasion could be brought on South Africa to abandon her irrational colour policy, or again, problems such as Israel and China would receive comment from a fellowship pledged to pure sense regardless of political expediency, which could not but influence opinion at the United Nations beneficially.

We will now pass to military and economic measures. First, in chronological order, comes the formation of a special staff for conducting cold war defence, as well as for the positive propagation of free world principles. This has been advocated in the R.U.S.I. lecture, "Staff Work for the Cold War," by Mr. Donald McLachlan. The reason for it is incontestable, the technique of unarmed hostility has reached a stage where specialized training and experience are essential for countering it. There is a startling range of activities by which ordinary trade can be interrupted and over which remedial measures may have to be instigated; ill-will (the converse of commercial goodwill), discrimination in trade being induced by false or distorted news, by prohibiting accurate news and agents' travel; finance, trade being disrupted through the manipulation of foreign exchange and the money market; force, pseudo-legal methods being concocted to interfere with commerce, strikes unofficially encouraged, 'sending to Coventry' co-operative persons, in short, labour terrorism, while hooliganism and sabotage are condoned, and the interruption being either to the supply of raw materials or to traffic (e.g. canal, airfield, pipeline).

To counter this, as Mr. McLachlan points out, so far as this country is concerned, a special staff is required in the Ministry of Defence. Action, though, would be through normal commercial channels and the Board of Trade, or through broadcasting, and linked with the fighting Services' peace-time roles. Thus a considerable extent of inter-departmental co-ordination will be involved for which Mr. McLachlan suggests a 'para-military' staff drawn from experienced civilian sources. This the present writer would recommend also, but modifying it slightly by commissioning the selected civilians into their respective Services, those connected with shipping becoming naval officers, and so on. The point is that there is no hard and fast dividing line between armed and unarmed hostilities; modern conditions against an unscrupulous enemy more nearly resemble those on a colonial frontier, where nominal peace gradually slides into formal war, and *vice versa*, peace being on a semi-military footing. Our readiness must be for the extreme; and as military efficiency is greatest when allowed a free hand, it were better to have the organization military from the outset with, rather than a civilian 'para-military' staff, a political branch in a specially recruited military staff.

The difference, slight though it may seem, touches the fundamental aspect of this essay. The struggle is for civilized ways of life against barbaric. Military force represents the eighth principle of our code, determination to uphold it. That determination must be asserted from the outset; our defence may be organized by men in mufti, but they must be fighting men; vapidness must be shunned.

Another military measure becomes practicable with the firmer inter-allied bonds proposed in this essay and enables increased flexibility of plans and secrecy. It is for a mandate over military operations (to borrow a political term) to be given to whichever country is most intimately concerned. The practice is not new, having been adopted in Korea and N.A.T.O., but is in the opposite direction to that developing in the United Nations, and representing a higher degree of mutual trust. With it disappears the inefficiency arising from the commander in the field being fettered by the indecision of a group of independent peoples with divided counsels. The commander is responsible to his own government only, and that government receives the others' trust to use its initiative in the common cause without having to seek prior consent or to divulge secret projects.

That the free world is in need of enhanced military strength as the background for defence against Communist unscrupulousness is obvious; that it may be forth-

coming as the result of clarifying the free world's aim, with the wider understanding and greater confidence generated, is to be anticipated. Much present numerical weakness lies in the apathetic unconcern with which we watch one another's efforts. Western disinterest in Muslim antipathy for Communism squanders a great potential source of strength. Absorbed as we are in the idea of atomic energy, the efficacy of a *jihad* against godless tyranny is ignored, if not scorned. Yet who is to say that atomic energy will inevitably be used? Gas was not; nor can we tell from which quarter the political wind at the time will blow. We would be wise to augment our numbers and their will power.

As another instance, compare the disinterest shown for a people farther east, actually in the process of throwing back Communism. A characteristically sympathetic newspaper writes, "China may find it impolitic to persecute the faithful in Tibet . . . but Tibet cannot remain for ever untouched by the influence of the modern world. What Marxist claptrap cannot undermine, science and technology may well succeed in diluting. But at least this ancient and independent society is not to be destroyed with ruthless speed."¹⁰ But why should we think of its being destroyed at all? Here is a people pluckily withstanding a Communist Power on its own resources, yet left complacently to fight a losing battle. Why are we not mobilizing all the help which public opinion could offer, here and in the East, to prevent science and technology from discrediting an ancient morality? They are neighbours of our much admired Gurkha allies, yet it seems we could scarcely care less.¹¹ Small wonder that uncommitted peoples do not choose to throw in their military lot with us. By the same token, if and when we can emerge from our narrow-minded shell and recognize that other peoples are pursuing the same aim as ourselves, though by different ways, and when we can support them sympathetically and generously, then we may expect the free world's military numbers to be swelled.

Constantly the events of the day are showing the struggle against Communism to be one of culture, and that the primary need in the free world is for an accepted cultural aim; but that is not to disregard the essential backing of physical force. Human nature will remain the same for countless generations; Cromwell's encomium, "Trust in God, and keep your powder dry," holds as good as ever. Accordingly such measures for enhancing physical strength as pooling scientific knowledge, standardizing equipment, unifying methods of procedure, are fully contemplated by this essay but are not being dwelt on in order to focus attention upon the vital need, the spirit of the cause.¹²

So too as regards treaties and organizations. Brains capable of threshing out effective ones we have in plenty, for example the present writer would not presume to add anything to the concluding Fabian International Essay (1956) on the subject. We have no need to doubt the mechanics of the free world system. It is its dynamics that are wrong. The feline nations want to enjoy their milk on earth in a happy democratic concourse, but instead they live on air on the house-tops. "Two cats sitting on a roof: which slides down the more slowly? The one with the bigger μ " —thus was the writer taught at His Late Majesty's expense. It is friction which is keeping us away from solid earth.

¹⁰ *The Daily Telegraph*, 10th October, 1957.

¹¹ Cf. Earl Atlee, House of Lords, 8th November, 1957. It was characteristic of this country that its interest was centred on the dog in the satellite, yet the lot of some human beings in other satellites was worse.

¹² Cf. footnote 1: "The problem is not in fact primarily one of machinery. It is the will that matters."

"The only sure basis for long-term optimism depends on the success of the non-Communist countries in mastering the conflicts among themselves." So writes the Fabian essayist. There is no excuse for our not doing so. The whole tale of freedom falling a prey to force has been enacted once before in history; the experience is written for all to read. Professor Gilbert Murray's *Hellenism and the Modern World* ought to be the Old Testament of free peoples, with Hellenic culture's object underlined as our own and upon everyone's lips, "to tame the savageness of man and make gentle the life of the world." The cause of its failure has been quoted in the appendix on democracy, as has also the remedy called for, education in how to cultivate character.

The Communist Powers attain their power through forceful control; the spectacle of their efficiency attracts to them adherence among the more impressionable and less scrupulous under-developed peoples. We in the free world are now called upon to show that equal power and efficiency, and greater contentment, can be gained by a free will which has a higher aim and accepts its obligations. But it is over the shouldering of obligations that friction occurs; on all sides we hear the caterwauling of the ineffectual who resent the idea of public duties and want freedom without paying for it. That can never succeed. "Take your cake, said God, and pay for it," from which we gather that God ordains the way of the gentleman. And that is the argument of this essay.

APPENDIX I

Greek democracy's aim: "Pericles began by explaining that Athens is called a democracy, because the government is in the hands of the many, not of the few. . . . Athenians are restrained from doing wrong not by force or threats of force, but by a general spirit of respect for the laws, especially . . . the unwritten laws of decency and honour which are felt by good men. . . . I would have you fix your eyes upon Athens day by day, contemplate her *dynamic*, her potentiality; not merely what she is but what she has the power to be, until you become her lovers. Reflect that her glory has been built up by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it. Make them your examples and learn from them that the secret of happiness is freedom." (*Hellenism and the Modern World*, Gilbert Murray.)

Greek democracy's failure: "It is generally believed that [it] perished because they were unable to sink their differences and combine . . . but this is to mistake the symptom for the cause. . . . Why could they not do so? Because their governments were, on the whole, actuated by immediate self-interest as they saw it, and nothing in their thought or their education taught them to see that immediate self-interest means ultimate disaster.

"What would have been the remedy? Education: an education that while encouraging individuality to the highest degree, yet discouraged immediate self-interest. For the next century or so let education encourage nationalism and even regionalism. But let every individual, every village, every group, every nation, learn to accept the basic truth that the passion for immediate self-interest must be 'quenched'; not necessarily because it is wrong, but because it is always dangerous and frequently suicidal." (*Greek City States*, Kathleen Freeman.)

Modern democracy's failure: "Democracy has failed because only the good of the few is taken into account, without regard to the good of other peoples. The first and foremost requisite for true democracy is self-sacrifice. . . . We needs must take into account the good of the whole of mankind. . . . The aim of any truly democratic form

of government should be to give its people opportunities to receive real self-education. The state educates its citizen for the state ; it should educate him for cultivating his own nobility." (*The Aryan Path Journal*, September, 1953.)

"In the climate of democracy most people feel abashed at being accused of [selfishness] and we know that the normal process is that they accept the majority decision and try to make the best of it. But what is being appealed to when they are told that they are expected to give in? It might be mere force: 'We are more than you, we are going to have our own way, and we will knock you on the head if you oppose us.' There is, I suspect, a stronger element of sheer force at the base of even an advanced democratic society than is usually allowed for by those who give it their praises. . . . [We may be] mixing up what people want with what people think right, and so far we have come across no guarantee that the [majority] are even trying to decide impartially what is the best course for everyone." (*The Problem of Power*, Lord Radcliffe.)

See also : Educational neglect to teach impartial citizenship. (*Mind in the Making*, J. H. Robinson.) Faulty opinion through influences of 'fashion' and self-interest. (*Clearer Thinking*, A. E. Mander.) Faulty opinion through disinterest to get accurate knowledge, and difficulty of getting it even if wanted. (*Thinking to Some Purpose*, Susan Stebbing.)

APPENDIX II

THE WAY OF THE GENTLEMAN

The survivals of this traditional code are best shown in tabulated form, for ready comparison with one another ; here, for brevity, they are only being listed. The actual code they represent ran thus—

Happiness is the sign of a healthy mind in a healthy body ; it should therefore be sought actively. But no person's happiness can be complete if others around him are discontented ; it is everyone's duty accordingly to behave considerately for others. The only way for general satisfaction is for all to be guided by reason. There are eight principles for a reasonable life :—

1. Aims must be for practical ideals, what is practicable being determined by reason. (This idealism, or unworldliness, used to be termed metaphorically 'the sky way' to happiness.)
2. The first requisite for reason is knowledge.
3. The next is impartial judgment (wisdom), for using knowledge properly. (It includes justice).
4. For impartiality a character of selflessness is necessary. (Militarily, self-discipline.)
5. Human judgment being liable to error, goodwill needs to be shown towards others in a generous outlook on their opinions and ways. (Goodwill includes love).
6. People's bodies need to be kept in health and strength. (Metaphorically youth.)
7. An adequate but simple livelihood is required by all.
8. Because of human inertia and perversity, each of these principles must be pursued with determination. (This includes military security.)

The outcome of these all is contentment.

The following are key-words to the various survivals; the numbers refer to the code above; resemblances to it are to be found in literary passages relating to the words.

Aryan Path: (2) Right View, knowledge; (3) Mindfulness, equanimity; (4) Aims, towards *dana*, charity; (5) Speech, considerate; (6) Action, temperate conduct; (7) Livelihood; (8) Perseverance. Outcome—Happiness, rapture; this is attained through unworldliness, which is (1).

Paths of Manliness (Hindu): Contained in Krishna's injunction to fight for ideals, and not to be content with mere contemplation; the name has been taken from the *Bhagavad Gita* opening—'Whence this depression, unworthy of an Aryan? Yield not to unmanliness.'

(1) Path of perfection; (2) Science; (3) Wisdom; (4) Renunciation, austerity; (5) Forgiveness; (6) Discrimination; (7) Work; (8) Devotion, the Kshatriyas' duty of military protection. Outcome—'Contentment follows.'

Beatitudes: (1) The 'poor,' unworldly, in spirit; (2) Righteousness, right knowledge; (3) Peacemakers; (4) Pure in heart; (5) Merciful; (6) Mourn their bodily infirmities shall laugh; (7) Meek, shall inherit the earth; (8) Persecuted, for their persistence. c.f. St. Peter II.i: (1) Faith; (2) Knowledge; (3) Godliness; (4) Charity; (5) Brotherly Love; (6) Temperance; (7) Virtue; (8) Patience.

Seven Valleys (Islam): (1) Unity, goodness in everything; (2) Astonishment, shall learn a hundred thousand knowledges; (3) Knowledge, wisdom, justice, war as peace; (4) Love, alien to self; (5) *Allah the merciful*: (7) Poverty; (8) Search, with patience. Outcome—The Valley of Contentment.

Eight Immortals (China): Personifications. In particular—(1) Man with entry to the Court of Heaven. The sky is the way; (6) the lame caricature of health; (8) the hero of the true active principle. Outcome—Happiness.

c.f. Confucius, *Great Learning*: (1) Illustrious virtue; (2) Complete knowledge; (3) Sincere thoughts; (4) Rectified hearts; (5) Cultivated persons; (8) Investigation of things. Outcome—'The kingdom became tranquil and happy.'

Immortals of Olympus (Greece): Personifications in six pairs of gods and goddesses, (4) and (8) being combined with others. In particular, War represents determination (8) for justice (3); see *Army Quarterly*, Apr. 1957, "Gods of War." Outcome—Harmony; when man wedded himself to her, all the Immortals came to earth.

Seven Champions of Christendom: Traditional Celtic personifications. (5) St. George of England; (4) St. David of Wales; (3) St. Andrew of Scotland; (6) St. Patrick of Ireland; (1) St. Antony of Italy; (2) St. James of Spain; (7) St. Denis of France. They are identifiable by their colours, which although different from those of their flags today are nevertheless correct, as can be told from the green-red-purple-black of the Western Isles in Greek myth, a point of great significance. Thus the Union Jack actually blazons this code of the gentleman as having been our national aim from time immemorial; it is a matter for intense pride.

The only other national flag to compare with it is the Muslim star and crescent. In view of the crying need for recognizing the identity between Western and Islamic tradition, it is to be appreciated that the crescent and sun (or star) was the ancient universal hieroglyph for reason, termed metaphorically light, *vide* the Greek traveller Megasthenes. In this country its most familiar survival is on horse brasses, derived from the Celtic emblem (e.g. on coins), another instance of the code.

HOW 'MILITARY' IS THE ROYAL AIR FORCE ?

By "RADIX."

FOR a variety of compelling reasons this country is now committed to having all Regular armed forces by 1962. Unfortunately it is becoming clear that, unless some drastic measures are taken, there is little hope of persuading recruits to come forward in sufficient numbers to achieve this goal.

This paper attempts to show that, so far as the Royal Air Force is concerned, nothing short of an entirely new approach is required if men are to be attracted away from civilian occupations. What is far more important, the very nature of the Royal Air Force demands the adoption of this new approach, even if it did not produce a single new recruit.

The aim of the Royal Air Force in war is to bring to bear upon the enemy the destructive power of a comparatively small number of aeroplanes manned by a fractional percentage of the total personnel in the Service. The vast majority of the men and women in the R.A.F. are not directly involved in the achievement of this aim, although the intimacy of their association with it varies widely according to their several tasks. This situation is entirely different from the other two Services and therefore requires a different type of organization to meet it.

Until the advent of the aeroplane the essential pattern of warfare had not changed for many centuries. Because of the indecisiveness of the weapons available, the waging of war demanded the maximum number of men each bringing to bear his individual puny weapon in a ceaseless war of attrition and manœuvre. Every sailor and soldier, irrespective of his Service trade, was potentially a combatant. Weight of numbers, allied to high morale, were two of the key factors to success.

It was therefore necessary to devise a method of living in peace-time—when there was no enemy to fight—which would ensure the required state of morale in wartime. Many factors had to be taken into account ; loyalty, discipline, *esprit de corps*, physical fitness, character, leadership, and so on. All these were vital in order to make certain that in the heat of battle each man would do his duty without hesitation. The whole peace-time organization was directed towards achieving complete harmony between officers, non-commissioned officers, and men. Discipline was needed to accustom men to accept orders without question, fitness in order to stand up to the exacting physical demands of a war of attrition, loyalty and *esprit de corps* to offset the weariness and despair of continually facing death. And, above all, character and leadership among officers and non-commissioned officers of a kind that would persuade their men willingly to follow them anywhere.

And so there came into being the military way of life, artificial by civilian standards but having qualities of service, mutual respect, and comradeship which appealed to a small but adequate proportion of the population. Only on this basis could there be forged a sufficiently strong peace-time link to withstand the shock of war. It was easy, moreover, for this type of organization to work efficiently in a society which for hundreds of years had known a clear distinction between the master and servant classes.

But none of this holds good today in the modern Royal Air Force. We are faced not only with a different kind of fighting Service but also with a different kind of warfare and a different society within which the Service must take its place.

It is most informative at this stage to observe the remarks of an Air Ministry Report, the 'Benson Experiment',¹ when dealing with ceremonial parades:—

"The second extreme type of social organization is that in which activities originally conceived as means to the achievement of goals become transformed into self-contained practices lacking further objectives. Societies of this type tend to become static and traditional.

"The social organization of the R.A.F. in common with all military and bureaucratic organizations tends toward the latter type.

"Two main sets of consequences follow from this type of social organization:—

(a) The fact that social activity of various types has become divorced from goal-seeking leads to wastage of energy and inefficiency and consequently renders the goals of the society more difficult to achieve.

(b) If a considerable proportion of the individual members of such a society reject the emphasis on means and tend to stress the functional aspects of behaviour, the social organization will tend to disintegrate.

"Data collected so far do indeed strongly indicate that most airmen reject the notion of participation in activities which have become to a considerable extent divorced from their functions."

All of this is a scientific way of saying what has been put forward in the opening paragraphs of this paper. The airman, in fact, rejects many of the present means of achieving the goal adopted by the R.A.F. What used to constitute perfectly valid means to the achievement of the goal for the Army of 1914 have become transformed into self-contained practices lacking further objective in the nuclear age Royal Air Force.

It would hardly have been within the terms of reference of the author of the Report to deduce from this data that parades should be abolished. So he contents himself with making recommendations to modify parades in order to bring them into closer relationship with function and goal. But in so doing he gives a momentary glimpse of how difficult he finds it to reconcile a ceremonial parade with a sufficiently profitable functional activity to be accepted by the airmen. In a flash of unintentional humour he recommends that "all groups and squadrons should parade as far as possible with some actual or symbolic representation of their functions."

One has only to visualize airmen pay clerks marching on to parade with fountain pens at the slope or cooks presenting arms with rolling pins to savour fully the extraordinary dilemma in which the author has been placed. He goes on to say, in amplification of his recommendation, "in this connection it should be remembered that to the infantryman the rifle is representative of his major function. To the airman the rifle does not have this significance."

This really puts the whole case in a nutshell. The airman is not a fighting man—the issue must be squarely faced—whereas the soldier is primarily a combatant and secondly a tradesman, although under modern conditions of war even the Army must be finding this position harder to maintain.

¹ Extracts quoted with the permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office from an Air Ministry report concerning an investigation which took place over eight months in 1954 at R.A.F. Station, Benson, to try to discover the main sources of dissatisfaction among airmen in the R.A.F.

The repair and servicing of aircraft to a very high standard is done by civilians for the major airlines all over the world. There is therefore no functional reason why military aircraft should not also be maintained by civilians—as indeed they sometimes are. Similarly, of course, there is no functional objection whatever to civilians doing all the vast mass of administrative work in the Service.

The individual tasks to be performed in the R.A.F. are precisely similar to those undertaken by young men in civilian airline organizations throughout the world. The young civilian, therefore, who seeks a routine job in the R.A.F. cannot understand why the R.A.F. requires him to be subjected to regimentation and extra discipline as a necessary condition for performing it. If it helped him to be a better clerk or cook or fitter he might appreciate the position and accept it. But not only does he not subscribe to this opinion, he is convinced that the whole atmosphere of regulation, military discipline, extraneous duties, and the like all strongly detract from his functional efficiency—apart from being a perpetual irritant.

The young civilian understands perfectly well that he cannot join the R.A.F. and still preserve entirely intact his former civilian status, because :—

(a) Men employed in an organization on which national survival depends must owe their allegiance direct to the Crown and must dissociate themselves from the right to bargain through a trade union or other autonomous association.

(b) As a complement to (a) personnel in the R.A.F. must surrender their individual freedom to the ultimate sanction of a military penal code.

(c) R.A.F. personnel must accept the right of their superiors to move them anywhere at a moment's notice.

(d) R.A.F. personnel must also accept the right of their superiors to order them to work at any time without extra remuneration.

These four requirements alone are sufficient to make clear to him the necessity for retaining part of the traditional military framework in the R.A.F. And the reasonable man will accept these restrictions on his liberty because he recognizes that they are essential for the efficient and proper functioning of the Service. It is only when we go beyond this criterion of functional efficiency and introduce purely traditional facets of the military way of life that our attitude becomes suspect.

Every kind of organization requires an element of discipline to make it work and, of course, the R.A.F. is no exception to the rule. The problem facing the R.A.F. is to decide how much of the traditional military framework, with its drill, parades, and other disciplinary formalities, must be retained. It has been shown that some form of military framework, involving such things as a military penal code and uniforms, is essential to an organization on which national survival depends. How far beyond these minimum requirements must we go ?

It is now common knowledge that the two main reasons for National Service airmen refusing to enter into Regular engagements are turbulence and the way of life (i.e. regimentation and regulation).

Turbulence is an inescapable disadvantage of Service life which can only be offset by more imaginative and liberal treatment over living conditions and welfare generally (e.g. guarantee of married quarters or a hiring immediately on reaching any new unit, educational assistance, movement of families to railway station by taxi, cafeteria-style messing, and abolition of 'eating irons,' etc.). The remedy here is one simply of improvements and does not involve any radical changes.

In regard to the way of life, there will be some who say: "The young chap of today has never had a chance to appreciate what a properly disciplined military way of life is like because the standards have been too low. Once we smarten him up and resuscitate the parades and discipline and other trappings of military life he will be duly grateful and his general smartness and pride of Service will be restored."

But when a man neither likes something nor agrees with the reasons underlying it, there is room to doubt that he can be made to change his mind by increasing the dose.

If discipline is essential—and no one would deny this fact—what sort of discipline is required to take the place of the traditional military type? The answer, briefly, is functional discipline which, given the right conditions, will spring from the men in the form of voluntary self-discipline. This envisages a happy Service in which, because they are really well looked after and well paid, the individuals will gladly give of their best in all circumstances.

This concept of the R.A.F. will be open to the charge that it smacks of an extension of the Welfare State and that it would need not R.A.F. officers but industrial relations officers and shop stewards to run it. This is obviously too strong a censure, since the 'new look' R.A.F. would embrace all the former basic conditions of Service (e.g. military penal code, military ranks, military uniforms, military respects and compliments, etc.). But—and here is where it fundamentally differs from the old concept—it would achieve its discipline, smartness, pride of Service, and other essential attributes by appealing to the best in each individual.

To achieve this it would be necessary, apart from adopting a more liberal outlook on welfare and conditions of service, to some extent to democratize the administration within the limits of a military framework; in other words to reconcile the industrial machinery designed to bridge the gap between workers and management in civilian life with the disciplinary code inseparable from an armed Service.

Unlike the case of a large industrial undertaking there would be no fear that this process of liberalization could lead to anything approaching a strike, since all airmen would be subject to the ultimate sanction of a military penal code. The privilege of earning for themselves freedom from restrictions and the rigid observance of military formalities would go hand in hand with the knowledge that abuse of this newly won freedom would be met with an uncompromising military discipline.

There are certainly good grounds for supposing that the R.A.F. stands to make considerable gains from introducing a type of administration which liberalizes the way of life of the airmen. From the evidence available such a change would go far towards removing the natural antipathy to Service life which is prevalent among National Service airmen and in this direction there would be a favourable response. Certainly there would be a substantial economic gain in effective bench hours per man through the abolition of 'military diversions.' Most important of all, can there be any reason to believe that the present stagnation in Regular recruiting will be overcome unless changes are made?

Do we stand to lose anything by making changes? No one can seriously suggest—particularly in the age of nuclear warfare—that the airman will be needed in a ground combatant role. Even in the last war he was rarely, if ever, called upon to fight on the ground. And certainly under the present organization of the R.A.F. he is not trained to do so. The payment of lip service to occasional drill and parades contributes nothing to this end.

Nor do drill, parades, and the minor manifestations of military discipline contribute to functional efficiency. The reverse is the case in the opinion of the men themselves, who look upon these things as unproductive diversions from their jobs and thus a source of minor irritation and resentment. A man's bearing and turnout are the direct reflection of being in complete harmony with the organization for which he works. A man who is happy in his work will show it in his bearing and in his gait. Conversely a man who nourishes a secret grievance and who does not feel at home in the atmosphere in which he lives and works will reflect his dissatisfaction in his outside contacts. And this will be so no matter what steps are taken to 'correct' his attitude.

In an overwhelmingly technical and administrative Service such as the R.A.F. already is—and will increasingly become in the future—the spur to the airman's pride in Service must be the creation of a voluntary self-discipline born of the knowledge that he is a member of a happy team whose future he can help to mould.

The hard fact is that, unlike the pre-war years, we can no longer rely on the empty stomachs of unemployment to bring us our recruits. We now have to go out and compete on equal terms with industry. The appeal of the Service must be *via* the intelligence and not *via* the stomach. In the old days many airmen accepted military discipline and the turbulence of Service life as part of the price which they had to pay for three square meals a day and an assured career. They did not question the functional value of parades and drill. They simply got on with them and got used to them—and even came to like them in the same way that many a husband, through constant association with the kitchen sink, has acquired a kind of tolerant affection for washing-up.

But now we have to face a better educated young man whose employment is secure and whose freedom is jealously guarded by his trade union. He is prepared to ask searching questions before embracing a Service life with its turbulence and reduction in individual freedom. He will put his finger on many Service practices and ask the reason for them. Unless our answer is logical and convincing he will turn aside. What is more, our answers must make sense to an independent and impartial observer to whom we are trying to sell something. They must go far deeper than the general sentiment that we are the best judges of the amount of military discipline required in the Service. In a highly competitive world no organization can sell itself to a sceptical customer in such a manner.

Even when we come to the quite separate issue of the officers who man the combat aircraft there is little justification for retaining the old type of military discipline. First and foremost, their value in battle stems from individual skill and character. Discipline in the Army sense, for example, was anathema to the fighter pilot in the last war—and indeed to all pilots.

No one would deny that the *corps d'élite* of General Duties officers must have a spirit of loyalty and an *esprit de corps* second to none. But this will not come from a blind subservience to corporate discipline. It will come from a natural blending of men bound together in the knowledge that upon their individual prowess, spirit of adventure, and courage rests the safety of the Western world.

Leadership in the air remains a very real requirement for these combat pilots, but for some extraordinary reason leadership on the ground has been built into this requirement. From this has sprung up all sorts of man management theories involving the need for young officers to obtain experience in commanding squadron

personnel. This undoubtedly derives from the old military relationship between the officers and the men whom they had to lead into battle. After all, it is only 40 years since the R.A.F. was but a military and naval appendage in the form of the R.F.C. and R.N.A.S. respectively.

To some extent the idea of being 'in command' of squadron personnel was fostered during the last war because of the very real bond between the ground crews and the pilots who flew 'their' aeroplanes. But this bond had nothing whatever to do with a carefully cultivated system of man management or military discipline. It was an entirely natural and humanitarian link forged inevitably under the stress of war—a sort of adult hero-worship. If it were possible to envisage decentralized servicing of aircraft in another global war, this link between aircrew and those immediately concerned with the maintenance of their aeroplanes would again be forged—quite spontaneously and of its own volition.

This link is not the link of those who share a common danger in battle. It is the link between those who, as non-combatants, take pride in providing the most efficient possible weapon and those who have to use it against the enemy. This link, indeed, persists among technicians working far away from the tarmac in the workshops and factories. It is, in short, the natural desire among the non-combatants to do everything possible to help the fighting men.

It is illogical to argue that this relationship requires to be cemented by some form of military framework which stresses 'command' and 'discipline.' Moreover, within the Service lifetime of the young officer of today, i.e. in the next 30 years, there will be no link at all between the technician and the pilot, at any rate in the fighter and bomber role, because there will be no aircrew in these roles.

Once we recognize that the R.A.F. is divided into two parts which serve a common aim and share a common allegiance, but which have quite separate entities, then we can confidently embark upon reorganization. Conversely, so long as we continue to support a shotgun wedding between the vast tail and the small fighting teeth under the banner of pseudo-military necessity, we will fail to attract Regular recruits.

The prime requirements for the huge technical and administrative supporting cast are, first, good pay and conditions of service; second, freedom to get on with the job without unnecessary let or hindrance; and third, maximum liberty for the individual subject to the absolute minimum demands of an armed Service.

The full implementation of these requirements would produce a happy Service in which each man is respected as an individual and in which, so far as is humanly possible, the rights and privileges which he formerly enjoyed in civilian life would be transferred to a benevolent military authority. Once these conditions are established we can expect functional efficiency. On this foundation—a happy and functionally efficient Service—the necessary degree of discipline can be superimposed without difficulty.

Surely there need be no fear that the product of such an organization would let his side down in his contacts with the general public by failing to 'cut a military figure.' By now the public realizes full well that the airman is not a fighting man, so there is no need to maintain any pretence that he is. What the airman needs to be is a smart, alert member of a predominantly technical and administrative organization wearing the Queen's uniform. He and the R.A.F. will be judged by his general behaviour and the opinions which he expresses about his employer.

A member of a happy team, be it commercial firm or any other type of organization, does his best to enhance the reputation of the team; he will want to be a good advertisement for it in his deportment, behaviour, and in his views about it. He will take a pride in being smart off duty, because smartness is one of the outward manifestations of a man who is inwardly satisfied with his way of life. That is the fundamental issue.

If, in place of that inner satisfaction, there is some measure of resentment and hostility towards the ordering of his daily life, these feelings will tend to permeate the whole of the man's outlook and communicate themselves to the world at large in the form of slackness in bearing and turnout, and even in outspoken criticism.

To solve the problem requires a painful reappraisal. It must be freely recognized that the R.A.F., apart from the comparative handful of men who fly the aeroplanes, is virtually a corps of technicians and administrators and not a combatant military force in the old tradition. Such an organization not only has no functional need of the military way of life but is actively endangering its future if it persists in thinking otherwise.

The final step is perhaps the hardest of all. It is to understand that in discarding most of the traditional military way of life we do not have to discard discipline. We shall merely replace the old type of military discipline, designed for a very good purpose, with a new kind of self-discipline attuned to the needs of the nuclear age Royal Air Force and deriving its strength from the voluntary and whole-hearted support of individuals living and working together in complete harmony.

THE LOSS OF H.M.S. BULLDOG, 1865

By COMMANDER W. B. ROWBOTHAM, R.N. (RETD.)



OUTSIDE the public entrance to the R.U.S.I. Museum is to be seen the figure-head of H.M.S. *Bulldog*, which was built in 1845. Her untimely end forms the subject of this article. There have been seven of H.M. ships bearing the name *Bulldog*, the one with which we are now concerned being the third. She was a wooden paddle sloop of 1,124 tons, 500 h.p., and was launched at Chatham on 2nd October, 1845. At the date of her loss the main armament was one 110-pr. Armstrong gun, one 10-inch, and four 32-prs.; her complement was 175 officers and men.

The first war service of this *Bulldog* was in the Baltic in 1854-55, and at the bombardment and reduction of Bomarsund on 16th August, 1854, she flew the flag of the Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier. She was not present at the bombardment of Sveaborg in the following year, but on 6th September her cutter captured two Russian Government schooners, laden with oatmeal and stores, off Biorko Island.¹

Her next service of interest was in the latter half of 1860 when, at the request of the promoters of the North Atlantic telegraph route, the Admiralty employed her to run lines of soundings to ascertain the practicability of laying a submarine cable between the Færøe Islands, Iceland, Greenland, and Labrador.² Whilst so employed she was commanded by Captain Sir Leopold McClintock, a name well known in connection with Polar exploration.

The *Bulldog* was recommissioned for the last time in March, 1864, and again went out to the North America and West Indies Station. At that period the several republican states in Central America and in the adjacent islands of the West Indies were often the scene of internal disturbances. Haiti, in particular, was once more beset by conspiracies which, in the following year, blossomed out into a full-scale revolution. The right of asylum under foreign flags was normally considered sacred in Haiti, though from time to time the negro mobs got out of hand and, aided and abetted by those aspiring to power, violated the foreign Consulates. In such circumstances, British and American naval officers frequently had to interfere in order to protect their nationals and to enforce respect for their flags. In these days of a reduced Navy it should not be forgotten that this form of Imperial maritime policing is an ever-recurring commitment of the Royal Navy.

Before relating how the *Bulldog* came to be involved in these disturbances, a few words may be said about the tangled skein of Haitian politics. In 1804 the negroes finally drove the French out of Haiti, which then declared its independence

¹ Navy Records Society, Vols. LXXXIII, LXXXIV.

² Remarks illustrative of *The Sounding Voyage of H.M.S. Bulldog*, 1860. Published by order of The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. (H.M.S.O., 1861.) [Admiralty Library, P(NS)37.]

and became a republic. The régime under which Haiti was successively governed usually acquired power by means of a revolution, in which unbridled ferocity, massacre, and arson were given full play. These disturbances were of frequent occurrence during the 19th century and they are not unknown even at the present day.³ Early in 1859 the Emperor Soulougue had abdicated, being succeeded by President Fabre Geffrard, who was a mulatto. But a mulatto was *persona non grata* to the blacks, who formed the greater part of the population, and Geffrard's period of office was no less disturbed than that of his predecessor. Insurrections continued with persistent frequency, only to be mercilessly suppressed, and the defection and corruption of the principal Ministers was as rife as ever. The year 1864 saw the rise of yet another negro revolutionary, Sylvestre Salnave, who operated at first from Santo Domingo, the eastern half of the island. Santo Domingo, it may be noted, then belonged to Spain, but in the following year it was abandoned by that country and again became a republic.

We can now follow the account of the *Bulldog's* last service in Haitian waters. She was then commanded by Captain Charles Wake. This account is compiled from his detailed report of the circumstances which led to the loss of his ship and from the other official documents which are preserved at the Public Record Office.

On 18th October, 1865, the *Bulldog* had left the harbour of Cape Haitien to carry out target practice and to communicate with Geffrard's Ministers at L'Acul on the subject of the blockade which had recently been raised by the insurgents. Shortly before noon a Salnavist steamer and three schooners were observed in chase of and firing at a steamer wearing British colours. Course was shaped to intercept and on closing the chase, which was then out of gunshot from her pursuers, it was seen that she had lowered a boat which was pulling towards the *Bulldog*. The boat, which proved to be from the Bristol ship *Jamaica Packet*, on charter to the Haitian Government for carrying stores, delivered the *Bulldog's* mails from Port-au-Prince. Meanwhile the insurgent ships, headed by the *Voldrogue*,⁴ closed.

Captain Wake fired a lee blank gun, lowered a boat, and hailed that he was sending it on board. The first lieutenant, John Lewis Way, was instructed to acquaint the commander of the *Voldrogue* that the papers of the ship he was chasing would be examined on board the *Bulldog* and that if she proved to have no right to fly British colours Captain Wake would not interfere; but if she was entitled to do so the *Voldrogue* would not be permitted to meddle with her. Lieutenant Way was also cautioned to be guarded and temperate both in manner and speech during his interview. He returned to report that the behaviour of the *Voldrogue's* commander was overbearing and offensive throughout and that he had insisted on going on board the *Jamaica Packet*.

While the *Jamaica Packet* was picking up her boat the *Voldrogue* attempted to run alongside her and actually fouled the *Bulldog* in her efforts to do so. The Salnavist commander came forward on the forecastle, revolver in hand, and demanded information about the *Jamaica Packet*. He was firmly told that his demand would not be

³ The history of those earlier days of the Republic of Haiti is traced in *Haiti, or the Black Republic*, by Sir Spenser St. John, K.C.M.G., formerly Her Majesty's Minister Resident and Consul-General in Haiti. (Smith, Elder & Co., 1884.)

⁴ The *Voldrogue* was originally an iron Glasgow-built merchant vessel of about 500 tons burthen. She mounted four light guns and had been captured by the insurgents from the Haitian Government.

complied with, upon which he again tried to close the packet. But when he was warned that if he did not desist he would be captured, he withdrew to rejoin his consorts.

The master of the *Jamaica Packet* was then given assurance that he would be protected from further persecution. Attempts to communicate with the *Voldrogue*, when it was intended to supply the information required, proved abortive, so Captain Wake decided to return to Cape Haitien on the following day. He got in early in the forenoon and sent an account of the proceedings to Mr. Dutton, the British Vice-Consul, requesting him to inform the rebels that the *Jamaica Packet* was fully entitled to fly the British flag and that the *Bulldog* would protect her.

It was shortly after this that the insurgent flotilla arrived, and there then began, at the instigation of its commander, a series of insults which compelled Captain Wake finally to resort to force. These were :

- (1) A refusal to allow an officer from the *Bulldog* to land on duty and repelling him with an armed force.
- (2) Ignoring a letter to General Salnave demanding an explanation of this conduct ; and stating publicly that the captain of the *Bulldog* would not be permitted to land under pain of assassination.
- (3) Violating the British Consulate with an armed force and forcibly removing the political refugees who had been there during the whole siege under the protection of the British flag.
- (4) A second violation of the British Consulate on the following morning when two ladies—a sister and a niece of Geffrard—were also seized. (All these unfortunate people were said to have been murdered by the insurgents.)
- (5) Hoisting the red flag and training guns on the *Bulldog*.
- (6) Refusing to continue correspondence on the subject.

Two more days elapsed. A deadlock having been reached, and learning that an attack on the *Bulldog* was contemplated by the insurgents who were said to be confident of their ability to sink her, Captain Wake decided that it would be his duty to take upon himself the responsibility of vindicating the honour of the British flag. He also received on board Messrs. Dutton and Lyons, the latter an English merchant who had swum off to the ship, and recommended all foreigners to embark in the United States ship *De Soto*, whose captain (Captain W. M. Walker, U.S.N.) had promised to receive them.

Captain Wake accordingly sailed on the 22nd for L'Acul, where he landed his passengers and communicated the same evening with President Geffrard. His plan was to sink the *Voldrogue* by running her down, then to bombard Fort Picolet, at the entrance to the harbour, on his way out, and to return with all despatch to Port Royal, Jamaica. This last was in compliance with written orders to that effect, dated 13th October, from Captain Algernon F. R. de Horsey (*Wolverene*, 21), which he received on arrival at L'Acul. He explained that he was "anxious to avoid firing in the direction of the town as little as possible and that he disliked extremely the idea of firing into a ship so very inferior in force as the *Voldrogue* was ; also that by running her down she could be sunk with but little loss of life if any of her crew remained on board, an object that he desired to effect as expeditiously as possible." To that end he gave orders that "no guns were to be fired at the town, but only at the batteries which opened upon us, and he hoped in an hour from the time he entered the harbour to be off Fort Picolet again."

The *Bulldog* being a wooden ship, the advisability of ramming an iron ship, even if it was only half her size, is questionable. Sir James Hope, the Commander-in-Chief, North America and West Indies Station, was emphatically of the opinion that it was not. "Comment," he said, "was unnecessary. Running down a vessel moored close inshore in a harbour like Cape Haitien was one which presented the greatest possible amount of risk without any countervailing advantage." But when studying the chart and deciding upon the courses to be steered after entering the harbour, the possibility that the *Voldrogue* might have shifted berth during the absence of the *Bulldog* was unfortunately overlooked. This proved to be Captain Wake's undoing.

Having cleared for action and hung the stream chain cable over the ship's side inside the paddle wheels, in order to protect the engines, the *Bulldog* entered the harbour of Cape Haitien at half speed shortly before 0830 on the 23rd, opening fire on Fort Picolet in passing so as to give warning of what was intended and to afford the crews of the insurgent flotilla time to escape if they were so minded.

On opening the harbour the *Voldrogue* was seen at anchor in what was assumed to be her original position and, after clearing the shoals of Le Grand Mouton and Le Petit Mouton, no further navigational obstruction was anticipated. But the *Voldrogue* had, in fact, shifted to a position inside the tongue of the spit nearly opposite the Custom House. One shot was fired at her and then the *Bulldog* increased to full speed (nine knots), curving inshore in order to ram the enemy on his port beam. The ships were then about two cables apart.

The batteries farther inside the harbour next opened fire and the *Voldrogue* also fired two guns and some musketry. At this moment (0830) the *Bulldog* ran up on the spit—soft coral and sand—in 12 ft. 6 in. of water, two-thirds of the ship's length being aground. Her draught at the time was 14 ft. 10 in. forward and 14 ft. aft. The British pilotage left something to be desired. Two rounds from the Armstrong gun sufficed to sink the *Voldrogue* and one of the schooners; the others had secured alongside the *De Soto* and, as they were flying British colours, were not molested.

The *Bulldog* had gone ashore at about the top of high water and nothing was to be expected from the rise and fall of tide (half-neap), which was no more than about three feet. A request to the *De Soto*, a ship of 1,700 tons, to assist by trying to tow off the *Bulldog* was refused, though her captain offered to receive any wounded men. A boat was lowered to pick up the schooner's men in the water and seven were brought back as prisoners.

The port paddle-box boat was hoisted out, and while one watch laid out the stream anchor and 11-inch hemp cable, the other watch returned the fire of the batteries. The water was started in the tanks, the two foremost boilers were blown out, and the ship's company sent aft with shot in their hands. Full speed astern had no effect. The injection to the port engine became choked but this was eventually cleared.

It may be noted that the artifices of rocking the ship by the people moving together from one side to the other and of jumping simultaneously by word of command do not appear to have been employed on this occasion; but as most of the weight was forward and the ship was aground on a level bottom for two-thirds of her length, these devices might not have been of much use. No harm would have resulted, however, by trying.

Fire on the batteries was kept up all day, and by nightfall (1730) all their guns had been silenced except those of a battery immediately opposite the ship, which loaded field pieces under cover of solid masonry, ran them out quickly, and withdrew again under cover to reload.

The state of affairs at sunset was as follows. The *Bulldog* was hard and fast aground only 500 yards from the shore,⁶ and a report from the *De Soto* indicated that a night attack by the insurgents was contemplated and that additional guns were being brought down from Fort Picolet. No attack, in fact, materialized and the only firing during the night was an occasional musket shot. The ship had been hulled in several places but this damage was unimportant and she was not making any water. Only one boiler remained effective. The starboard after boiler had been pierced by a shot and the two forward boilers had been blown down in order to lighten the ship forward. Another shot, apparently a 42-pr., had gone through the main steam pipe. The engines, however, were intact. Three of the smaller boats had been rendered unseaworthy by the enemy's fire but the two paddle-box boats and the pinnace were still undamaged. Casualties, most of which were incurred during the forenoon, amounted to three killed (Mr. Painter, boatswain, and two marines), six badly wounded (of whom one died later), and four slightly wounded.

The ship's company were completely exhausted, having been in action for nearly nine hours. Jettisoning coal and stores was therefore not attempted. There remained sufficient ammunition for only three hours' firing on the following day, when the enemy's attack was certain to be resumed. There was no hope of any immediate outside assistance—Geffrard's steamers were too far away—and the existing insurrection in Jamaica precluded any chance of the arrival of a British ship of war. The prospect was not bright. Nevertheless the weather remained fine—a dark night, no swell, and practically a calm.

Captain Wake seems to have been unduly pessimistic about the possibility of refloating his ship, and he overrated the danger to be apprehended from the enemy opening fire again during the night. His reasons for not making any attempt to lay out a bower anchor are not convincing, which was the opinion arrived at by the members of the court-martial who investigated the cause of loss of the *Bulldog*. He contended that, if a bower anchor had been laid out, the chain cable would have had to be used because he did not consider that his 18-in. hemp cable was strong enough for heaving off; also, that if this were done, it would have entailed taking the men away from the guns for too long. In any case, the ship would have had to be lightened forward before attempting to do so. In view of the exhausted state of his crew he thought it impossible to lay out this anchor and chain cable before daylight. He also feared that, if his larger boats were disabled, his only chance of evacuating the crew in safety would be gone. Furthermore, if the worst came to the worst and it was found necessary to destroy the ship to avoid capture by the insurgents, he wanted to keep sufficient powder in reserve in order to do so.

Taking all these factors into consideration, Captain Wake came to the conclusion that he had no other alternative than to evacuate the crew and blow up the ship that night while he still had the means of doing so effectively. Before taking this decision he consulted his two lieutenants, who concurred.

The wounded and prisoners having been sent to the *De Soto*, the ship's company were fallen in and the state of affairs explained to them. Everyone was then

⁶ The *Bulldog's* position was Tour d'Estaing 285°, 500 yards. The *Voldrogue* bore from her 206°, about 150 yards.

mustered in the boats with their arms; combustibles were prepared between decks, and a train laid to the magazine. Captain Wake and a scuttling party remained behind to light the fuses, and finally left the ship in the whaler at 2320. Ten minutes later the *Bulldog* blew up. The funnel remained standing and the paddle wheels still showed above water.

The boats then proceeded to Limonade, some seven miles away on the opposite side of the bay, where the ship's company were landed at about 0200 on the 24th. The Haitian general at Petite Anse provided a steamer which took them round to L'Acul the same evening. There they were transferred to the Haitian steamer *22me D cembre* which, by the President's orders, conveyed them to Port Royal where they arrived at 1730 on 29th October. The survivors, except about 50 men who were retained on the station to fill vacancies, were sent home shortly afterwards in the *Galatea* which was already under orders to return to England.

The Commander-in-Chief was very displeased at the action taken by Captain Wake, but as there were not available on the station sufficient officers of the requisite seniority to form a court-martial he exhibited three charges of disobedience of orders on the part of Captain Wake upon which he might be tried in England. A fourth charge was added, namely, to inquire into the circumstances of the loss of the *Bulldog*. The first three charges, however, formed no part of the indictment.

On 15th January, 1866, and on the following day, a court-martial was assembled on board the *Royal Adelaide* at Devonport to inquire into the circumstances under which H.M.S. *Bulldog* was destroyed at Cape Haitien on 23rd October, 1865, and to try Captain Charles Wake, the officers, and crew of that ship for their conduct on the occasion. The members of the Court were Admiral Sir Charles H. Fremantle (Commander-in-Chief), President, Rear-Admiral T. M. C. Symonds (Superintendent of Devonport Dockyard), Captain T. H. Mason (*Canopus*), Captain W. Edmonstone (*Indus*), Captain F. B. P. Seymour (*Royal Adelaide*), Captain C. J. F. Ewart (*Cambridge*), Captain R. Maguire (*Galatea*), Captain F. S. Tremlett (*Impregnable*), and W. Eastlake, Esq. (Deputy Judge Advocate of the Fleet). The finding of the Court was as follows:

"The Court is of opinion that the cause of H.M.S. *Bulldog* running aground on a shoal in the harbour of Haitien was negligence on the part of Captain Charles Wake and Mr. Edwin Behenna, the Acting Master of that ship, in having taken H.M.S. *Bulldog* within the marks laid down for clearing the said shoal when going at full speed with the intention of destroying the *Voldroque*, an armed steamer belonging to the rebel forces at Cape Haitien.

"The Court is further of opinion that sufficient exertions were not taken by Captain Charles Wake to get H.M.S. *Bulldog* off the shoal on which she was grounded, inasmuch as no attempt was made to get a bower anchor out, nor were sufficient means taken to lighten H.M.S. *Bulldog*.

"The Court is further of opinion that H.M.S. *Bulldog* was prematurely abandoned and destroyed, no attempt having been made to get her off after dark and after all firing had ceased.

"The Court is therefore of opinion that blame is imputable to Captain Charles Wake and Mr. Edwin Behenna, and doth in consequence adjudge Captain Charles Wake to be dismissed from H.M.S. *Bulldog* and to be severely reprimanded.

"And Captain Charles Wake is hereby so sentenced and severely reprimanded accordingly.

" And the Court adjudges Mr. Edwin Behenna to be reprimanded.

" And Mr. Edwin Behenna is hereby reprimanded accordingly.

" The Court is further of opinion that Lieutenant John Lewis Way and Lieutenant Frank Rougemont, both of H.M.S. *Bulldog*, erred in judgment only in counselling the premature abandonment of H.M.S. *Bulldog* when consulted. But the Court acquits the said Lieutenant John Lewis Way and Lieutenant Frank Rougemont of all other blame and they, together with the other officers and crew of H.M.S. *Bulldog*, are hereby acquitted accordingly."

Captain Wake subsequently called the attention of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to the wording of the sentence, but he was informed that their Lordships did not consider that any imputation was cast on his honour or his courage.

The evidence at the court-martial is reported in *The Times* and also in the *Naval and Military Gazette*. The affair formed the subject of the weekly cartoon in *Punch* (Vol. L, 27th January, 1866), which also printed a set of twenty verses entitled "The Pounding of Port-Haytien" (A Fo'k'sle Ballad by a Bull-dog). The final verse may be quoted here :

" And here's three cheers for CAPTAIN WAKE, and while we sail the sea,
May British Bull-dogs always find Captains as stout as he,
That's all for biting when they bite, and none for bark and brag ;
And thinks less about Court-Martials than the honour of the flag."

It would seem that their Lordships took a lenient view of Captain Wake's proceedings in the previous October, for eight months later (24th September, 1866), he was appointed to a screw frigate—a larger ship—which was being commissioned for the Mediterranean Station. This was the *Endymion*, 21, which he commanded until 18th May, 1869. His next and last command was the *Penelope*, 11, a twin-screw iron, armour-plated corvette, which was the Coastguard ship at Harwich. He continued in her from 22nd December, 1871, until 31st December, 1874, by which time he was near the top of the captains' list. He was promoted rear-admiral on 21st September, 1876, but never hoisted his flag. Advanced to vice-admiral on 3rd January, 1881, he was placed on the retired list 16 days later, becoming admiral (retired) on 12th April, 1886. He died on 26th March, 1890.

The point of view taken by Sir James Hope over the *Bulldog* incident, as set forth in his letter No. 456 to their Lordships of 22nd December, 1865 (folio P.381), makes rather curious reading. He said :

" In reference to 530 M of 23rd November, I have reported fully upon Captain Wake's proceedings in my No. 402 of 23rd November and No. 417 of 27th November. I have forwarded charges for the trial of that officer by court-martial. From these it will be observed that the legality 'of using force against the insurgents at Cape Haitien consequent on any act of hostility or provocation on their part,' also that 'of resenting their firing upon the *Jamaica Packet* when employed in the service of the Haitian Government'—the questions referred to [*sic*] by their Lordships to the Law Officers of the Crown—though of much interest and importance in themselves, in no wise touch the conduct of Captain Wake, he having been by my orders expressly debarred from the use of force for such purposes and as expressly ordered to refer such cases to me.⁶

⁶ Their Lordships had been averse to expressing any opinion on these points until they had obtained the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown. The latter appear to have upheld Captain Wake's actions.

" I understand it to be my duty in no case to permit a resort to force except for the protection of British life, and under very special circumstances only for the protection of British property, seeing that in the latter case ample compensation can always be obtained under their Lordships' instructions to that effect without the slightest injury to the public service consequent on the delay in obtaining them.

" Reparation to insults to the British Flag, such as the outrage on the Consulate at Cape Haitien and matters of the like description, are always in my view subjects for their Lordships' decision, and not for that of the Consular or Diplomatic functionaries on the spot.

" In reference to your further No. 539 of 1st December, I would repeat that I have approved of Commodore Sir Leopold McClintock's dealing with this affair, without reference to me, solely on the ground of the complication introduced into it by the loss of the *Bulldog*, the evil effects of which, both here and in Haiti, imperatively demanded an immediate remedy.

" In conclusion, I would add that the power of resorting to force without express orders from myself to that effect is one which I do not entrust to any officer under my command, and with the means presented to me once a fortnight of obtaining their Lordships' instructions within six weeks, it is one which I should never exercise myself without their previous sanction unless under very exceptional circumstances indeed."

This attitude on the part of Sir James Hope surely tends to stifle all initiative by a commanding officer of one of H.M. Ships. But it is evident that their Lordships were not disposed to regard Captain Wake's actions in a particularly unfavourable light, for otherwise they would not have given him another and better command within the comparatively short space of eight months. Although a court-martial was held, as usual, to inquire into the circumstances of the loss of the *Bulldog*, their Lordships decided to take no action against Captain Wake on the three charges of disobedience of orders. The first page of the Commander-in-Chief's letter has written right across it in pencil (by whom it is not indicated) the word 'Cancelled.'

From time to time there may arise a set of circumstances when the naval officer on the spot is not only able to but does implement the policy of 'that for that.' If action is taken *at the time*, the disturbers of the peace can usually connect cause and effect; but when it is postponed for several weeks whilst waiting for approval by higher authority, the benefit of an immediate sharp lesson is lost because the transgressors have probably forgotten how the circumstances came about in the first place.

* * *

The Royal Navy had not yet finished with the insurrection in Haiti, for five days after the blowing up of the *Bulldog* the British Chargé d'Affaires at Port-au-Prince, Mr. Spenser St. John, sent an urgent letter to the Senior Naval Officer at Jamaica, Commodore Sir Leopold McClintock, in which he said :—

" . . . These serious insults to the British Flag and the refusal of all redress were the causes which induced Captain Wake to resent the conduct of the insurrectionary forces, &c., as far as the information has reached me, fully justify the course he pursued.

" Should you consider, as I do, that the conduct of Salnave and his followers is only worthy of banditti, and that such conduct should be punished in the most exemplary manner, and should you consider, as I do, that further measures should be taken to enforce the fullest satisfaction, I must request that the squadron should

call [in] here before proceeding to the Cape, in order that I may accompany it to conduct the diplomatic negotiations which may be necessary.

"I write this in great haste, but it appears highly probable that there is some connection between the movement at the Cape and that in Jamaica."

The Commander-in-Chief, it may be noted, was then absent at Halifax and did not return to Port Royal until 10th November.

The Commodore replied to the foregoing on 1st November, when he remarked that, according to the captain of the *De Soto*, some of the political refugees who had been removed from the British Consulate were scarcely entitled to such protection, and the fact that they had all been executed had not been confirmed. There was also the possibility that the British Consulate had become a focus of intrigue without the Consul having either the slightest knowledge of or power to prevent it.

Next day Captain Rochfort Maguire (*Galatea*, 26) received his sailing orders :—

"An act of aggression has been committed on the English Vice-Consulate at Cape Haitien by the party in possession of that place, acting against the Government. You are therefore hereby directed to proceed to Port-au-Prince and place yourself in communication with H.M.'s Chargé d'Affaires to the Haitian Government for the purpose of embarking him, if he deems it expedient, or of conferring with him previous to your proceeding to Cape Haitien.

"Having heard the opinions of H.M.'s Chargé d'Affaires as to what he considers would be a proper reparation to demand for the insult to our Flag, you are, if you consider it feasible, to proceed to Cape Haitien and exact the satisfaction agreed upon.

"In exacting this service, should you deem it necessary to refer to me for further instruction, do not hesitate to do so.

"It is to be remembered that any attack made upon Cape Haitien should not assume a political character, as we are not called upon to suppress the Haitian insurgents, and the property likely to be destroyed, as it belongs mainly to foreigners, would entail heavy expense upon Her Majesty's Government without inflicting punishment upon the party which has committed this act of aggression.

"Should our Chargé d'Affaires deem it expedient to accompany you to Cape Haitien, you are to embark him for that purpose, and subsequently to reland him at Port-au-Prince if he requests you to do so.

"You will receive herewith for your guidance and information a copy of the correspondence addressed to me on this subject by Captain Wake of H.M. late ship *Bulldog*.

"Having performed this service, you are to return to Port Royal, using steam only when it may be necessary to do so."

By Command of the Commodore.

F. O. L. PATCH, Secretary.

"P.S.—A vessel⁷ will be sent to join you off Perle Point, upon your arrival there, and her Commander will be directed to place himself under your orders. She will be due off the Point on Monday [6th] at noon."

The *Galatea* called at Port-au-Prince on the 5th and embarked Mr. St. John ; she then went on to Cape Haitien, picking up the *Lily* next day. The ships anchored in the morning of the 7th at Cape Haitien where they found the French *Amphion*, and

⁷ This vessel was the *Lily*, 4 (Commander Algernon C. F. Heneage—'Pompo' of later years).

the *De Soto* also arrived the same forenoon. Late that evening the *Galatea's* master was sent away to buoy the west end of La Trompeuse shoal, and next day both British ships shifted berth to take up bombarding positions opposite the forts which were held by the insurgents.

Shortly after 0900 on the 9th the British ships began to engage the several forts. By noon Fort St. Michel had been destroyed by the accurate fire from the *Lily*, and the Haitian Government troops then entered and took possession. The *Lily* next engaged Fort Picolet, which was also knocked to pieces, and at 1600 parties from both ships landed to disarm the fort, when 17 36-prs. were spiked; some were thrown over the face of the battery and the rest were dismounted. The fire from the *Galatea* on the other forts was no less effective. All firing ceased at 1620. About an hour later the insurgents set fire to the town in several places, after which Salnave and his principal followers took refuge on board the *De Soto*.

Order at Cape Haitien having been restored and the insurgents driven out, formal recognition of the Geffrardist Government was accorded at 0800 on the 11th by a salute of 21 guns to the Haitian flag, and that forenoon Captain Maguire and Mr. St. John paid a formal call on the President. The next week was taken up in salving gear from the wreck of the *Bulldog*, and on the 20th both ships left Cape Haitien, Mr. St. John taking passage in the *Lily* to return to Port-au-Prince.

The aftermath of this affair is interesting. In 1955 an American salvage firm, whilst searching for the wreck of Columbus's flagship, the *Santa Maria*, discovered a sunken wreck in the harbour of Cape Haitien. This was described as "the remains of a side-wheel steamer with a square boiler, which was located in April of this year in Cape Haitien harbour, approximately 1,500 yards south of the west end of the Barrier Reef." Information was requested as to the "nature and purpose of a copper wire line, about $\frac{3}{8}$ -inch in diameter and consisting of 66 links, each 2 feet in length, recovered from the wreck and assumed to be a sounding (lead) line because a 'lead' (of sorts), badly corroded, was also found."

The records of wrecks in America and Canada threw no light on the identity of this vessel, so the Admiralty was approached in the matter. The answer was speedily forthcoming. The wreck, it was stated, was almost certainly that of the ill-fated *Bulldog*, and although no records remained at the Admiralty to confirm the identity of the mysterious long copper links, these might well have been required in connection with the special sounding machines which had been supplied to the *Bulldog* in 1860 for use in running the lines of transatlantic soundings to which reference has already been made.

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HELICOPTERS

By

MAJOR T. M. P. STEVENS, M.C., R.M.



AS the size of our armed forces is reduced, so must their mobility and hitting power be increased. One way of doing this is to use troop-carrying helicopters.

The great latent possibilities of helicopters for troop-carrying have not really been seriously studied in Britain. They have so far been developed for anti-submarine, air-sea rescue, mine-sweeping, reconnaissance, and logistic support, and these helicopters have been 'mis-appropriated' for troop-carrying on a small scale in Malaya and Cyprus, and finally at Port Said. All this, however, is but make-shift.

There are three main reasons why helicopters have not been developed especially for troop-carrying, and these are expense, vulnerability, and the poor performance of present machines. Expense and vulnerability will be discussed later ; for the moment let us concern ourselves with performance.

The best British helicopter used yet in operations, the Westland Whirlwind, carries only five or six men and its performance falls off so much at altitude and in tropical conditions that it is often useless for troop-carrying. But helicopters of far higher performance are already in service in America, France, and Russia, and some will soon be available in Britain. Our most promising one is the Westland Wessex. Based on the Sikorsky S58, it can carry 14 men for a distance of 80 miles, or nine men for 200 miles, and it can fly at over 100 knots. The Sikorsky version is in service in the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, and has been used extensively by the French in operations in Algeria with great success. The prototype of the British version shows great promise. Production models could appear by 1960 or 1961.

What this performance means can be quickly seen if we consider the lift available for the Port Said operation. There were 22 Whirlwinds and Sycamores with a total lift of 100 men. One lift on its own would be vulnerable to enemy attack ; and it was mainly because of this that the Royal Marine Commando was landed within the beach-head already captured by sea-borne Commandos. The same number of Wessex helicopters could have carried 250 in each lift, together with support weapons, vehicles, and artillery, and the lifts could have arrived more frequently. With such a build-up we get our first glimpse of the real possibilities of helicopters.

Other promising helicopters are the twin-rotor Bristol 192B, comparable to the Wessex, which may appear soon ; the Fairey Rotodyne, carrying 40 men or three vehicles ; and the 'Flying Crane' version of the Westland Westminster, with a payload of 12,000 lb.

The value of helicopters is greatest in cold war. An enemy can strike suddenly in remote places, and can as suddenly disappear before being brought to action. Or he can trust to difficult country to deter us from the effort. Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, the Aden Protectorate, and Oman are examples. Outlying villages are intimidated because they can be overwhelmed before help can come, while our own ground forces must be dispersed to defend the many targets the enemy can attack. Parachutists are not the answer to this problem. Apart from the special training they need and the difficulty of using them in wild country, they lack mobility when they reach the ground. Another alternative, which is policing by air strikes, can sometimes help but will never by itself defeat a determined enemy.

Helicopters can completely change the picture in two ways; they can bring troops (even those with no previous training) quickly to the trouble spot, and they can give those troops great tactical mobility. Consider a guerilla attack on a village in difficult country some 40 miles from our nearest reserves, for example. At present there is little that could be done about it. But with helicopters the first troops could arrive half-an-hour after the news was received. The C.O. could fly over the area in a light helicopter, while two or three others would find a landing zone clear of enemy fire. The rest of the force could then be flown in. Reconnaissance by ground and air could discover the dispositions of the enemy, and more troops could be put down on escape routes. The C.O. could control the battle from his light helicopter, moving his reserves also by helicopter.

This is an example of an immediate counter-attack. Helicopters could also be used for pre-planned operations. For example, to clear bandits from a chosen area they might be used in conjunction with a sweep by ground forces.

This is not crystal-gazing, but a description of what the French do in Algeria. The French soon realized the value of helicopters and their total number, including those on order, probably exceeds 400, with many Sikorsky 58s and Vertol H21 (twin-rotor). With widespread troubles in a large area of difficult country, the helicopter is probably the chief factor which has kept the French more or less on top militarily. Several times whole bands of enemy have been destroyed, and this ability to arrive quickly has greatly reduced rebel activity in many areas and kept waverers on the side of the French.

Speed is often paramount in cold war operations. Delays mean that the enemy escapes, that friends and allies are killed, that people sitting on the fence help the rebels. If both friends and enemies know that they can be reached quickly in strength, then small campaigns such as these will soon be over.

Speed is always valuable in tactical operations; in the cold war it is often vital in strategic movement. Trouble may crop up suddenly in a remote place, and if it is not nipped in the bud a long campaign may be needed. For rushing troops to the area, transport aircraft are usually better than helicopters, in range, speed, payload, and cheapness. Air transport, however, has limitations. Apart from the time needed to assemble the aircraft, and the enemy threat to available airstrips, the troops will lack tactical mobility after they land. Even if vehicles are pre-positioned and the balance brought in by air and sea, the force will be road-bound, with its communications vulnerable to enemy guerillas. It will be some time before enough vehicles, troops, and stores can be flown and shipped in to allow vigorous offensive operations.

Such a problem can often be solved by the Commando carrier. This may carry 20 helicopters and 500 Royal Marine Commandos. Based within striking distance of

the more likely trouble spots, it could arrive in a matter of days. It would have no need of ports or airstrips, and the force would have great tactical mobility.

The Commando carrier is not a rival to the air-transported strategic reserve but complementary to it. Let us suppose a minority try to seize power in a remote place. The Commando carrier is sent to the area, and the Commando, supporting the local police, can force the rebels on to the defensive by rapid blows where they are least expected. The strategic reserve is then flown in to an airstrip captured by the helicopter-borne forces. Whereas they would have been immobile because of lack of transport, they can now use the helicopters, and the whole force, army and marines, can overwhelm the enemy by superior mobility.

On other occasions the strategic reserve may get there first. The arrival of the Commando carrier means more than reinforcing the strategic reserve by one unit. The Commando itself would be valuable as the cutting edge for helicopter operations, the trained nucleus who are best for the difficult tasks and who have worked out the techniques. But the vital element in the carrier is the helicopters, bringing the gift of mobility.

If we have a lodgement in the area, helicopters can be brought in by ordinary ships or flown in by 400-mile stages, carrying nothing but fuel. Some types of troop-carrying helicopters might even be carried in Beverleys. But the Commando carrier is the best way, bringing not only maintenance facilities, fuel, and spare helicopters, but also the unit specially trained in helicopter operations, and a 'built-in' command and control system so that operations can start immediately.

VULNERABILITY TO GROUND FIRE

The value of helicopters in cold war is hardly in doubt. Their value in limited war is more questionable because of their vulnerability to ground fire and air attack.

There is already much experience to draw on. In Korea and Algeria helicopters were frequently riddled with bullets yet continued to fly. At Port Said one helicopter had 20 bullet holes, six of them in the rotor blades, and only went unserviceable through a leaking petrol tank. Experience shows that the petrol tank and the pilot are the chief risks. The chances of losing helicopters can be greatly reduced by making petrol tanks self-sealing and by giving the pilot light armour.

This does not mean that helicopters should land on top of the enemy, for well-aimed machine-gun fire will knock out a lot of machines and men. It would be preferable to follow the U.S. Marine Corps slogan and 'hit 'em where they ain't,' choosing a landing zone free from aimed small-arms fire.

Helicopters can be landed under fire if the task is important enough, such as a *coup de main* on a vital bridge. Approaching at ground level at 100 knots they can probably reach their objective, though several might be damaged on the ground or in getting away. Unlike gliders, helicopters are of continuous use throughout an operation, so the importance of such tasks must be balanced against the subsequent loss of build-up and tactical mobility. On occasions some loss might be acceptable, and both the Americans and the French are developing lightly armoured helicopters with rockets and guns fitted so that they can shoot their way into vital areas.

The routing of helicopters will often be a problem. To fly over an enemy position after a long, open approach is as suicidal as a frontal attack by unsupported infantry. But modern helicopters have the range and speed to sweep wide and to choose

country where the enemy cannot afford to put troops in strength. Flying fast and low over chosen routes, they will be past an enemy before aimed fire can be brought to bear.

One learns from this the obvious truth that there are times when helicopters can be used and times when they cannot. This needs saying, for some people think that because a helicopter is not bullet-proof, it is therefore vulnerable in some absolute sense and not fit for the battlefield. The most vulnerable item on the battlefield, the infantry soldier, has played a vital part in battles for thousands of years. Give him wings to fly at 100 knots over the battlefield at ground level, over rivers, jungles, mountains, and desert, and consider whether he is more or less vulnerable! The troop-carrying helicopter must be seen in this light; not as an isolated new weapon for the battlefield but a means of carrying the vulnerable soldier and putting him where he is least expected. The helicopter brings its own new risks, but none so great as the frontal assault against prepared defences which is often the only alternative.

VULNERABILITY TO AIR ATTACK

The chief new risk that helicopter operations will bring is vulnerability to air attack. To land a battalion with its support weapons 15 miles behind the enemy line would require 20 S58s running a shuttle service for two hours, over ground where there would be no warning of enemy aircraft and no chance of intercepting them.

Yet before this risk is accounted unacceptable, it must be brought into perspective. Offensive operations, particularly airborne operations, are not normally carried out until a favourable air situation has been achieved. In proportion as we fail to reduce the enemy air, so we must limit our offensive. Secondly, helicopters are not the only targets an enemy will want to attack. The landing will be a part of a general offensive, and if there is a sound deception plan the enemy will not know where his greatest danger lies.

Nevertheless, the rough direction of the helicopters will soon be known and enemy fighters will undoubtedly be sent to deal with them. Now a helicopter flying straight and level at 1,000 feet is a dead duck. They won't do that. They can be flown in groups at tree-top height, following the contours of the ground, choosing ground which gives them best concealment against enemy air, and over varying routes. In the build-up described above there might be one group of five helicopters to 160 square miles of country. Even if an enemy spots them his work is not done. The group will break up, he will be left with one dodging helicopter close to the ground, and it may take several runs to guarantee a hit. There will certainly be casualties to the helicopters but, as always, these must be balanced against the greater ends that might be attained.

One can easily visualize air situations where helicopter operations behind the enemy are out of the question, and on such occasions they would not be attempted. But on other occasions it might well prove acceptable to risk a single lift of 30 helicopters to land 500 men a mile or two behind the enemy, or to carry out a *coup de main* on a bridge with half-a-dozen helicopters. On other occasions still, depending not only on the enemy air strength but on the concealment offered by broken ground, it might be worth risking a sustained build-up far behind the enemy lines. On others, helicopters might be able to roam at will behind the enemy, in which case the battle is as good as won. Every plan has risks. The problem is not to avoid them but to assess them.

Even if the enemy air prevents us from operating extensively behind the enemy, helicopters will always be useful in our own territory, for bringing troops to threatened spots or for carrying supplies. Enemy aircraft can, of course, reach them there too. But once again we must think not so much of the vulnerability of the helicopters but of the loads, whether of stores, weapons, or men. If these do not go by helicopter, they must usually go by lorry.

A quick calculation shows that to do the same job in the same time by lorry and by S58 helicopter, from 10 to 15 lorries would be needed for each helicopter, more in difficult country. It is not difficult to visualize a situation where a reinforcement or re-supply problem requires either 240 lorries or 24 helicopters. The lorries must stick to the roads, with all their dangers from air attack, and may be held up when bridges are blown or roads are blocked. The helicopters, moving five times as fast over unexpected routes, can dodge enemy aircraft; the lorries cannot. The lorries can operate by night. So can helicopters, with certain aids. The lorries can hide in the woods by day. So can helicopters.

An odd but valid way of looking at the problem is to compare 24 helicopters operating normally with 240 rotorless helicopters bound to the roads at 20 miles an hour. The two lots can do the same job. Take your pick!

This is a complex problem with much more to be said on both sides. But the analogy of the rotorless, road-bound helicopters underlines the real nature of the problem, not only behind our own lines but over the whole battlefield. It is not a question of the vulnerability of the helicopters but the vulnerability of the cargo. There are jobs to be done—reserves brought in to meet a sudden assault, sectors to be maintained, surprise attacks to be launched. Often the air situation will make it dangerous to do the job by helicopter; on those occasions it will usually be impossible to do the same job by other means. Thus trials of the vulnerability of helicopters are useless unless there are simultaneous trials of the vulnerability of doing the same job by other means.

Notwithstanding all that has been said, there are obviously great risks in using large numbers of helicopters. To help to decide whether these risks are justified it is wise to suspend judgment on vulnerability and to assume for the moment that helicopters can range freely over the battlefield. Only then can it be seen how great their possibilities are.

Speed is paramount in the first battle of a war. The attacker will try to overwhelm the enemy or to occupy vital territory in the first surprise onrush. History has many examples, the most recent of which are the invasion of South Korea and Israel's war with Egypt. In both cases the attackers almost overwhelmed the defence in the first onslaught.

This may contain the pattern of limited wars of today. With hot war no longer practicable, countries may launch swift, short campaigns with a limited object, such as to seize some area before the defence can react, trusting to political deadlock to prevent the major operation necessary to evict them. Thus speed matters more than ever—speed by the aggressor, to achieve limited aims before his opponents can move, and speed by the defenders to delay him until forces can be built up to stop him.

Airborne and air-transported forces, dropped in the path of the advancing enemy to secure vital defiles or river lines, might seem to be the answer. But airborne operations have two great disadvantages; they usually need long and detailed planning and mounting; and the forces, once committed, are even more immobile

and inflexible through lack of transport than normal ground forces. Such limitations can be fatal in the face of a rapid onslaught by a mobile enemy, who could seize or bomb the airstrips needed by the defence to fly in the main force. Only helicopters can provide the answer, by giving tactical mobility to whatever forces can be got to the area in time.

The perennial problem of small forces is to wrest the initiative from a numerically superior enemy. The commander is tempted to respond to all the enemy's threats, to try to plug all the holes in the dyke. Yet if he does so he will be beaten everywhere. The perennial answer is mobility—the power to concentrate rapidly on some part of the enemy, stun it before the rest can move, then turn against another part. The classic examples of this are Napoleon's operations in Italy and Lee's in the American Civil War.

This may be the great contribution of helicopters to modern war. To the weak they give the power to create a reserve and to strike quickly; to the strong they bring the ability to run rings round an enemy and to destroy him in a few days.

It is not suggested that helicopters can work miracles, that a few helicopters can give to a small force the power to defeat a powerful, mobile enemy who has strong air support. But helicopters can bring that vital mobility which gives a better chance to delay the enemy while stronger forces are built up.

Besides moving troops to plug holes or to launch an attack, helicopters can give added mobility by moving stores, fuel, and ammunition, or by switching artillery rapidly. They can land patrols in remote places, or help guerillas. Helicopter-borne troops can guard lines of communications against enemy guerillas or penetration, releasing a brigade or more which would otherwise be pinned down in the rear areas. They may even make possible operations without ground lines of communication. Certainly they would make commanders less sensitive to threats to their rear.

In attack, apart from their value in the assault and in seizing important ground behind an enemy, they can help to maintain momentum. An armoured force breaking through can be refuelled and rapidly reinforced by highly mobile troops and guns, while all ground won can be quickly secured if it is needed.

Here again one sees the distinction between helicopters and paratroops. Paratroops are (roughly speaking) a means of drawing a blue circle on the map ahead of advancing forces—a job which they can often do far better than helicopter-borne forces. Helicopter-borne forces on the other hand can be used continually to work with advancing forces, or on exposed flanks, or behind the enemy lines, or on many other jobs. Yet we should not see helicopters and airborne forces as rivals, but as complementary—the shock effect of a big airborne landing with flexibility and mobility added to it by helicopters.

Helicopters are invaluable in amphibious operations. During the assault, helicopter-borne forces can land in the enemy flanks or rear, can knock out headquarters and gun areas, and can secure vital ground inland. Its greatest contribution to amphibious operations may be to make a port unnecessary, and thus to reduce specialized shipping to the amount needed to land tanks. The bulk of ship-to-shore movement can be carried out by medium and large helicopters, lifting stores and vehicles from ordinary transports miles out to sea to well inland.

THE EXPENSE

Can we afford enough helicopters? Expense, like vulnerability, is relative. When assessing the cost of helicopters we must consider how much it will cost to do the same job without them. In cold war, and often in limited war, far more men will be needed to do the same job, and will take far longer, without helicopters than with them. Sometimes the presence of helicopters may make the difference between holding and losing some important piece of territory. The money spent on helicopters will be nothing compared to the powerful blows struck at our economy if vital places are lost.

Another factor which makes helicopters economical is their versatility. At all times, in peace and war, there are jobs they can do, many that can only be done by them. They are one of the few military equipments that can pay a daily dividend.

The difficulty about the armed forces is that though they pay their way (in a sense) when fighting, at all other times they are a drain on the country's economy. This need not be so with helicopters, for we can follow an example from naval history. Long ago, when there was little difference between warships and merchant ships, England solved the problem of expense by, on the one hand, hiring merchantmen in time of war, and on the other hand, hiring out the 'Royal' ships in time of peace as merchantmen. There is little difference between military and civilian helicopters at present. This means that civilian firms using helicopters commercially could be subsidized with a view to earmarking their machines for war, while many of the 'Royal' helicopters could be hired out in peace, bringing them back to the active list when crises approach. Because we are not seeking profit they could be hired out at a reasonable price and should prove particularly useful for commercial enterprises in undeveloped countries. There are difficulties in this, of course, but such a scheme offers chances of providing large numbers of helicopters at no great cost.

CONCLUSION

This article has painted the possibilities of helicopters in bright colours and has dwelt more on their advantages than on their undoubted limitations. There are other problems besides vulnerability; for example, maintenance, fuel supply, and control. Fuel supply will usually be a more serious handicap than vulnerability. It is not suggested that helicopters are a panacea for all the ills of cold and limited war. There are many occasions when it would be highly dangerous to use them, and many possibilities for disasters. But properly handled and in adequate numbers, they could be a great contribution to our military effort, and often a decisive one. It certainly seems a line of thought worth deep study. In that study we must decide whether, though helicopters are vulnerable, our small ground forces are not already too vulnerable without them; and whether, though they are expensive, we can afford not to have them.

THE ARMY OF ISRAEL

By MAJOR EDGAR O'BALLANCE

IN Biblical times there is little doubt that the Jews were a warlike and martial-minded people, and the Old Testament records many of their battles. They were eventually eclipsed by the Romans and dispersed, after which the Jewish soldier did not appear on a battlefield under his own national flag until over 18 centuries later, except for one or two Messianic movements of a military nature. During the past 150 years he has quietly and bravely played a part in the armies of many nations; indeed, an entirely Jewish unit, raised in Bavaria, fought against the British at Waterloo.

THE BEGINNING

The origin of the present Israel Defence Army can be traced back to the days of Turkish rule in Palestine when, to protect themselves against Arab depredations, a number of guards (*Shomerin*) were unofficially appointed to afford a sort of protection to the Jewish communities there. After the Russian pogroms of 1905, many Jews who had received military training fled from Russia and joined the *Shomerin*.

The result was that, in 1907, these guards were expanded and reformed into an organization called the *Hashomer* (watchmen), which had the task of defending the isolated Jewish settlements against raids from the Bedouin. After the first World War the *Hashomer* grew into a larger body, called the *Haganah* (Defence Organization), which had a small permanent staff. The *Haganah* retained its police flavour since the Zionist leaders who controlled it were not in favour of it developing into a military force.

The *Haganah* later came under the control of the Jewish Agency, the body officially representing the Jews in Palestine, and became a sort of underground private police force. Many Jews were killed in the Arab riots of 1929, and as a result the *Haganah* expanded, and began to acquire small arms and to carry out secret military training. By the time the Arab Rebellion broke out in 1936 it was able to give a fair amount of protection to the Jewish settlements. However, the policy of the Jewish leaders was still that of self restraint, though a small body of the *Haganah* was during this emergency tacitly, but unofficially, allowed to remain in being, largely under the guise of 'Settlement Police.' A few successful raids on Arab terrorists and gangs were carried out.

With the Arab Rebellion dying out in 1939, the mandatory Government insisted that the *Haganah* disband, but it refused to do so and instead went deeper underground. A number of its leaders were imprisoned. In 1941, when our fortunes were at a very low ebb in the Middle East and it was feared that we would have to evacuate Palestine in the face of the German threat, it was proposed, in the event of such a contingency, to leave a 'fifth column' behind in that country. The *Haganah* volunteered to carry out this task and a section of it was armed and trained accordingly. After this the Jewish Brigade was formed, which is a story on its own.

With the end of the second World War the *Haganah* again went underground and prepared to fight for Jewish independence, concentrating upon acquiring arms and carrying out military training. The policy of the Jewish Agency remained one of defence only, and it devoted its attention to consolidating the positions and territory held by the Jews, and of smuggling illegal immigrants into the country.

A few raids for arms were made on the mandatory forces, but the majority of this sort of outrage was committed by the dissident groups which had no connection with the *Haganah*.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, 1948

The war between the Arabs and the Jews really began on 29th November, 1947, when the United Nations passed the Partition Resolution on Palestine. Both Arab and Jew got down to the business of fighting each other, the British security forces interfering less and less as they concentrated preparatory to withdrawal. The first phase, which lasted until May, 1948, was fought under the noses of the disinterested British troops in Palestine and consisted mainly of battles for control of the roads, and also for the various strong-points as they were evacuated by British units. At first the Arabs were successful but, after three months of fighting, the tide changed somewhat and the Jews began to gain the upper hand. The brunt of this fighting was borne by the *Haganah*, which was under the central direction of the Jewish Agency.

In May, 1948, when the Mandate formally ended, the Regular armies of Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and the Lebanon marched against the newly proclaimed Jewish State of Israel, and for four weeks the Jews fought back with little more than small arms in their hands. Overnight the *Haganah* had become the new Israeli Army, since the Jewish Agency had become the country's first provisional Government. At this stage it consisted of about 35,000 men but had only enough small arms for about 20,000. This position improved as the fighting went on and more arms were acquired.

The army had as a nucleus over 300 officers who had served in the Jewish Brigade and other British formations. They set to work to provide a staff organization and to train and lead the Israelis. Previously the *Haganah* had been mainly organized into companies, and battalion formations had only just begun to appear. Now, as weapons became available, more battalions were formed, and following them came brigades. The *corps d'élite* of the *Haganah* was the *Palmach* (spearhead), a sort of commando-type brigade which had a left-wing political bias about it. For example, there were no badges of rank and no saluting, but its members were fanatical in the cause and it quickly gained a high reputation in the fighting. In the first instance this was the only mobilized part of the *Haganah*. It should, of course, be noted that formal ranks and saluting were only introduced into the Israeli Army as a whole in August, 1948, but the *Palmach* held out longer.

It is not proposed to give an account of this war, but merely of the growth of the army. In a truce, which lasted for a month, much was done to equip and reorganize. Arms poured in, including heavier material such as tanks, aircraft, and guns, and more units were quickly formed. The suddenly released stream of immigrants provided the manpower, though much of it was either semi-trained or completely raw.

A difference of opinion arose during this truce period as to how exactly the new army should be built. One school of thought, impressed by the performance of the *Palmach*, wanted a 'citizen army' of a similar type, with no saluting or other military formalities. Others, led by Mr. Ben Gurion, demanded a more conventional sort of army. After some internal political tussles Ben Gurion had his way, and under the guidance of experienced officers Israel's new army was constructed on a western pattern. In many respects it was identical to the British Army, from which many of the best aspects had been copied.

At the time of the Cease-Fire in July, 1948, the Israeli Army was about 60,000 strong, or perhaps a little more. By December it reached a strength of about 100,000, and there were sufficient small arms for that number. The country was divided up into four territorial commands, in each of which, in addition to the static installations and troops, was stationed a small striking force. In the south the *Palmach*, which had expanded to divisional strength, remained independent for a short while but was eventually incorporated into the national Army, which came directly under the control of the provisional Government.

Later in 1948 the Israelis launched short, successful campaigns against the Egyptians in the south, and against Arab irregulars in Galilee. By the beginning of 1949 Israel possessed small quantities of guns, armoured personnel carriers, and aircraft.

The various armistice agreements were signed in 1949, after which priority was given to building up a strong army as a defensive shield. Conscription was decreed and all the young men had to serve for two and a half years and the women for two years. A cadre of Regular officers and non-commissioned officers, about 11,000 in all, was recruited to train and administer them.

The basic fighting formation chosen was that of a brigade, often over 6,000 strong and similar to the British brigade group of that period. In the first instance there were about nine of these brigades in existence at a time, depending upon the number of conscripts serving. A number of reserve brigades, probably an additional 15, were available in an emergency.

The policy was to have a large element of 'mounted infantry,' especially in the south where there are flat, open stretches of country to be defended. The standing brigades absorbed and trained the conscripts, manned the frontiers, and also did agricultural and constructional work as well. Training schools were set up, and Israeli officers were sent to foreign countries for courses of instruction. A small armoured brigade was formed with the collection of armour that had been accumulated, and a few of the brigades had a handful of tanks under command.

The defence of the country was based on a strong, defended front line of agricultural settlements, whose task it was to hold the enemy while the army mobilized. The army had a big say in the siting of the frontier settlements and actively assisted in founding them.

Not only was the army used for defence and construction works, it was also essentially a medium to fuse together the many ingathered nationalities. All young men had to serve in it and its task was to imbue them all with enthusiasm and loyalty for their new country, to teach them colloquial Hebrew, and often to read and write, and in the case of some African and Asian Jews it had to teach even the elementary rules of hygiene.

The hungry quest for arms went on in a desperate effort to try to achieve something like parity with the hostile Arabs, but without any great success. The initial Czechoslovakian source soon dried up—in any case the Czechoslovakian material was poor and often unreliable. The Tripartite Declaration of the three Western Powers in 1950 severely restricted the amount of heavy war material the Israelis could buy, but in spite of difficulties and restrictions quantities trickled through and the Israeli Army slowly grew stronger. Mortars and small arms, including ammunition for them, were manufactured locally and there were no shortages in that respect,

but in the main it could not be said that the Israeli Army was a perfectly balanced war machine as it lacked sufficient heavy armaments.

The years from 1949 to 1956 were anxious ones for Israel, a tiny country of just over 1,500,000 people, overlooked by unfriendly Arab neighbours with a huge preponderance of manpower. The frontiers were almost continually alive with incidents, large and small. In the face of Arab provocations the Israeli policy was one of armed retaliation, and the Israeli Army was used to make punitive raids on enemy posts and villages near the border thought to harbour raiders. During the years 1949 to 1953 several raids of company strength, supported by mortars and armour, and in some instances by aircraft, were made; and after 1953 raids involving units of battalion strength and above were launched. In 1955 and 1956 two or three attacks were made involving almost complete brigade groups with supporting arms against Arab positions.

THE SINAI CAMPAIGN, 1956

After the arms agreements of 1955 large quantities of Soviet war material began to pour into Egypt, and as the Western Powers would not increase their quota to counter-balance this, Israel launched a lightning campaign against that part of the Egyptian Army stationed in the Sinai Peninsula. There were, of course, other contributory reasons, such as Fedayeen activities, the economic blockade, and the recently formed Arab military command. On 25th October, 1956, Israel secretly mobilized, and on the 29th paratroops were dropped well inside Egyptian territory to prepare for the swift penetration of four separate mechanized and armoured columns. Again it is not proposed to give an account of this campaign, which in itself is worthy of study; it is sufficient to say that independently the Israeli columns probed, smashed, and mauled the static Egyptians. In less than four days of fighting the demoralized Egyptian Army was streaming back homewards and the triumphant Israelis were overlooking the Suez Canal.

Anglo-French intervention altered the course of affairs and subsequent events, coupled with a poor Israeli publicity department, overshadowed this fine effort, which from a military point of view was highly commendable. Huge quantities of war material were captured, including tanks, guns, vehicles, and fuel—more than sufficient to make good the Israeli losses which, in vehicles, had been heavy.

THE ISRAELI ARMY TODAY

Conscription remains with the original periods of service, and this gives a large reserve of trained manpower. The Israelis claim to be able to mobilize 250,000 troops in 48 hours, but there are, of course, a number of limiting factors to calling-up such huge numbers. In such an event the economic life of the country would almost stop. The men may be neatly earmarked into perhaps 30 to 40 brigades, but the plain fact is that there are not enough vehicles, arms, or other equipment available to activate that number of formations.

It is thought that a more realistic figure in an emergency might be an optimum number of about 30 brigades. In the Sinai campaign a total of between 10 and 13 brigades was under arms. The brigade itself has by now become more streamlined and resembles closely the American combat team. Three brigades are armoured and are completely mobile, but it is doubtful whether there is sufficient transport in the country, civilian vehicles included, to make more than another eight infantry

brigades completely mobile. The remainder would be 'on their feet' or static. Probably there are sufficient mortars and small arms for 40 brigades, but it is doubtful whether there is heavy armament for more than a dozen. There is, in addition, a small brigade of paratroopers.

So far, on an average, between 40,000 and 60,000 conscripts have been serving at a time, and these form about nine standing brigades. The extra brigades would be filled out with reservists, and they are based territorially. Practice mobilizations are frequent and reservists are liable to serve for up to 38 consecutive days a year. The intake of conscripts is increasing annually, but this will not mean that the existing number of fighting formations will be increased, as in practice the receipt of heavy military equipment results in the additional men being absorbed in the growing 'tail.'

Israel may possess some 400 tanks, perhaps more, of various sorts, mainly French AMXs, Shermans, and captured Russian T-34s. She also has a number of armoured personnel carriers, some captured, some bought, and a few guided anti-tank missiles, the French SS10. The field artillery pieces, perhaps enough for a dozen brigades, are still miscellaneous and present a complex ammunition supply problem.

In the air Israel has about 300 aircraft, all of fairly modern types. Until recently they were mainly Meteor and Vampire jet fighters, but now she had accumulated a number of Mystères and Ouragans by a secret agreement with France, possibly as many as 150. At sea the Israeli Navy is still tiny, consisting of three destroyers, one captured from the Egyptians, a few frigates, and a handful of small coastal craft. At the moment of writing she is anxiously negotiating to try to procure submarines and anti-submarine equipment to combat those acquired by Nasser, but so far has been unsuccessful.

The Israeli Defence Force as a whole comes directly under the Minister for Defence who, through a unified General Staff, controls all three Services, which in such a small country simplifies many problems. The country is now divided into three territorial Commands, the Northern, the Central, and the Southern, each of which is responsible for the troops within it and also for administering any additional forces operating within its area on any particular occasion. There is an armoured group in the south, which comes directly under G.H.Q.

The proportion of 'teeth' to 'tail' is high, much higher than any other army, but with increasing mechanization the 'tail' is increasing more than the Israelis care to admit. When questioned on this point, Major-General Laskov, the new Chief of Staff, would not commit himself to actual figures but said he was fully aware of the danger of a 'growing tail' and also said that one of his primary concerns was to watch closely to see that this did not happen. He has a reputation for efficient administration and said he would prune ruthlessly if it became necessary to maintain the present proportion.

Morale in Israel is high and the people are fully aware of the necessity for having a sound defence force. Also, being close to the people, the army is held in high esteem and no Israeli begrudges the large amounts of money allotted to it from a slender purse. The Israeli Defence Budget is, in part, secret.

THE FUTURE

It is always both difficult and unwise to attempt to peer into the future, but certain broad assumptions can, perhaps, be made with some degree of confidence. An attack upon Israel by one or the other of the Arab countries cannot be completely

ruled out, and should this occur the Israelis can doubtless be relied upon to hold fast, and also to maul their attackers. They have soundly beaten the Egyptians recently, but most true Arabs have nothing but ridicule for the Egyptian fighting man. It must be remembered that the quality of the Arab soldier varies considerably. The Syrian or the Jordanian on the battlefield is a different proposition to the Egyptian, for instance. There is a distinct danger that the Israelis may rate their victory in the Sinai too highly and use it as a yardstick to measure up their other antagonists. If they do become over-confident, and accordingly careless, they may suffer casualties they can ill afford in the first few days of any hostilities.

However, as matters stand at present, the Arabs do not seem over anxious to come to blows, even though they are ever boastful and vainglorious. It is possible, however, that Colonel Nasser may be able to breathe fire into them and persuade them to make the attempt. Again, as Arab morale rises and the Army of the United Arab Republic becomes better equipped—and especially if Nasser is successful in getting a few tactical atomic weapons from Russia—he may be tempted to start something. But whilst her army remains in its present high state of morale and efficiency, Israel need not worry unduly about the final outcome on the battlefield.

Should 'foreign volunteers,' in large numbers, suitably disguised under Arab names, flood into the Middle East to man the Soviet modern war equipment and to stiffen the fighting units, that is another matter and is outside the scope of this article.

Less clear is the outcome should Israel be tempted to use her army in an offensive role. According to the Israeli military authorities, this is in no way their intention, but such action could certainly be contemplated in the nature of a counter-offensive should Israel be attacked. In such an event it is probable that the Israeli Army would be given one or more of three possible tasks:—

- (1) To push the Israeli frontier eastwards to the River Jordan.
- (2) To re-occupy the Sharm El Sheikh strip in the Sinai Peninsula.
- (3) To take Akaba and the adjoining north-western hilly part of Saudi Arabia.

The first course is perhaps the most likely. Israel is dangerously narrow at the waist, in fact only 12 miles across in one part, and desperately needs space to manoeuvre. The temptation to iron out the Samaritan Triangle, as this Arab 'bulge' is known, would obviously be great. It is held by the troops of Jordan, the former famous Arab Legion, which has a total of four mobile infantry brigades in all, plus a light armoured brigade. It seems probable that the Israelis could occupy this area within 48 hours. Although it is difficult country, Jordan would be lucky to extricate even part of the forces she normally keeps in the area and fall back to the line of the River Jordan in good order.

The United Arab Republic is at present antagonistic towards Jordan and might not be averse to seeing Jordan's Army badly battered. Iraq, her former ally in the Arab Federation, is an ally no longer. It is, however, unwise to speculate on matters such as these, for regimes in the Middle East can come and go with bewildering rapidity. By the time these words appear in print, the situation *vis-à-vis* Jordan may be completely changed.

The second task, that of re-occupying the Sharm El Sheikh strip along the south-eastern edge of the Sinai Peninsula, may be considered necessary, or even vital, as the Israelis are staking much on developing their new Red Sea port of Elath. Should Egypt once again be tempted to interfere with Israeli shipping, this may well

happen. The Egyptian Army has already been badly shaken, and there is little doubt that the Israelis could quickly and efficiently carry out this task.

The third probable task, to capture Akaba and the hilly part of north-western Saudi Arabia which controls the entrance to the Gulf of Akaba, might be attempted if Saudi Arabia, emulating the former tactics of Egypt, attempts to blockade Elath. This would be a new venture for the Israelis, and they would be up against Saudi Arabian soldiers. The fighting qualities of the desert-bred Arab are rated considerably higher than those of the Egyptians.

But at the same time they have many drawbacks. King Saud is chronically short of good officer material, and although he is, on paper, planning a force of four divisions, it is doubtful whether, even by impressing ARAMCO transport, which he has done before, he could put more than four or five indifferent brigades into the field. The result would probably not be in doubt, but the Israelis might have a tougher nut to crack than they had anticipated, as the hilly ridges that fringe the coast lend themselves to defensive tactics.

To sum up, the picture presented is one of an efficient, determined, hard-hitting army, the second largest in that part of the world (Turkey can probably field 22 divisions). It is an army which could give a very good account of itself in an emergency, but limited in the extent of its operations by distance, and in the duration of any hostilities by economic pressure.

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CORRESPONDENCE

(Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the JOURNAL, or which are of general interest to the Services. Correspondents are requested to put their views as concisely as possible, but publication of letters will be dependent on the space available in each number of the JOURNAL.—EDITOR.)

THE TERRITORIAL ARMY

To the Editor of the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL.

SIR,—Your Editorial note on the above in the August edition of the JOURNAL is, I venture to suggest, not quite historically accurate. The merger of the Yeomanry and Volunteer Forces was effected by Parliament, not by the County Associations. Apart from the Honourable Artillery Company—which incidentally did not form part of the Volunteer Force—no Volunteer units had been in existence in 1908 as armed forces of the Crown for hundreds of years. The Yeomanry came into existence in 1794, but the Volunteer Force, which was largely infantry, was raised in 1859. The Volunteers of the Napoleonic era were all disbanded by 1816.

The County Associations did not re-form the Army Cadet Force during the second World War. They could not do so under the then existing legislation, which was not changed until 1951. Until then the A.C.F. was controlled by County Cadet Committees set up by the Army Council.

Territorial units were always an integral part of the Army. During 1914–1920 the Territorial Force was not fused with the Regular Army as was the case in 1939–1945.

May I also record—since so many seem to have forgotten it—that the bulk of Field-Marshal The Viscount Gort's command in France and Flanders in 1939–40 were pre-war Territorials.

DONOVAN JACKSON,

Lieut.-Colonel.

31st August, 1958.

THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN

SIR,—I have read with much interest Captain Wynne's and Lieut.-Colonel Wilson's inquiries into the causes of British failures in the first World War. If I may add one more to Colonel Wilson's comments, I would like to mention a factor which neither of them has mentioned and which, I believe, provides a key to the correct interpretation of the events they have been discussing. This factor was the change in artillery technique made for the battle of Cambrai in 1917. This change is described in the Official History of the Cambrai operations, which explains that, thanks to it, "it became possible to dispense with ranging and registration, keeping the artillery preparations hidden from the enemy, while securing greater accuracy of fire" (my italics). It was this change which made it possible, at long last, to satisfy the second and third of the conditions for success specified by Colonel Wilson. Indeed, it satisfied his fourth condition also, for experience proved that, when the bombardment was really accurate, the German fire ceased to be an insurmountable obstacle. It may be mentioned in this connection that some of the most successful of the British attacks in 1918 were made without any help from tanks.

The full tactical significance of this change seems to have been generally overlooked, perhaps because the first mention of it in official documents was in the above-mentioned volume of the Official History which was not published until about 1948. At all events it is a fact that this particular artillery technique, which produced such remarkable tactical results in the first World War, was not used by us in the second until more than three rather disastrous years had elapsed. When it was at last used, at El Alamein, the results were no less remarkable than those which had followed in 1918.

M. N. MACLEOD,

Major-General.

1st September, 1958.

SIR,—Lieut.-Colonel Wilson's article in your August issue truly attributes British failures on the Western Front in 1915 and 1916 to inexperienced (for a European war) high commanders, staffs, and troops; to inflexible plans slowly executed; to good chances of success thrown away; to faulty artillery arrangements; and to mistaken loyalty to the French. Some reasons for this, hitherto overlooked, may be given.

Until 1914 most of the British Army was serving abroad in many lands, leaving little more than recruits in the U.K. An European war was well-nigh unthinkable, and British study and training for a war on land were therefore largely concerned with problems of defence of her colonial territories. The Germans, on the other hand, had one single aim—preparations for war in Europe.

Before 1914 the British War Office had to arrange for an army of only a few hundred thousand soldiers spread all over the globe. The sudden need, owing to unexpected French and Russian disasters, to raise and equip millions of men provided a colossal task, admirably done with inadequate means.

In the South African War of 1899–1902, the Boer rifle fire made frontal attacks too costly, and they soon gave way to outflanking movements in that vast, open country. But the absolutely continuous defences on the Western Front, from December, 1914, till March, 1918, offered no flanks to envelop save when small gaps were punched temporarily in the enemy's line during battles or in their partial withdrawal in the spring of 1917.

British pre-war training manuals laid down that infantry could not hope to close with the enemy until his small-arms fire had been neutralized. At first the B.E.F. attacked on this principle, with units advancing independently as they could, covered by their own fire and that of mobile artillery, and their fighting qualities were described by the German General von Kluck as *unvergleichlich*, incomparable.

This elasticity gave way, when the most gallant, semi-trained lads of the Territorial and New Armies, unable to manoeuvre, took the field, to stereotyped assaults at walking pace in four dense lines covered by heavy artillery barrages. These barrages were expected to obliterate the defence, and the slow rate of advance was thought necessary to maintain cohesion for simultaneous assaults everywhere. (This gave rise to German criticisms of the rigidity of British attacks.)

On the Somme, on 1st July, 1916, the 8th Division, suffering severely from machine-gun fire, gained in places the third German trench line before being driven back altogether to their morning positions. The 12 battalions concerned lost some 90 per cent. of their officers and about 65 per cent. of other ranks.

The British High Command, always too confident that the next assault would succeed, kept battering away at the same positions, often under most adverse conditions. It was, of course, ever possible that another attack would bring victory, and in fact the Germans were nearer a major defeat at Ypres in 1917 than then appeared.

There were sound reasons for the repeated British attacks. The French armies suffered terrible losses in 1914, 1915, and 1916, and urgent appeals were made to Haig to continue his offensives to save the French from utter collapse. The Somme relieved the intolerable pressure on Verdun in a few days, thankfully admitted by General Pétain.

The British High Command have been blamed and have even been called murderers, for our ghastly casualties in the War. But foe and ally, following similar tactics to the British—though perhaps launching fewer costly assaults—suffered no less. In the five-month Battle of the Somme British casualties were 419,000, French 204,000 (with many less divisions engaged), German 650,000 (official figures). At the end of the battle General Ludendorff confessed that the German Army had been fought to a standstill.

J. L. JACK,
Brigadier-General.

20th September, 1958.

SIR,—Having read with much interest Captain Wynne's articles and the various comments thereon, I suggest that all these military historians are pursuing a false trail. It is, I think, generally accepted that it is unwise to fight a war with the methods of the last one. The principles of war and strategy and the art of the general change only in emphasis and are therefore well worth historical study with a view to practice. The methods, that is tactics, change from war to war and are of academic interest only.

W. D. M. RAEBURN,

Colonel.

28th August, 1958.

THE HEEL OF ACHILLES

SIR,—Sincere congratulations on the publication of the "Heel of Achilles" article. These things badly wanted saying, and with all the authority of the JOURNAL behind them. The present want of A/S ships and aircraft is enough to chill the spine. Will our 'masters' never learn? Apparently not. They read nothing, except each other's speeches, and appear to be impervious to experience and quite without memory. All that can be said of them is that in every generation they run true to form.

REGINALD HARGREAVES,

Major.

17th September, 1958.

DEFENCE

SIR,—It is a brave man who suggests that an Editor may be mistaken in his comment, for the latter can always have the last word! Your correspondent therefore hopes that this letter will be understood to be more in the nature of an inquiry rather than in criticism of certain passages in your Notes in the August (1958) edition of the JOURNAL.

A section of these Notes makes reference to the debatable subject of defence co-ordination. It was, of course, written before the publication of the White Paper (Cmd. 476) entitled *Central Organization for Defence*. This seems to be a more suitable title than your anticipation that the subject matter would deal with "the high command structure of our forces." Are we not in danger of confusing 'command,' implying executive control, with 'policy direction,' implying the proper and effective management at Government level of political and economic considerations with the military problem and issues? It would be a pity if the Services themselves were led to believe that there was any change in the *command* structure, as such. Nor is there, and in your correspondent's view, for morale and psychological reasons, long may this situation continue.

In fact, as the White Paper seems to indicate, there is no fundamental change in the organization of the higher direction machinery—at least the addition of a Defence Board and a change in the title of the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee are not significant beyond the degree to which they may directly or indirectly strengthen the personal hand of the Minister of Defence in his dealings with the Cabinet. In this connection it is of interest to note the emphasis laid upon the functions of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. This Committee moreover bears a remarkable resemblance in terms of reference and composition (including its flexibility in membership) to the one-time Committee of Imperial Defence. Not that the existence of a Defence Committee is anything new. It is simply what the Committee of Imperial Defence was to all intents and purposes, and in its newer form has always continued to exist and function. Rightly and necessarily so, for however much a Government may choose to delegate authority to a particular Minister, only the Governmental Executive, in the form of the Cabinet itself and the Prime Minister in particular, can take final decisions on matters of major policy affecting the country's welfare; and, as it were, insist upon their execution.

Supporters of the Ministry of Defence concept argue that in these days only by means of such an organization can the burden upon the Cabinet Defence Committee be kept within bounds, and the desirable 'knocking together of heads' be effective in arriving at balanced, unbiased advice. Those who have doubts about the need for such a supra-

Defence machinery maintain that the pre-war Committee of Imperial Defence system, where what might have equally well have been called the Defence Committee of the Cabinet was supported and advised directly by inter-departmental bodies, worked as near perfectly as makes no odds without the top heavy 'intrusion' of an extra Ministry and all that is thereby implied in the way of staff and costs.

But whether or not there is anything significant in change in the latest White Paper, your correspondent looks forward to the discussions which you hope will be forthcoming in the JOURNAL. A Ministry of Defence has come to stay and the subject is, as you so rightly say, of prime importance to us all. The concept *must* be made to work if the best use is to be made of our limited financial and man-power resources, even if some will continue to believe that the same conclusions on policy could be reached through simpler ways and means.

In regard to the one time Committee of Imperial Defence you refer to "the transition from the Committee of Imperial Defence to the Chiefs of Staff Committee." Surely this is misleading? The Chiefs of Staff Committee (established in 1922) was an integral part of the Committee and sub-Committee machinery supporting the Committee of Imperial Defence, charged to provide its superior body, either on its own initiative or arising out of specific terms of reference, with concerted professional advice and views on strategic policy and on the military implications of defence policy generally. Just, indeed, as it continued to perform that function in war *vis-a-vis* the Prime Minister in his capacity as Minister of Defence, and as it has done so since to the Government through the post-war Ministers of Defence. The only change, effected after this war, was the provision of a separate chairman to preside over meetings of the three Service Chiefs of Staff. By some account there are past Chiefs of Staff who will assert that in their time no one on the Chiefs of Staff Committee felt the need for such an 'extra,' but that is probably not a point of great moment. Be that as it may; if you had said that the transition of the Committee of Imperial Defence machinery from its peace-time advisory role to its war-time executive counterpart went smoothly you would receive considerable support from a great number of people, particularly from those who were directly behind the scenes at the time. The only dissent, perhaps, would be in your qualification in regard to stresses and strains that "it worked *well enough* in the last war" (the italics are mine). Is this reservation justified? There are at any rate many who will say that it worked superbly. The Americans adopted and copied the system virtually in every respect; and they are a logical people and, *inter alia*, not too ready to believe that someone else's ideas are better than theirs. It was the German system that failed, pointing once again to the danger of divorcing responsibility for advice from responsibility for the ultimate execution. It is this trap into which we must never fall, and into which so far those in support of the Ministry of Defence concept have not, thank goodness, slipped.

On one last point, in your Notes you suggest that "the military machine creaked badly" over the Suez operation, and that this evidences a defect in our higher direction for war. Is this really fair? That the operation was well conceived seems to be borne out by the fact that it was perfectly executed; losses in relation to the potential opposition were negligible; and objectives were attained exactly as planned, including for political reasons the avoidance of noticeable damage to life and property. That the operation was not pursued to what would certainly have been a finally successful conclusion was for reasons quite beyond the compass of those responsible for our defence policy or co-ordination. Misguided outside pressure made a nonsense of the military effort, but surely that was not the fault of those involved in its planning? Whether, in other words, the Cabinet (Government) was right to give way to those pressures, since shown to have been so ill-advised, is another matter; but it is at least difficult to believe that any amount of 'streamlining the higher command structure,' which by inference you hope for, will obviate such an exasperating circumstance.

A. W. CLARKE,

Captain, R.N.

28th August, 1958.

GENERAL SERVICE NOTES

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

C.-IN-C., ALLIED FORCES, SOUTHERN EUROPE.—It was announced on 22nd July that Admiral C. R. Brown, U.S.N., had been selected to succeed Admiral R. P. Briscoe, U.S.N., as C.-in-C., Allied Forces, Southern Europe, with effect from 1st January, 1959.

BAGHDAD PACT

COUNCIL MEETING

The joint declaration and communiqué issued at the beginning and on conclusion of the meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact in London on 28th–29th July, attended by the respective Prime Ministers of Great Britain, Pakistan, Persia, Turkey, and an American delegation led by Mr. Dulles, the Secretary of State, included the following :—

Joint Declaration

“(1) The members of the Baghdad Pact attending the Ministerial meeting in London have re-examined their position in the light of recent events and conclude that the need which called the Pact into being is greater than ever. These members declare their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect.

“(2) Under the Pact collective security arrangements have been instituted. Joint military planning has been advanced and area economic projects have been promoted. Relationships are being established with other free-world nations associated for collective security.

“(3) The question of whether substantive alterations should be made in the Pact and its organization, or whether the Pact will be continued in its present form, is under consideration by the Governments concerned. However, the nations represented at the meeting in London reaffirmed their determination to strengthen further their united defence posture in the area.

“(4) Article 1 of the Pact of Mutual Co-operation signed at Baghdad on 24th February, 1955, provides that the parties will co-operate for their security and defence and that such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements. Similarly, the United States, in the interests of world peace, and pursuant to existing Congressional authorization, agrees to co-operate with the nations making this declaration for their security and defence, and will promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to this co-operation.”

Communiqué

“The Baghdad Pact Council met, as previously scheduled, in London on 28th and 29th July. . . . A significant declaration was signed on 28th July. The member-Governments represented welcomed the new initiative of the United States as set out in Paragraph 4 of that declaration, whereby the United States agreed to co-operate with the other nations making the declaration for their security and defence.

“The Ministers exchanged views on the world situation, with particular reference to the Middle East. They expressed their concern at the recent examples of aggression by indirect means. This represents a spreading and dangerous threat to the independence and territorial integrity of sovereign States and should be combated by all possible legitimate means, including action by the United Nations.

“In this connection the Ministers appreciated the recent prompt action, taken in accordance with the principles of international law and in conformity with the U.N. Charter, by the United Kingdom and the United States in responding to the call for help of the lawful Governments of Jordan and Lebanon. . . .”

GREAT BRITAIN

CENTRAL ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENCE

A White Paper (Cmd. 476, price 6d.) published on 15th July describes three new features introduced in the central organization for defence. The following summary of these new features is given in the White Paper :—

"First, the composition and operation of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet is being adjusted in order to secure greater flexibility and efficiency.

"Secondly, a Defence Board is being set up to assist the Minister of Defence in formulating defence policy and for dealing with inter-Service problems.

"Thirdly, certain adjustments are being made in the Staff organization, including the assumption by the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the title of Chief of the Defence Staff: these are designed to emphasize the importance of the closest inter-Service co-operation and to ensure that the fullest information and advice from the Service Departments is made available to the Minister of Defence."

To gain greater flexibility, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, over which the Prime Minister presides, is now so constituted as to allow the various types of problem that arise to be considered by the Ministers most directly concerned with them. The Prime Minister will determine which of the members should attend particular meetings of the Committee according to the subjects to be discussed and with full regard to the Ministerial responsibilities involved.

The Chiefs of Staff will be in attendance, and may be invited to attend meetings of the full Cabinet.

The Defence Board consists of the Minister of Defence (Chairman), the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War, the Secretary of State for Air, the Minister of Supply, the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Chiefs of Staffs of the three Services, and the Permanent Secretary and the Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Defence.

When the Service Ministers or the Minister of Supply wish to make proposals on any matter affecting defence policy they will normally submit them to the Minister of Defence. This arrangement does not, however, prejudice their constitutional right to make submissions to the Cabinet and its committees.

The Board is the consultative body on major issues of policy for the Minister of Defence. In the discharge of his responsibility as Minister "in charge of the formulation and general application of a unified policy relating to the armed forces of the Crown as a whole and their requirements," the Minister of Defence has authority to decide (subject to the responsibilities of the Cabinet and the Defence Committee) all major matters of defence policy affecting the size, shape, organization, and disposition of the armed forces and their weapons and war-like equipment and supply (including defence research and development).

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir William Dickson has been appointed to the new post of Chief of the Defence Staff. The previously combined posts of Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence have been abolished and the holder of the new post is the principal military adviser to the Minister. He also acts as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Operational orders hitherto issued jointly in the name of the Chiefs of Staff Committee will now be issued by the Chief of the Defence Staff as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

The Chiefs of Staff will continue to act collectively to give their advice to the Minister of Defence and the Government, but, where there are differences between the Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of the Defence Staff will not merely report the differences but will tender his own advice. Nevertheless, the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services have at all times a right of access to the Minister of Defence, and when necessary to the Prime Minister, whether on operational or other military matters.

The Joint Planning Staff are now responsible directly to the Chief of the Defence Staff as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. They will, however, continue to study inter-Service problems in their own Departments under the Chiefs of Staff of their respective Services.

REGULAR RECRUITING

Recruiting figures for August continued to show a satisfactory improvement in the number of men volunteering for longer engagements. They were as follows (those for August, 1957, in parentheses):—

Royal Navy and Royal Marines. Nine-year engagements, 228 (151). Total, including juniors and apprentices, 328 (241).

Army. Three years, 343 (1,461); six years, 1,420 (90); nine years, 527 (111). Total, including boys and apprentices, 2,901 (1,801).

Royal Air Force. Three years 725 (382); four years, 113 (75); five years, 287 (130); nine years and over, 401 (165). Total including boys and apprentices, 1,526 (752).

FOREIGN

WESTERN GERMANY

AUTUMN MANŒUVRES.—Manœuvres involving 80,000 officers and men and 15,000 vehicles of the *Bundeswehr* were held in different parts of Western Germany between 12th and 27th September. Only a few Air Force units took part. Two of the new self-contained brigade groups which are eventually to form the principal combatant formations of the *Bundeswehr* were exercised during the last four days. U.S. and Italian troops and some Dutch aircraft played the part of "aggressors," but no British units participated.

NETHERLANDS

CIVIL DEFENCE CONSCRIPTION.—It was announced by the Netherlands Government on 9th July that there would be conscription for certain Civil Defence services. At present, it was stated, the 160,000 volunteers constituting the Civil Defence Corps were insufficient. In consequence, 60,000 men between the ages of 24 and 60 would be called up at the beginning of 1959 for training in rescue, ambulance, and fire-fighting duties. The initial training would be spread over 60 days.

PORTUGAL

NEW CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, ARMED FORCES.—General José Antonio da Rocha Bezeza Ferraz has been appointed Chief of General Staff of the armed forces in succession to General Julio Botelho Moniz, who has become Minister of Defence.

RUMANIA

WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES.—It was announced on 25th July by Bucharest Radio that all Soviet armed forces had been withdrawn from Rumanian territory.

NAVY NOTES

H.M. THE QUEEN

The Queen, the Duke of Edinburgh, the Prince of Wales, and Princess Anne left Southampton in the Royal yacht *Britannia* on 7th August for a 12-day cruise to the west coast of Scotland. The Queen and the Duke visited Anglesey on 9th August, landing for the day at Holyhead; Dunoon and Rothesay on 11th August; and arrived at Fort William on the 18th, whence they drove to Balmoral.

AIDES-DE-CAMP.—The following have been appointed Naval Aides-de-Camp to The Queen from 7th July, 1958, in succession to the officers stated:—

Captain J. Grant, D.S.O., in succession to Rear-Admiral K. R. Buckley.

Captain R. C. Lewis, D.S.O., O.B.E., in succession to Captain S. A. Harrison-Smith, O.B.E.

Captain A. G. Poe, D.S.C., in succession to Rear-Admiral P. W. Gretton, D.S.O., O.B.E., D.S.C.

Captain C. H. Campbell, D.S.C., in succession to Captain J. S. M. Richardson, D.S.O.

Captain R. E. Portlock, O.B.E., in succession to Captain G. W. Hawkins.

Captain R. R. S. Pennefather, in succession to Rear-Admiral E. N. V. Currey, D.S.O., D.S.C.

Captain W. W. H. Ash, in succession to Captain C. W. McMullen, D.S.C.

Captain H. C. Hogger, D.S.C., in succession to Captain C. M. Parry, C.V.O., O.B.E.

Captain F. H. Fletcher, in succession to Captain R. L. Jordan, O.B.E.

With effect from 22nd August, 1958, Brigadier N. C. Ries, O.B.E., R.M., has been appointed a Royal Marine Aide-de-Camp to The Queen in succession to Major-General R. C. de M. Leathes, M.V.O., O.B.E.

HONORARY CHAPLAIN.—The Rev. J. Armstrong, O.B.E., R.N., has been appointed an Honorary Chaplain to The Queen from 15th June, 1958, in succession to the Rev. E. G. D. Fawkes, O.B.E., R.N.

HONORARY SURGEON.—Surgeon Captain C. B. Nicholson has been appointed an Honorary Surgeon to The Queen from 30th June, 1958, in succession to Surgeon Rear-Admiral E. T. S. Rudd, C.B., C.B.E.

DEPUTY TREASURER.—Commander P. J. Row, M.V.O., O.B.E., has been appointed Deputy Treasurer to The Queen in the room of Commander Sir Dudley Colles, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., O.B.E., from 16th July, 1958. Commander Colles has been appointed as an Extra Equerry to Her Majesty.

PRINCESS MARGARET

Princess Margaret on 15th July was present at Canada's first full dress Naval Review at Esquimalt. From the bridge of H.M.C.S. *Crescent*, she took the salute of 32 ships from the Canadian, British, and United States Navies. On reaching the review area, synchronized 21-gun salutes were fired from the Canadian cruiser *Ontario*, the British cruiser *Newcastle*, and the American aircraft carrier *Bennington* and amphibious headquarters ship *Estes*.

DUKE OF EDINBURGH

The Duke of Edinburgh on 28th July arrived in the *Britannia* at Dartmouth, where he was a cadet 20 years ago, and on behalf of The Queen he presented a Queen's Colour to the Royal Naval College. On 29th July he arrived in the *Britannia* at Plymouth, and proceeded to the Royal Naval Engineering College at Manadon, where he opened a new officers' mess, the first to be designed in contemporary style for the Royal Navy.

On 4th August the Duke, accompanied by the Prince of Wales, embarked in the *Britannia* at Cowes for Regatta Week. H.M.S. *Apollo* was anchored in the Roads as guardship.

BOARD OF ADMIRALTY

FIRST LORD.—The Earl of Selkirk, First Lord of the Admiralty, left London by air on 1st September for Karachi on a series of visits to the Navies of the Commonwealth in Australia, New Zealand, India, and Pakistan. His object was to gain first-hand knowledge of the work of the Far East Fleet.

FIRST SEA LORD.—It was announced on 9th September that Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten of Burma, First Sea Lord, was to visit Canada and the United States to meet the Chief of the Canadian Naval Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy. The First Sea Lord was due to be in Canada from the 4th to 10th October, and in the United States from 10th to 22nd October.

BOARD ROOM IN USE.—After using improvised accommodation for more than three years, members of the Board of Admiralty moved back into the historic oak-panelled Board Room on 31st July for their fortnightly meetings.

OLD BUILDING REOPENED.—In September the Old, or Ripley, Building, the oldest part of the Admiralty in Whitehall, was reoccupied after modernization and redecoration. The main entrance in Whitehall was reopened on 29th September, the 200th anniversary of the birth of Nelson. The Old Building and main entrance had been in the hands of contractors since the spring of 1955.

FLAG APPOINTMENTS

FOURTH SEA LORD.—Rear-Admiral N. A. Copeman, D.S.C., to be a Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty, Fourth Sea Lord, and Vice Controller, in succession to Vice-Admiral Sir A. Gordon V. Hubback, K.B.E., C.B. (November, 1958).

CHATHAM DOCKYARD.—Rear-Admiral J. Y. Thompson to be Admiral Superintendent, H.M. Dockyard, Chatham, in succession to Rear-Admiral G. V. M. Dolphin, C.B., D.S.O. (October, 1958).

R.N. COLLEGE.—Rear-Admiral the Earl Cairns to be President, Royal Naval College, Greenwich, in succession to Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Barnard, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (December, 1958).

PORTSMOUTH.—Rear-Admiral E. N. V. Currey, D.S.O., D.S.C., to be Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, and to Commander-in-Chief, Home (designate), in succession to Rear-Admiral V. C. Begg, D.S.O., D.S.C. (September, 1958).

SEA TRAINING.—Rear-Admiral W. G. Crawford, C.B., D.S.C., to be Flag Officer Sea Training (September, 1958). This officer will follow in the footsteps of the Flag Officer Training Squadron, whose appointment was allowed to lapse in December, 1957, after the withdrawal of the training carriers from the squadron for reasons of economy had led to its abolition. The present intention of the Admiralty is to bring all the ships now engaged in training, together with the organization for the working up of newly commissioned ships, under one command. On 2nd September, it was announced that, as a measure of economy, it had been decided that the Flag Officer Sea Training will, in addition to his main duties, take over the responsibilities remaining with the Captain-in-Charge, Portland, after the run-down of the dockyard. There will thus be a saving of a captain's post.

FLEET MAINTENANCE.—Rear-Admiral R. T. Sandars to be Director of Fleet Maintenance, in succession to Rear-Admiral N. E. H. Clarke (September, 1958).

D.C.N.P.—Rear-Admiral N. E. Denning, O.B.E., to be Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel (Training and Manning), in succession to Rear-Admiral R. T. Sandars (August, 1958).

INTERVIEW BOARDS.—Captain E. T. Larken, O.B.E., A.D.C., to be Flag Officer Admiralty Interview Boards, and President First Admiralty Interview Board, in succession to Rear-Admiral J. Y. Thompson, serving in the acting rank of Rear-Admiral (October, 1958).

RESERVE FLEET.—Captain J. Grant, D.S.O., to be promoted Rear-Admiral to date 7th January, 1959, and to be Flag Officer Commanding, Reserve Fleet, in succession to Vice-Admiral G. B. Sayer, C.B., D.S.C. (January, 1959).

GIBRALTAR.—Captain P. F. Powlett, D.S.O., D.S.C., to be promoted to Rear-Admiral to date 7th January, 1959, and to be Flag Officer Gibraltar and Admiral Superintendent, H.M. Dockyard, Gibraltar, in succession to Rear-Admiral R. S. Foster-Brown, C.B. (January, 1959).

FAR EAST.—Rear-Admiral V. C. Begg, D.S.O., D.S.C., to be Flag Officer Commanding Fifth Cruiser Squadron and Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Far East Station, in succession to Vice-Admiral L. G. Durlacher, C.B., O.B.E., D.S.C. (December, 1958).

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.—Surgeon Captain W. P. E. McIntyre, Q.H.P., to be promoted Surgeon Rear-Admiral with effect from 24th November, 1958, and to be Deputy Medical Director-General, in succession to Surgeon Rear-Admiral R. L. G. Proctor, C.B., Q.H.P.

RETIREMENTS AND PROMOTIONS

Vice-Admiral Sir John W. Cuthbert, K.B.E., C.B., placed on the Retired List (29th August, 1958).

Rear-Admiral L. A. B. Peile, C.B., D.S.O., M.V.O., promoted to Vice-Admiral (29th August, 1958).

Rear-Admiral T. V. Briggs, C.B., O.B.E., placed on the Retired List (1st September, 1958).

EAST INDIES STATION ABOLISHED

The flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Hilary Biggs, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., the hundredth and last Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies Station, was struck in H.M.S. *Jufair*, the Naval Base at Bahrein, on 7th September, when the command ceased to exist. The intention to abolish the East Indies Command was announced by the Admiralty in February, when the Navy Estimates were issued. Its responsibilities are being divided between the Commanders-in-Chief of the Far East and the South Atlantic and South America Stations, and the Commander of the new Arabian Seas and Persian Gulf Station. The latter comprises the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and a small area of the north-western part of the Indian Ocean.

Captain G. F. M. Best, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, assumed the new title of Commodore Arabian Seas and Persian Gulf on 7th September. He will also be Naval Deputy to the Commander, British Forces, Arabian Peninsula at Aden. For the present, however, he will remain at Bahrein.

EXERCISES AND CRUISES

HOME FLEET.—Ships of the Home Fleet under the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir William W. Davis, left their home ports in the first week of September for the autumn cruise and exercises. From Rosyth, the fleet carried out weapon training before putting to sea for a large scale N.A.T.O. exercise later in the month. During October ships were due to pay courtesy visits to various home and continental ports before leaving for Gibraltar to continue training. Further N.A.T.O. exercises were to be held before the return of the fleet early in December.

EXERCISE "SHIPSHAPE."—The N.A.T.O. exercise "Shipsape" took place between 18th and 26th September in the English Channel, Western Approaches, and Eastern Atlantic areas. British ships taking part included the depot-ship *Tyne*, flagship of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, the cruiser *Birmingham*, ten destroyers, a fast mine-layer, frigates, minesweepers, and four submarines.

LIBYA EXERCISES.—Ships and aircraft of the Royal Navy, Royal Marine Commandos, and units of the British and Libyan Armies took part in exercises on the coast of Libya early in September. A landing was made on the 4th near the town of Homs by 1,500 R.M. Commandos in assault and landing craft from the cruiser *Ceylon*. Further landings were made on beaches west of Derna.

FISHERY PROTECTION.—On 15th August, the Admiralty announced that to keep the Fishery Protection Squadron at its full strength when individual ships are withdrawn for refit or other reasons, it is intended to attach temporarily other ships from the Home Fleet. Initially, H.M.S. *Eastbourne*, a frigate of the Third Training Squadron, was lent to the squadron. The *Eastbourne* was on this duty when on 1st September Iceland extended her exclusive fishery limits from four to 12 miles, a decision not recognized by the British Government. Support was afforded to British trawlers who resisted attempts to board them within the 12-mile limit. On 2nd September, a boarding party of nine men from Icelandic gunboats boarded the British trawler *Northern Foam* about 6½ miles east of Hornesness. The *Eastbourne*, with Commodore B. Anderson, commanding the Fishery Protection Squadron, on board, came to her assistance and put a naval boarding party on board the trawler. The Icelandic gunboat captain refused to take back his boarding party, whereupon Commodore Anderson decided to remove them, and they were taken to the *Eastbourne* as 'guests.' They were put ashore in Iceland some days later. Other ships of the Navy on duty off Iceland during September included the destroyers, *Diana*, *Decoy*, *Hogue*, and *Lagos*, and the frigates *Russell* and *Palliser*, with the ocean minesweeper *Hound*.

PERSONNEL

COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH TITLES.—The Admiralty announced on 11th July that, in order more clearly to reflect the nature of their respective duties and the common aspects of their training, new titles are to be introduced for signalmen and telegraphists of the Royal Navy. In general, signalmen, who in the main operate visual methods of communication, will become tactical communication operators, and telegraphists will become radio communication operators. The traditional term Yeoman has been retained for senior signal ratings—chief yeoman of signals becoming chief communication yeoman. Senior telegraphists will be known as supervisors—e.g., a chief petty officer telegraphist becomes chief radio communication supervisor—thus denoting that they take charge of a watch. This term is in common use in civilian-manned communication centres.

MATERIEL AND DOCKYARDS

H.M.S. VANGUARD.—In the House of Commons on 23rd July the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, asked if he would make a statement on the future of the battleship *Vanguard*, said that for the past two years this vessel had been maintained at a high state of readiness in operational reserve to meet Treaty obligations. These obligations no longer existed and the *Vanguard* would now come to a lower state of readiness. This will result in considerable savings in manpower and money. She will continue to be used as a training and Reserve Fleet headquarters ship until satisfactory alternative arrangements can be made.

ACCEPTANCES.—H.M.S. *Echo*, the first of a new class of three inshore survey craft, was commissioned at the Cowes yard of J. Samuel White and Co. Ltd., on 12th September. This class has been built and specially equipped to carry out coastal and harbour hydrographic surveys around the coasts of the British Isles, and to replace the surveying motor launches built about 1940 as harbour defence launches.

H.M.S. Leopard, name ship of the latest class of anti-aircraft frigates was commissioned at Portsmouth on 30th September. She is to serve on the South Atlantic and South America Station.

DISPOSAL OF SHIPS.—In the House of Commons on 9th July, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty said that decisions had been taken to dispose of five cruisers, seven destroyers, 33 frigates, nine ocean minesweepers, and 31 fast patrol boats and motor, gun or torpedo boats. All the ships mentioned except 18 of the patrol boats are of pre-war or war-time construction.

RESERVE FLEET POLICY.—An explanation of Admiralty policy concerning the Reserve Fleet was given by the First Lord, the Earl of Selkirk, in the House of Lords on 31st July in replying to a debate in which Admiral of the Fleet the Earl of Cork and Orrery contended that the selling and scrapping of ships of this Fleet was, under prevailing

conditions, becoming a national danger. The First Lord described the three categories of the Reserve Fleet—the Operational Reserve, Supplementary Reserve, and Extended Reserve—and emphasized that money should be spent on the development of new construction rather than on the maintenance in various stages of obsolescence of our older ships.

WRECK DISPERSAL.—The Admiralty's Wreck Dispersal fleet will be wound up by the end of the year. Since 1940 it has disposed of nearly 800 war-time wrecks. H.M.S. *Steepholm*, the last of 20 specially converted trawlers which were at one time engaged on the task, is now employed on her last job of this kind.

MALTA DOCKYARD.—Plans for the future of Malta Dockyard were contained in an official report presented to Parliament on 31st July. The Government have decided that the yard should be transferred to a private ship-repairing firm. Preliminary negotiations have been concluded with Messrs. C. H. Bailey, of South Wales, and subject to the completion of a satisfactory agreement this firm will form a company to take over the dockyard on lease during 1959. Recognizing the special difficulties of launching this new enterprise, the Government have welcomed an approach which Messrs. Bailey have made to Vice-Admiral Sir Gordon Hubback to become the Managing Director of the company which is being formed. Admiral Hubback was Commodore Superintendent at Malta and has recently been the member of the Board of Admiralty who deals with the naval dockyards.

ROYAL MARINES

HONORARY COLONEL COMMANDANT.—Major-General H. T. Tollemache, C.B., C.B.E., has been appointed Honorary Colonel Commandant, Portsmouth Group, Royal Marines, in succession to Major-General H. T. Newman, C.B., C.B.E., with effect from 31st October, 1958.

CHIEF OF STAFF.—Colonel R. C. de M. Leathes, M.V.O., O.B.E., was promoted to Major-General on 22nd August, 1958, and assumed the appointment of Chief of Staff to the Commandant General Royal Marines on the retirement of Major-General F. C. Horton, C.B., C.B.E.

AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE.—From 8th September, 250 officers and men of the R.M. Forces Volunteer Reserve (City of London) took part in a novel training period of interest to the Royal Marines and Amphibious Warfare Headquarters. A week's training of assault and raiding craft crews and Commandos culminated in Exercise "Mickey Finn" from 15th to 18th September. From Plymouth the force made a landing near Dawlish on the Devon coast, and an 'enemy' force was provided by the Regular Army.

INDIA

NEW FRIGATES.—Two anti-submarine frigates for the Indian Navy were launched during the quarter ending 30th September. I.N.S. *Talwar* was launched on 18th July by Cammell Laird and Co., Birkenhead. She has an extreme length of 370 feet (360 feet between perpendiculars) and a beam of 41 feet. With specialized anti-submarine equipment, she will have a main armament of one twin 4.5-inch gun and two smaller guns. I.N.S. *Kirpan* was launched on 19th August by Alexander Stephen and Sons, Glasgow. She has an extreme length of 310 feet (300 feet between perpendiculars) and a beam of 33 feet. The armament includes three Bofors guns and two three-barrelled anti-submarine mortars which can fire a pattern of large projectiles.

MALAYA

R.M.N. TRANSFERRED.—On 12th July the Royal Malayan Navy was transferred to the Federation of Malaya at a ceremony at Singapore. The White Ensign was replaced on shore and on board vessels of the R.M.N. by the Federation Ensign, which is similar to the White Ensign but has the Federation National Flag in place of the Union Jack.

Since its inception in 1952 the Royal Malayan Navy has been based at Singapore and administered and paid for by the Singapore Government. Its vessels—one small minelayer, one landing craft, one maintenance repair craft, and seven seaward defence

boats, all on loan from the Royal Navy—have now been formally handed over to the Federation Government, and officers and ratings of the Royal Navy at present on loan will continue to serve. Ten inshore minesweepers of the Royal Navy have been handed over as a first instalment of a further build-up, and in the next few years it is expected that a coastal minesweeper and two more inshore minesweepers of the Royal Navy will be transferred. The United Kingdom Government is also to make a cash grant of 1,250,000 Malayan dollars for the purchase of naval stores and equipment, and in addition will pay 6,750,000 dollars towards the cost of constructing a base at Port Swettenham. Until this base is ready the R.M.N. will continue to use the Woodlands base at Singapore.

FOREIGN

ARGENTINA

H.M.S. WARRIOR PURCHASED.—It was announced on 7th July that verbal agreement had been reached between the Government of Argentina and H.M. Government in the United Kingdom for the purchase of H.M.S. *Warrior*, aircraft carrier.

GERMANY

EXERCISES.—On 11th August units of the new West German Navy left Kiel under Commodore Rolf Johannesson for exercises in the Baltic until the end of the month. For the first time since the war, U-boats took part in the exercises.

NETHERLANDS

AIRCRAFT TRIALS.—The aircraft carrier *Karel Doorman* (ex-H.M.S. *Venerable*) arrived at Portsmouth on 8th July for catapult deadload trials and subsequently to carry out flying trials. The deadload trials were carried out with the assistance of the Royal Navy's Flight Deck Machinery Training and Trials Unit.

SWEDEN

MIDGET SUBMARINE.—The midget submarine H.M.S. *Stickleback* was handed over to the Royal Swedish Navy at a ceremony at Portland on 15th July. She was originally known as the X.51, and was launched in 1954. Her name has been changed to *Spiggen*.

UNITED STATES

U.S.S. NAUTILUS.—The atomic submarine *Nautilus*, which left Honolulu at 0600 G.M.T. on 23rd July, passed under the North Pole at 0315 G.M.T. on 4th August. She emerged from the ice pack on Greenwich meridian at 79° N. at 1354 G.M.T. on 5th August. Her commanding officer, Commander W. R. Anderson, transferred at sea to a helicopter on 8th August and flew first to Washington and then to London, rejoining his ship in the English Channel on 12th August. She visited Portland from 12th to 18th August, and on the return passage to New York, where she arrived on the 25th, set up a new underwater record for the Atlantic crossing of 6 days, 11 hours, 55 minutes.

U.S.S. SKATE.—A second U.S. nuclear submarine, the *Skate*, crossed the North Pole at 0147 G.M.T. on 12th August, under the command of Commander James Calvert. She remained for a few days for explorations under the Arctic ice cap. On 23rd August, she arrived at Bergen, Norway, and on the 25th at Oslo. The Danish Government decided not to permit her to visit Copenhagen because of theoretical risks. On 1st September she arrived at the Dutch naval base at Den Helder. She returned to Boston on 22nd September after travelling 8,000 miles and remaining submerged for 31 days.

U.S.S. TRITON LAUNCHED.—The eighth of an authorized fleet of 33 nuclear submarines, the *Triton*, was launched at Groton, Connecticut, on 19th August. She is the world's largest submarine, with a displacement of 5,900 tons and a length of 447 feet, having three decks and two atomic engines. At the launching Admiral Jerauld Wright, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, referred to her as a "nuclear-propelled, invisible, electronic brain." Her ultra-modern radar, he said, is a virtual electronic periscope with a range a hundred times that of the ordinary submarine periscope. Unlike other atomic submarines, she is designed to spend much of her time on the surface for radar surveillance.

ARMY NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN

H.M. THE QUEEN

The Duke of Edinburgh, on behalf of The Queen, presented new Colours to the 1st Battalion, The South Wales Borderers, and the 2nd Battalion, The Monmouthshire Regiment, T.A., at the Sports Ground, Ebbw Vale, on 25th July.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve the following appointments :—

H.M. Queen Elizabeth The Queen Mother to be Honorary Colonel, University of London Contingent, Officers Training Corps, T.A., with effect from 5th September, 1958.

H.M. King Olav of Norway to be Colonel-in-Chief, The Green Howards (Alexandra, Princess of Wales's Own Yorkshire Regiment), and Honorary Colonel, 284th (The King's Own Royal Regiment, Norfolk Yeomanry) L.A.A. Regiment, R.A., T.A., with effect from 19th August, 1958.

TO BE AIDES-DE-CAMP TO THE QUEEN.—Brigadier H. S. Mitchell (20th May, 1958), vice Major-General B. D. Jones, C.B.E., promoted; Brigadier F. K. Barnes, O.B.E. (28th July, 1958), vice Brigadier F. L. Saunders, O.B.E., retired; Colonel (Honorary Brigadier) A. H. Jones, C.B.E., T.D. (16th September, 1958), vice Colonel (Honorary Brigadier) E. W. C. Hurford, M.B.E., T.D., D.L., tenure expired.

TO BE HONORARY PHYSICIAN TO THE QUEEN.—Colonel G. M. Warrack, D.S.O., O.B.E., T.D., L.R.C.S., L.R.C.P. (29th July, 1958).

TO BE CHIEF ROYAL ENGINEER.—General Sir Kenneth Crawford, K.C.B., M.C. (1st October, 1958), vice General Sir Edwin Morris, K.C.B., O.B.E., M.C.

TO BE COLONEL COMMANDANT.—Of the Royal Army Dental Corps, Major-General D. J. Muir, C.B., O.B.E., Q.H.D.S. (22nd August, 1958), vice Major-General A. B. Austin, C.B., F.D.S., R.C.S., tenure expired.

TO BE COLONELS OF REGIMENTS.—Of The King's Regiment (Manchester and Liverpool), on formation, Major-General T. B. L. Churchill, C.B., C.B.E., M.C. (1st September, 1958); of the 3rd East Anglian Regiment (16th/44th Foot), on formation, Lieut.-General Sir Reginald F. S. Denning, K.B.E., C.B. (2nd June, 1958); of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, Major-General R. B. F. K. Goldsmith, C.B., C.B.E. (27th August, 1958), vice Major-General V. Eveleigh, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E.; of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise's), Brigadier F. C. C. Graham, D.S.O. (1st October, 1958), vice General Sir Gordon Macmillan of Macmillan of Knap, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., D.L., tenure expired; of the Gurkha Signals, Brigadier W. G. Tucker, C.B.E. (1st September, 1958).

APPOINTMENTS

MINISTRY OF SUPPLY.—Brigadier J. French, B.A., appointed Vice-President, Ordnance Board, Ministry of Supply, with the temporary rank of Major-General (1st March, 1958).

Major-General G. E. R. Bastin, C.B., O.B.E., appointed Assistant Controller of Munitions (B) (15th September, 1958).

WAR OFFICE.—Major-General R. N. Anderson, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Vice-Adjutant-General (15th September, 1958).

Colonel H. Quinlan, Q.H.D.S., B.D.S., appointed Director, Army Dental Service with the temporary rank of Major-General (20th September, 1958).

Brigadier J. F. Metcalfe, C.B.E., appointed Director of Personnel Administration, with the temporary rank of Major-General (22nd September, 1958).

Brigadier D. G. Moore appointed Director, Weapons and Development, with the temporary rank of Major-General (22nd September, 1958).

UNITED KINGDOM.—Major-General J. F. M. MacDonald, D.S.O., O.B.E., appointed G.O.C. Lowland District and 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division, T.A. (10th October, 1958).

GERMANY.—Brigadier R. H. L. Wheeler, C.B.E., appointed Major-General Artillery, Headquarters Northern Army Group, with the temporary rank of Major-General (December, 1958).

MIDDLE EAST LAND FORCES.—Brigadier K. T. Darling, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., Cyprus District, with the temporary rank of Major-General (12th October, 1958).

GIBRALTAR.—General Sir Charles F. Keightley, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Commander-in-Chief (21st May, 1958). Appointment not remunerated from Army Funds.

WEST AFRICA.—Major-General A. G. V. Paley, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., loaned for duty with the Ghana Army, and ceases to be remunerated from Army Funds (1st July, 1958).

PROMOTIONS

Lieut.-General.—Temporary Lieut.-General to be Lieut.-General:—R. G. Collingwood C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (15th August, 1958).

Major-Generals.—Temporary Major-Generals or Brigadiers to be Major-Generals:—R. E. Goodwin, C.B.E., D.S.O. (21st June, 1958); G. R. D. Musson, C.B.E., D.S.O. (2nd July, 1958); J. H. Amers, O.B.E. (5th July, 1958); G. C. Hopkinson, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C. (6th July, 1958); S. M. H. Battye, M.A. (15th August, 1958); E. S. Cole, C.B.E. (24th August, 1958); J. A. R. Robertson, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (31st August, 1958).

Brigadiers or Colonels to be temporary Major-Generals:—J. French, B.A. (1st March, 1958); H. Quinlan, Q.H.D.S., B.D.S. (20th September, 1958); D. G. Moore (22nd September, 1958); K. T. Darling, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (12th October, 1958).

RETIREMENTS

The following General Officers have retired:—Lieut.-General Sir Brian C. H. Kimmins, K.B.E., C.B. (15th August, 1958); Major-General W. S. Cole, C.B., C.B.E. (24th August, 1958); Lieut.-General Sir Harold Redman, K.C.B., C.B.E. (29th August, 1958); Major-General V. Boucher, C.B., C.B.E. (31st August, 1958); Major-General H. R. B. Foote, V.C., C.B., D.S.O. (12th September, 1958); Major-General C. E. R. Hirsch, C.B., C.B.E. (13th September, 1958); Major-General P. N. White, C.B., C.B.E. (15th September, 1958); Major-General W. H. Lambert, C.B., C.B.E. (29th September, 1958); Major-General R. St. G. T. Ransome, C.B., C.B.E., M.C. (6th October, 1958).

BATTLE HONOURS

The following are the eighth and ninth lists of Battle Honours approved by The Queen for the 1939-45 War. The Battle Honours selected to be borne on Colours and Appointments are shown in bold print.

THE SHERWOOD RANGERS YEOMANRY, R.A.C., T.A.—“**Normandy Landing**,” “Villers Bocage,” “Odon,” “Fontenay le Pesnil,” “Defence of Rauray,” “Mont Pincon,” “Jurques,” “Noireau Crossing,” “Seine, 1944,” “**Gheel**,” “Nederrijn,” “**Gellenkirchen**,” “Roer,” “Rhineland,” “Cleve,” “Goch,” “Weeze,” “**Rhine**,” “**North-West Europe, 1944-45**,” “**Alam el Halfa**,” “**El Alamein**,” “**El Agheila**,” “**Advance on Tripoli**,” “**Tebaga Gap**,” “Point 201 (Roman Wall),” “**El Hamma**,” “**Chebket en Nouiges**,” “**Enfidaville**,” “**Takrouna**,” “**North Africa, 1940-43**.”

NORTH IRISH HORSE, R.A.C., T.A.—“**Hunt's Gap**,” “**Sedjenane I**,” “**Tamera**,” “**Mergueb Chaouach**,” “**Djebel Rmel**,” “**Longstop Hill, 1943**,” “**Tunis**,” “**North Africa, 1943**,” “**Liri Valley**,” “**Hitler Line**,” “**Advance to Florence**,” “**Gothic Line**,”

"Monte Farneto," "Monte Cavallo," "Casa Fortis," "Casa Bettini," "Lamone Crossing," "Valli di Commacchio," "Senio," "Italy, 1944-45."

SCOTS GUARDS.—"Stien," "Norway, 1940," "Mont Pincon," "Quarry Hill," "Estry," "Venlo Pocket," "Rhineland," "Reichswald," "Cleve," "Moyland," "Hochwald," "Rhine," "Lingen," "Uelzen," "North-West Europe, 1944-45," "Halfaya, 1941," "Sidi Suleiman," "Tobruk, 1941," "Gazala," "Knightsbridge," "Defence of Alamein Line," "Medenine," "Tadjera Khir," "Medjez Plain," "Grich el Oued," "Djebel Bou Aoukaz, 1943, I," "North Africa, 1941-43," "Salerno," "Battipaglia," "Voluturno Crossing," "Rocchetta e Croce," "Monte Camino," "Anzio," "Campoleone," "Carroceto," "Trasimene Line," "Advance to Florence," "Monte San Michele," "Catarelto Ridge," "Argenta Gap," "Italy, 1943-45."

THE KING'S OWN ROYAL REGIMENT (LANCASTER).—"St. Omer-La Basse," "Dunkirk, 1940," "North-West Europe, 1940," "Defence of Habbaniya," "Falluja," "Iraq, 1941," "Merjayum," "Jebel Mazar," "Syria, 1941," "Tobruk, 1941," "Tobruk Sortie," "North Africa, 1940-42," "Montone," "Citta di Castello," "San Martino Sogliano," "Lamone Bridgehead," "Italy, 1944-45," "Malta, 1941-42," "Chindits, 1944," "Burma, 1944." *Honorary Distinction* (5th Battalion): A Badge of the Royal Armoured Corps with year-dates "1944-45" and one scroll: "North-West Europe."

THE SUFFOLK REGIMENT.—"Dunkirk, 1940," "Normandy Landing," "Odon," "Falaise," "Venrai," "Brinkum," "North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45," "Singapore Island," "Malaya, 1942," "North Arakan," "Imphal," "Burma, 1943-45."

THE EAST SURREY REGIMENT.—"Defence of Escaut," "Dunkirk, 1940," "North-West Europe, 1940," "Tebourba," "Fort McGregor," "Oued Zarga," "Djebel Ang," "Djebel Djaffa Pass," "Medjez Plain," "Longstop Hill, 1943," "Tunis," "Montarnaud," "North Africa, 1942-43," "Adrano," "Centuripe," "Sicily, 1943," "Trigno," "Sangro," "Cassino," "Capture of Forli," "Argenta Gap," "Italy, 1943-45," "Greece, 1944-45," "Kampar," "Malaya, 1941-42."

THE ROYAL HAMPSHIRE REGIMENT.—"Dunkirk, 1940," "Normandy Landing," "Tilly sur Seules," "Caen," "Hill 112," "Mont Pincon," "Jurques," "St. Pierre La Vielle," "Nederrijn," "Roer," "Rhineland," "Goch," "Rhine," "North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45," "Tebourba Gap," "Sidi Nsir," "Hunt's Gap," "Montagne Farm," "Fondouk," "Pichon," "El Kourzia," "Ber Rabal," "North Africa, 1940-43," "Landing in Sicily," "Regalbuto," "Sicily, 1943," "Landing at Porto S. Venere," "Salerno," "Salerno Hills," "Battipaglia," "Cave di Tirreni," "Voluturno Crossing," "Garigliano Crossing," "Damiano," "Monte Ornito," "Cerasola," "Cassino II," "Massa Vertecchi," "Trasimene Line," "Advance to Florence," "Gothic Line," "Monte Gridolfo," "Montegaudio," "Coriano," "Montilgallio," "Capture of Forli," "Cosina Canal Crossing," "Lamone Crossing," "Pideura," "Rimini Line," "Montes-cudo," "Frisoni," "Italy, 1943-45," "Athens," "Greece, 1944-45," "Malta, 1941-42."

THE SOUTH LANCASHIRE REGIMENT (THE PRINCE OF WALES'S VOLUNTEERS).—"Dunkirk, 1940," "Normandy Landing," "Odon," "Bourguebus Ridge," "Troarn," "Falaise," "Venrai," "Rhineland," "Hochwald," "Bremen," "North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45," "Madagascar," "Middle East, 1942," "North Arakan," "Mayu Tunnels," "Kohima," "Meiktila," "Nyaungu Bridgehead," "Letse," "Irrawaddy," "Sittang, 1945," "Burma, 1943-45."

THE ROYAL ULSTER RIFLES.—"Dyle," "Dunkirk, 1940," "Normandy Landing," "Cambes," "Caen," "Troarn," "Venlo Pocket," "Rhine," "Bremen," "North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45."

7TH GURKHA RIFLES.—"Tobruk, 1942," "North Africa, 1942," "Cassino I," "Campriano," "Poggio Del Grillo," "Tavoleto," "Montebello-Scorticata Ridge," "Italy, 1944," "Sittang, 1942, '45," "Pegu, 1942," "Kyaukse, 1942," "Shwegyin,"

"Imphal," "Bishenpur," "Meiktila," "Capture of Meiktila," "Defence of Meiktila," "Rangoon Road," "Pyawbwe," "Burma, 1942, '44-45."

THE CAMBRIDGESHIRE REGIMENT, T.A.—"Johore," "Batu Pahat," "Singapore Island," "Malaya, 1942."

THE RHODESIAN AFRICAN RIFLES.—"Arakan Beaches," "Taungup," "Burma, 1944-45."

4TH QUEEN'S OWN HUSSARS.—"Gazala," "Defence of Alamein Line," "Ruweisat," "Alam el Halfa," "El Alamein," "North Africa, 1942," "Coriano," "San Clemente," "Senio Pocket," "Rimini Line," "Conventello-Comacchio," "Senio," "Santerno Crossing," "Argenta Gap," "Italy, 1944-45," "Proastelon," "Corinth Canal," "Greece, 1941."

11TH HUSSARS (PRINCE ALBERT'S OWN).—"Villers Bocage," "Bourguebus Ridge," "Mont Pincon," "Jurques," "Dives Crossing," "La Vie Crossing," "Lisieux," "Le Touques Crossing," "Risle Crossing," "Roer," "Rhine," "Ibbenburen," "Aller," "North-West Europe, 1944-45," "Egyptian Frontier, 1940," "Withdrawal to Matruh," "Bir Enba," "Sidi Barrani," "Buq Buq," "Bardia, 1941," "Capture of Tobruk," "Beda Fomm," "Halfaya, 1941," "Sidi Suleiman," "Tobruk, 1941," "Gubi I, II," "Gabr Saleh," "Sidi Rezegh, 1941," "Taieb el Essom," "Relief of Tobruk," "Saunnu," "Msus," "Defence of Alamein Line," "Alam el Halfa," "El Alamein," "Advance on Tripoli," "Enfidaville," "Tunis," "North Africa, 1940-43," "Capture of Naples," "Vturno Crossing," "Italy, 1943."

22ND DRAGOONS.—"Normandy Landing," "Odon," "Caen," "Falaise," "Le Havre," "Lower Maas," "Venlo Pocket," "Reichswald," "Rhine," "North-West Europe, 1944-45."

COLDSTREAM GUARDS.—"Dyle," "Defence of Escout," "Dunkirk, 1940," "Cagny," "Mont Pincon," "Quarry Hill," "Estry," "Heppen," "Nederrijn," "Venrai," "Meijel," "Roer," "Rhineland," "Reichswald," "Cleve," "Goch," "Moyland," "Hochwald," "Rhine," "Lingen," "Uelzen," "North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45," "Egyptian Frontier, 1940," "Sidi Barrani," "Halfaya, 1941," "Tobruk, 1941, 1942," "Msus," "Knightsbridge," "Defence of Alamein Line," "Medenine," "Mareth," "Longstop Hill, 1942," "Sbiba," "Steamroller Farm," "Tunis," "Hammam Lif," "North Africa, 1940-43," "Salerno," "Battipaglia," "Cappezano," "Vturno Crossing," "Monte Camino," "Calabritto," "Garigliano Crossing," "Monte Ornito," "Monte Piccolo," "Capture of Perugia," "Arezzo," "Advance to Florence," "Monte Domini," "Catarelto Ridge," "Argenta Gap," "Italy, 1943-45."

THE ROYAL NORFOLK REGIMENT.—"Defence of Escout," "St. Omer-La Basse," "St. Valery-en-Caux," "Normandy Landing," "Caen," "Le Perier Ridge," "Brieux Bridgehead," "Venrai," "Rhineland," "Hochwald," "Lingen," "Brinkum," "North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45," "Johore," "Muar," "Batu Pahat," "Singapore Island," "Malaya, 1942," "Kohima," "Aradura," "Mandalay," "Burma, 1944-45."

THE ROYAL LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT.—"Vist," "Norway, 1940," "Dunkirk, 1940," "Normandy Landing," "Cambes," "Fontenay le Pesnil," "Defence of Rauray," "Caen," "Orne," "Bourguebus Ridge," "Troarn," "Nederrijn," "Le Havre," "Antwerp-Turnhout Canal," "Venrai," "Venlo Pocket," "Rhineland," "Hochwald," "Lingen," "Bremen," "Arnhem, 1945," "North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45," "Sedjenane I," "Mine de Sedjenane," "Argoub Sellah," "North Africa, 1943," "Salerno," "Vietri Pass," "Capture of Naples," "Cava di Tirreni," "Vturno Crossing," "Garigliano Crossing," "Monte Tuga," "Gothic Line," "Monte Gridolfo," "Gemmano Ridge," "Lamone Crossing," "San Marino," "Italy, 1943-45," "Donbaik," "Point 201 (Arakan)," "North Arakan," "Buthidaung," "Ngakyedauk Pass," "Ramree," "Burma, 1943-45."

THE ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT (PRINCESS CHARLOTTE OF WALES'S).—"Dyle," "St. Omer-La Basse," "Dunkirk, 1940," "Normandy Landing," "Rhine," "North-

West Europe, 1940, '44-45," "Pursuit to Messina," "Sicily, 1943," "Monte Camino," "Calabritto," "Garigliano Crossing," "Damiano," "Anzio," "Carroceto," "Italy, 1943-45," "Donbaik," "Kohima," "Mao Songsang," "Shwebo," "Kyaukmyaung Bridgehead," "Mandalay," "Fort Dufferin," "Rangoon Road," "Toungoo," "Burma, 1942-45."

THE HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY (CITY OF GLASGOW REGIMENT).—"Withdrawal to Cherbourg," "Odon," "Cheux," "Esquay," "Mont Pincon," "Quarry Hill," "Estry," "Falaise," "Seine, 1944," "Aart," "Nederrijn," "Best," "Scheldt," "Lower Maas," "South Beveland," "Walcheren Causeway," "Asten," "Roer," "Ourthe," "Rhineland," "Reichswald," "Goch," "Moyland Wood," "Weeze," "Rhine," "Ibbenburen," "Dreirwalde," "Aller," "Uelzen," "Bremen," "Artlenberg," "North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45," "Jebel Shiba," "Barentu," "Keren," "Massawa," "Abyssinia, 1941," "Gazala," "Cauldron," "Mersa Matruh," "Fuka," "North Africa, 1940-42," "Landing in Sicily," "Sicily, 1943," "Italy, 1943, '45," "Athens," "Greece, 1944-45," "Adriatic," "Middle East, 1944."

THE RIFLE BRIGADE (PRINCE CONSORT'S OWN).—"Calais, 1940," "Villers Bocage," "Odon," "Bourguebus Ridge," "Mont Pincon," "Le Perier Ridge," "Falaise," "Antwerp," "Hechtel," "Nederrijn," "Lower Maas," "Roer," "Leese," "Aller," "North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45," "Egyptian Frontier, 1940," "Beda Fomm," "Mersa el Brega," "Agedabia," "Derna Aerodrome," "Tobruk, 1941," "Sidi Rezegh, 1941," "Chor es Sufan," "Saunnu," "Gazala," "Knightsbridge," "Defence of Alamein Line," "Ruweisat," "Alam el Halfa," "El Alamein," "Tebaga Gap," "Medjez el Bab," "Kasserine," "Thala," "Fondouk," "Fondouk Pass," "El Kourzia," "Djebel Kournine," "Tunis," "Hamam Lif," "North Africa, 1940-43," "Cardito," "Cassino II," "Liri Valley," "Melfa Crossing," "Monte Rotondo," "Capture of Perugia," "Monte Malbe," "Arezzo," "Advance to Florence," "Gothic Line," "Orsara," "Tossignano," "Argenta Gap," "Fossa Cembalina," "Italy, 1943-45."

THE NORTHERN RHODESIA REGIMENT.—"Giarso," "Abyssinia, 1941," "Tug Argan," "British Somaliland, 1940," "Middle East, 1942," "Mawlaik," "Kalewa," "Arakan Beaches," "Taungup," "Burma, 1944-45."

BRIGADE REPRESENTATIVE COLONELS (INFANTRY)

The following list of Brigade Representative Colonels has been published by the War Office:—*Lowland*: Major-General J. Scott-Elliott, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. *Home Counties*: Colonel (Honorary Brigadier) G. R. P. Roupell, V.C., C.B., D.L. *Lancastrian*: Major-General V. Blomfield, C.B., D.S.O. *The Fusilier Brigade*: Brigadier P. G. Bamford, D.S.O., O.B.E. *Forester*: Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G., G.C.B., D.S.O. *East Anglian*: Lieut.-General Sir Reginald F. S. Denning, K.B.E., C.B. *Wessex*: Major-General B. A. Coad, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. *Light Infantry*: Field-Marshal Lord Harding, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. *Yorkshire and Northumberland*: Brigadier G. H. Cree, C.B.E., D.S.O. *Mercian*: General Sir Richard N. Gale, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. *Welsh*: General Sir Hugh Stockwell, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O. *North Irish*: Field-Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.B.E., D.S.O. *Highland*: General Sir Gordon MacMillan of MacMillan of Knap, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. *Green Jackets*: General Sir Montagu Stopford, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. *The Brigade of Gurkhas*: Field-Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.B.E., D.S.O.

DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS TO BE DISBANDED

On 12th September, the War Office announced that the disbandment of Headquarters, North-West District, Preston, is to begin in April, 1959. This is one of the first steps in the planned reorganization of the static chain of command in the United Kingdom.

The aim of this reorganization is to achieve a substantial reduction in the number of soldiers employed in static headquarters so as to free them for posting to the fighting

units. The intention is that District Headquarters as they now exist will be disbanded and replaced by very small Area Headquarters, based largely on existing Territorial Army formations. Most of the present responsibilities of District Headquarters will be taken over by Command Headquarters.

Area Headquarters replacing H.Q. North-West District are to be set up at Hale (H.Q. 124 Inf. Bde., T.A.), Liverpool (H.Q. 125 Inf. Bde., T.A.), Lancaster (H.Q. 126 Inf. Bde., T.A.), and Manchester (H.Q. 127 Inf. Bde., T.A.).

REDUNDANCY IN THE ARMY

It was announced by the War Office on 9th September that the quota of premature retirements and discharges for 1959/60 will begin on 1st April, 1959, and that 629 officers and 1,154 warrant officers and senior non-commissioned officers have been notified that they will be retired during that year. All of these will receive the compensation previously announced to compensate them for the premature termination of their army careers.

It is not possible at this stage to assess the final numbers of those who will have to be retired by 31st March, 1960, and it is possible that a further small number, above those already notified, will have to be retired before that date. A supplementary notification of the residue to be retired in 1959/60 will be made in March, 1959.

MISCELLANEOUS

PRESENTATIONS OF COLOURS.—On behalf of The Queen, Field-Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, presented new Colours to the 1st Battalion, The Seaforth Highlanders (Ross-shire Buffs, The Duke of Albany's), at Münster on 14th August.

General Sir Dudley Ward, Commander-in-Chief British Army of the Rhine, presented new Colours to the 1st Battalion, The North Staffordshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's Own), at Minden on 15th August.

NEW REGIMENTAL TITLE.—The Queen has approved the title "The Somerset and Cornwall Light Infantry" for the Regiment which is to be created by the amalgamation of The Somerset Light Infantry (Prince Albert's) and The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.

ALDERSHOT MEMORIAL.—Memorial gates to the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions at the entrance to the Royal Garrison Church, Aldershot, were opened by Field-Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis on 29th July. These divisions were formed at Aldershot in 1902.

FOREIGN

PORTUGAL

CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE ARMY.—General Luis Maria da Camara Pina has been appointed Chief of Staff of the Army.

AIR NOTES

H.M. THE QUEEN

The Queen has approved the award of The Standard to No. 38 Squadron and No. 64 Squadron in recognition of their completion of 25 years of existence in the Royal Air Force.

APPOINTMENTS

AIR MINISTRY.—Mr. W. J. Taylor, C.B.E., D.L., J.P., M.P., as Chairman of the Air Training Corps Central Council of Welfare in succession to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Francis Humphrys, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.B.E., C.I.E.; Air Commodore C. M. Wight-Boycott, C.B.E., D.S.O., as Director of Operations (Forecasting and Planning) (September, 1958); Air Commodore T. W. Piper, C.B.E., A.F.C., as Director of Operational Requirements (A) (September, 1958); Air Vice-Marshal J. Grandy, C.B., D.S.O., to be Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operations) (November, 1958); Air Vice-Marshal G. Silyn-Roberts, C.B.E., A.F.C., M.Sc., F.R.Ae.S., to be Director-General of Engineering (November, 1958); Air Vice-Marshal H. D. Spreckley, C.B., O.B.E., to be Controller of Engineering and Equipment, with the acting rank of Air Marshal (February, 1959); Air Vice-Marshal W. P. G. Pretty, C.B., C.B.E., to be Director-General of Organization (October, 1958).

BOMBER COMMAND.—Air Commodore M. E. M. Perkins, C.B.E., B.A., M.I.Mech.E., A.F.R.Ae.S., to be Senior Technical Staff Officer, with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (October, 1958).

FLYING TRAINING COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal H. A. V. Hogan, C.B., D.F.C., to be Senior Air Staff Officer (October, 1958); Air Vice-Marshal J. F. Hobler, C.B., C.B.E., to be Air Officer Commanding, No. 25 Group (October, 1958).

TECHNICAL TRAINING COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal J. Marson, C.B., C.B.E., to be Air Officer Commanding No. 24 (Training) Group (January, 1959).

MIDDLE EAST AIR FORCE.—Air Vice-Marshal W. M. L. MacDonald, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., to be Commander-in-Chief, with the acting rank of Air Marshal, in succession to Air Marshal Sir Hubert L. Patch, K.C.B., C.B.E. (December, 1958).

TASK FORCE "GRAPPLE."—Air Vice-Marshal T. A. B. Parselle, C.B.E., to be Commander (October, 1958).

R.A.F. COLLEGE, CRANWELL.—Group Captain D. F. Spotswood, C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.D.C., to be Commandant, with the acting rank of Air Commodore (September, 1958).

RETIREMENTS

Air Commodore J. D. Miller, C.B.E. (15th July, 1958); Air Commodore C. J. Nobbs, C.B.E. (15th July, 1958); Air Vice-Marshal F. G. S. Mitchell, C.B., C.B.E. (29th July, 1958); Air Commodore G. P. O'Connell, M.B., B.Ch., B.A.O. (29th August, 1958); Air Commodore L. E. Jarman, D.F.C. (30th August, 1958).

OPERATIONS

In addition to their duties connected with the emergency, Cyprus-based R.A.F. helicopters have helped considerably to reduce the destruction by fire of valuable forests over the past two years. Their help is acknowledged in the annual report of the Conservator of Forests. In 1956 fires destroyed 30 square miles of forest, but in 1957 this was reduced to two and one-half square miles. For this reduction the report gives much credit to the R.A.F. The use of R.A.F. helicopters became standard practice and a number of helicopter landing points have now been constructed at strategic places in the forests.

TRAINING

R.A.F. MISSILE TRAINING.—Three types of courses are now being operated by the R.A.F. for instructing General Duties branch officers in the design, construction, and

employment of guided weapons. These courses are being conducted at the R.A.F. Technical College, Henlow, and the R.A.F. Flying College, Manby. The first two are introductory courses at Manby; one is a two-weeks' course on guided missiles and their guidance systems and the other a three-weeks' course to provide selected officers with a basic knowledge of ballistic missiles. The third is a 23-week course to give selected officers theoretical and operational knowledge of guided missiles and their guidance systems. The syllabus is divided into two parts consisting of 12 weeks' theoretical instruction at Henlow, followed by 11 weeks' training on operational aspects at Manby.

In addition, introductory courses on guided weapons are held at Manby for students of the R.A.F. Flying College. Plans are also being made to set up two specialized schools to provide for future operational training. One is to provide the instruction of surface-to-air weapons wings and the other is to give similar training to personnel in the intermediate-range ballistic missile squadrons. The former wings are to be incorporated in the U.K. defence system, and the latter are being set up in Bomber Command.

ESPARTO GRASS PHOTOGRAPHY.—No. 39 Squadron, with its Canberras based in Malta, is helping the Libyan Government's Forestry Department during its operational training by aerially mapping large tracts of esparto grass in Tripolitania. The work, when completed, will provide mosaics of an area of 4,000 square miles for development purposes.

JUNGLE SURVIVAL.—Nearly 1,000 men of the Commonwealth and S.E.A.T.O. air, land, and naval forces in the Far East have passed through the tropical survival school operated by the R.A.F. at Changi, Singapore. These include servicemen from the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan.

AIR TRAINING CORPS CHIPMUNKS.—Fifty Chipmunk dual-control training aircraft belonging to the R.A.F. have been allotted to 13 R.A.F. and civil airfields for the exclusive use of cadets of the Air Training Corps and air sections of Combined Cadet Forces in schools. Their purpose is to provide the cadets with passenger flying experience and they will be flown by some 200 qualified pilots specially commissioned into the training branch of the R.A.F. Volunteer Reserve.

AIR TRAINING CORPS GLIDING SCHOOLS.—Four new week-end gliding schools for the Air Training Corps have been opened in Cornwall, Gloucestershire, Bedfordshire, and Durham. Altogether six new gliding schools have been promised for the A.T.C., bringing the total up to 26, plus two whole-time gliding centres in Kent and Nottinghamshire. The additions will allow a further 800 cadets to be trained annually up to solo standard. During the 12 months ended 31st May last, 1,435 cadets gained their gliding proficiency certificates, 44 reaching advanced level.

MISCELLANEOUS

BATTLE OF BRITAIN FIGHTER ASSOCIATION.—Air Chief Marshal Lord Dowding, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command, during the Battle of Britain, laid a wreath on the Royal Air Force Memorial on the Victoria Embankment on 15th September, Battle of Britain Day. The wreath was from the members of the Battle of Britain Fighter Association, formed earlier this year as a permanent successor to the temporary Battle of Britain Aircrew Reunion which for some years had organized an annual aircrew reunion on Battle of Britain Day. Lord Dowding is the first president of the new Association.

R.A.F. FELIXSTOWE HONOURED.—Royal Air Force Station, Felixstowe, one of the oldest units in the Service, was granted formal Freedom of Entry by the Felixstowe Urban District Council on 26th September. At a dinner on 25th September the Commanding Officer presented a ceremonial council chair to the Chairman of the Council. It was made by local craftsmen and bore the R.A.F. Wings and a plaque recording the occasion.

GORDON SHEPARD MEMORIAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1958.—The winners of the four prizes, in order, were: Squadron Leader E. J. Baker; Squadron Leader G. C. T.

Richards, M.A.; Wing Commander J. H. F. Ford, D.F.C.; Wing Commander J. F. Powell, O.B.E., M.A.

CANADA

APPOINTMENTS.—Air Vice-Marshal M. M. Hendrick, O.B.E., R.C.A.F., to be Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff in succession to Major-General H. A. Sparling. At present Air Member for Technical Services in Ottawa, Air Vice-Marshal Hendrick served as Air Member, Canadian Joint Staff, in Washington from 1950 to 1951, and became Chief of R.C.A.F. telecommunications in 1955.

Air Vice-Marshal L. E. Wray, O.B.E., A.F.C., A.O.C. Air Defence Command since January, 1955, has been appointed A.O.C. No. 1 R.C.A.F. Air Division in Europe. He succeeds Air Vice-Marshal H. Godwin, C.B.E., who is retiring from the Service.

The present Chief of Operations at R.C.A.F. Headquarters, Air Commodore W. R. MacBrien, O.B.E., is to become A.O.C. Air Defence Command, with the rank of Air Vice-Marshal. Holding his present post since July, 1956, Air Commodore MacBrien previously served with the 4th A.T.A.F. in Germany.

AUSTRALIA

RADAR STATION FOR DARWIN.—A new radar station capable of detecting bombers, controlling jet fighters, and operating in conjunction with guided weapons, is to be installed for the Royal Australian Air Force at Darwin. The Minister for Air, Mr. F. M. Osborne, has stated that an order for more than £A.1,000,000 for the latest American radar equipment will be placed by the R.A.A.F., and that the new station will be in operation by the end of 1961. This will be the third R.A.A.F. Control and Reporting Unit. The first was set up at Brookvale on the coast near Sydney. The second is a mobile unit formed at Dubbo, and shortly to go to Malaya to operate with R.A.A.F. Avon-Sabre jet fighter squadron at Butterworth.

R.A.A.F. FLYING TRAINING.—R.A.A.F. Basic Flying School at Uranquinty, New South Wales, is to be transferred to Point Cook, near Melbourne. The Advanced Flying Training School was recently moved from Point Cook to Pearce, Western Australia, because of the high cost of building new jet facilities at Point Cook, and because the Vampire Trainers used at the school would have created an air traffic hazard.

ALL AIRCREW TO BE COMMISSIONED.—Under a new scheme approved by the Air Board, all R.A.A.F. pilots and navigators will be commissioned. Formerly aircrew trained at the Flying Training School were in the musters of airman pilot and airman navigator, and graduated with the rank of sergeant. The change is a recognition of the increased responsibility and skills demanded by the development of Service aircraft.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

GENERAL

The Generalship of Alexander the Great. By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller. (*Eyre and Spottiswoode.*) 35s.

If it were only that General Fuller's curiosity has ranged so widely, that he has always delighted his readers, always stimulated them, and never bored them, it would be reason enough for welcoming this latest study from him of Alexander the Great. But in it he has so skilfully used his soldier's eye to reconcile the evidence of the ancient authorities with the views of the best modern scholars that he has succeeded in producing a masterpiece of exciting narrative and shrewd analysis which must command respect and attention from every military historian.

He starts with a description of the political and intellectual climate in which Alexander attained his majority. He describes the Macedonian army that he inherited as a weapon, and the Persian Empire and army that he made his enemy. He then proceeds to a straightforward narrative of Alexander's campaigns over those 13 years which changed the course of history. He follows this with a detailed analysis of the battles and sieges, accompanied by useful sketches and diagrams. These two parts are the most exciting of the book and are eminently satisfying. He concludes with an analysis of Alexander as a statesman and a general, and screens him through the lens of Clausewitz and others. He attaches an epilogue in which, pleading a resemblance between conditions prevailing in Alexander's time and those in our own, he condemns our strategy in the late war and commends Stalin's.

So long as General Fuller confines himself to Alexander, his campaigns, his battles, and even the rather more controversial question of his statesmanship, he has every right to our admiration. Professional soldiers with such skill on their own craft are rare, and those who subject themselves to the further discipline of antiquarian scholarship are very few indeed. For nine of General Fuller's 11 chapters we shall ever be in his debt; and Oh, had he but left it at that!

Regrettably, portions of his first chapter will not commend themselves to many. His treatment of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle will not bear serious examination, and when he describes Plato's *Republic* as "transcendental bolshevism" and "communism," he is clearly ignoring the meaning of the words he uses. In the epilogue, moreover, he gives his enthusiasm too much rein. Had we studied Alexander, he says, we should have avoided the cardinal error of destroying Germany and aimed instead at destroying Nazism. Alexander, he says, never *destroyed* his enemies: he *reconciled* their forms of government with his, and he *appropriated* their resources. We, by insisting on unconditional surrender, prolonged the war and let the Russians into eastern Europe. All this, many will think, is asking a bit much from Clío who, obliging as the lady is, speaks when consulted as an oracle in muffled and often incomprehensible language. General Fuller is surely right to urge our attention to reconciliation and appropriation by force as objects of war, rather than sheer destruction. But ask no more of Clío, or she will remind us of things best forgot. If General Fuller felt this epilogue was needed as an excuse for his interest in Alexander, he may be assured nothing from him ever needs excusing.

Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age. By Raymond L. Garthoff. (*Atlantic Books, Stevens and Sons, London.*) 25s.

In this book Dr. Garthoff gives us the benefit of his access to an extraordinary range of Soviet official periodicals, publications, and public statements. His chapter devoted to the sources and his bibliography is not the least impressive and valuable feature of this interesting book.

Inevitably, given the sources, many of his conclusions must to some extent coincide with what the Russians would like us to believe. There is perhaps not enough discrimination between the detail of the restricted, and therefore specialized, military periodical, and

the propaganda type of journal. At least one factual error mars his thesis where he says that Mr. Khrushchev served as Political Officer on Marshal Koniev's First Ukrainian Front and instances this as an example of their likely collusion. Marshal Koniev assumed command there only in June, 1944, by which time Mr. Khrushchev had been promoted. At no time did these two serve together during the war.

Nevertheless, certain broad trends in Soviet military thinking do emerge in this study. Russia is not gambling on the use of an absolute weapon and welcomes the nuclear stalemate. She considers that future war will not be decided in this way, but rather that it will be prolonged and the decisive arm will be land forces. She has shaped her armed forces accordingly, and intends to use her weapons in combination without special emphasis on any one of them, even though this includes the latest nuclear and ballistic inventions. Soviet strategists oppose the exclusive use of air power to destroy the economic-population potential of an enemy. The heavy casualties likely to be incurred in nuclear attack are regarded as underlining the Soviet need for greater reserves of manpower. So, too, does the necessity of holding the satellite countries and the possibilities of expansion.

Inter-Service differences, if they exist, are of little account compared with those in the major Western countries. Not only has Russia succeeded in integrating the separate military ministries but she has also organized the various commands on a rational and efficient basis which should give some concern to the West. This is a functional approach which lends itself to the formulation of policy and strategy and the command and direction of military affairs of a highly complex nature, not only in respect of national but of international forces.

While the author believes that it does not appear that Russia plans a strategic ocean role for her navy, Russian military thought has moved some way from the stasis of Stalin's influence. They by no means scorn nuclear possibilities but are confident that their combination of an immense army, a vast submarine force, and the I.C.B.M. gives them a great flexibility of military compass over the Western countries with their smaller armies in the strait-jacket of their nuclear stockpiles.

The implications of any one of these facets could, or should, ensure widespread discussion and consideration among Western strategists, politicians, and indeed the general public. Dr. Garthoff's presentation of the facts is lucid and happily free from needless argumentation or invidious debate. It is to be hoped that this work will be rewarded by the notice it unquestionably merits.

Strategic Surrender—The Politics of Victory and Defeat. By Paul Kecskemeti. (Stanford University Press. London: Oxford University Press.) 40s.

Since the first total war in modern times was decided by Sherman's and Sheridan's campaigns 'against women and children,' the termination of fighting—the transition from violence to non-violence—has confronted victorious belligerents with increasingly difficult strategic, diplomatic, and psychological problems. At the end of the second World War only Russia, which largely ignored their existence by using peace as a continuation of war with other means, was able to reach satisfactory solutions. One stage in the final unwinding of hostilities may be strategic surrender, "the orderly capitulation of the loser's remaining forces" after he has suffered decisive defeat; it is this type of total surrender which Mr. Kecskemeti considers in his remarkable book.

An introductory section attempts to define the conditions governing strategic surrender in the political and in the military sphere. Its various facets are illustrated and more closely examined in the second and longest part of the work, which discusses with admirable clarity the four major surrenders of the second World War. The author demonstrates that strategic surrender is essentially a bargain in which, each to his own advantage, "winner and loser dispense with a last round of fighting"; and that it keeps this characteristic even in the case of unconditional surrender. France capitulated to the Germans on a qualified basis and retained partial sovereignty; in September, 1943,

Marshal Badoglio surrendered Italy unconditionally, but less than two months later the Allies felt compelled to recognize his regime as a co-belligerent; Japan capitulated 'unconditionally' while wresting from her enemies a most vital concession, retention of the Emperor. Only Germany was unable to compromise the totality of Allied demands; yet by her policy of surrendering in the west while continuing the struggle in the east, which the Allies could do nothing to prevent, it realized one definite gain; the rescue of 3,000,000 Germans from Russian control.

The idea of unconditional surrender and its role in the late war is subjected to a brilliant analysis which—though profoundly critical of the concept—disagrees with the thesis that by presenting the enemy with an impossible choice it needlessly prolonged the conflict. The author points out that Great Britain and the United States were much more emphatic about unconditional surrender than the Russians—indeed no equivalent to the 'National Committee Free Germany' under the Generals Paulus and Seydlitz existed in the west; and yet "no blandishments on the part of the Soviet Union could induce the Germans to abandon their last-ditch resistance." In this case as in so many others the decisive factors were irrational and moral; it is one of the great strengths of Mr. Kecskemeti's work that it takes account of these forces which too often tend to be ignored by German and other critics. The author also recognizes that to the unwarlike democracies—particularly to America—"war can be justified only if it is waged to eliminate war," that is if it becomes a crusade based on moral absolutes. Here one might suggest an extension of his argument: unconditional surrender was the Western Allies' answer to genocide and unconditional war.

Nevertheless it remains an inefficient policy. Mr. Kecskemeti condemns it on two main points: that it tends to rule out all bargaining and thus makes communication between belligerents extremely difficult—a hindrance that proved particularly serious in the Pacific; and that it was inspired and directed by the belief that the durability of peace depends on the extent to which one's enemies are stripped of power. As the author observes, "if the Western leaders had read history correctly they would have realized what a fleeting thing is a wartime monopoly of military strength."

The study ends with a brief, speculative survey, "Surrender in Future Strategy," which includes the suggestion "that a Power might develop a perfect winning strategy for all-out nuclear war, i.e., the strategy of a first strike that eliminates all significant retaliatory capabilities. . . . If one Power has a monopoly of such a winning strategy, and its adversary knows it, a mere threat of attack might induce the latter to surrender politically." On the book's appearance this passage blew up a squall in Washington, where it was read to mean that the United States might have to surrender to the Soviet Union. As the study was written under the auspices of the Rand Corporation, a research agency financed by the Air Force, critics held the Defence Department responsible; the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee going so far as to ask Congress to amend a pending appropriations bill in order to cancel any official studies "on how the U.S. might surrender to its enemies." A statement by President Eisenhower and explanations by the Air Force and Rand Corporation were required to lay the excitement. That the problem of surrender appears so distasteful to some that they refuse to examine and understand it is not surprising; one hopes, however, this will not prove the general attitude, and that Mr. Kecskemeti's book achieves a measure of influence commensurate with its undeniable importance.

The Arms Race. By Philip Noel Baker. (*Atlantic Books, Stevens and Sons, London.*) 25s.

Inspection for Disarmament. Edited by Seymour Melman. (*Columbia University Press. London: Oxford University Press.*) 48s.

The Great Arms Race. By Hanson W. Baldwin. (*Atlantic Books, Stevens and Sons, London.*) 15s.

The first two books are written specifically about disarmament problems and the third is a completely fatalistic account of the arms race itself without any interest in

checking it. All three are useful texts for anyone who wishes to study the dangerous possibilities of this febrile contention between two rival systems each becoming equipped to annihilate one another and most of mankind as well within a matter of days.

Mr. Noel Baker's book is the best and he has achieved a scholarly and balanced account resting on a sound historical approach to the whole disarmament problem. It has the authority and insight which is to be expected from a writer with his experience of the disarmament policies of the great Powers stretching back to the aftermath of the first World War. He outlines with skill the history of the ill-fated naval building race between Great Britain and Germany before 1914, and analyses the unstable political situation which resulted, drawing a useful and instructive parallel between that contest and the present missile and nuclear arms race. This is developed with a fair degree of technical detail, and also takes account of other methods of mass destruction of life not so often considered by the public, such as chemical warfare and biological agents. He considers that a multilateral disarmament treaty is essential, together with increased authority for U.N.O. It is, however, a little strange that a scholarly account such as this should not have taken up the question of the nature and scope of the legal and juridical processes which would have to be evolved to form the real basis of any effectual international compact and on which enforcement could act.

Inspection for Disarmament is an attempt at a technological *vade mecum* for policy planners and students of the disarmament question. It is rather theoretical in spite of a wish to consider practical detail, and misses many main premises as is so often the way when technical treatises extend themselves in a sociological direction. Man, who is really the nigger in this woodpile and not his instruments, tends either to be left out of account or regarded as a standardized product for whom 'recommended practices' can be formulated. Perhaps some very pertinent additional matter could have been fitted in if the editor had discussed the disarmament and reparations processes in Germany after the first World War. The lesson of this to the initiated was that even when a Power is totally defeated and occupied by overwhelming military force with complete topographical control, if there are elements of the population hostile to disarmament and reparations action, the defeated country can show really surprising ability, at times, in the art of frustrating or preventing action. This does not augur well for inspection processes unless an atmosphere of total acquiescence can be created, both official and unofficial.

Mr. Hanson Baldwin's book is a rather disappointing one for a writer of his undoubted and widely acknowledged eminence. He provides a remarkably concise and informative report on the armament race, but has a completely materialistic approach which misses wider issues. The fact that he completely ignores those who regard themselves as Allies of the U.S.A. all adds to a growing opinion that the military mind in the U.S. has been 'going it alone' in its conceptions for some time. Present-day actions seem indeed to be a logical outcome if this work is representative.

Defense of the Middle East. By John C. Campbell. (Oxford University Press.) 40s.

Since the manuscript of this work was completed in December, 1957, conditions in the Arab world have altered sufficiently to warrant the question whether the word 'defense' in the title should not fitly be changed to 're-conquest.' It is the strength of Dr. Campbell's study that his critical analysis of past U.S. policy in the Middle East has taken into account a possible further deterioration of the Western position; its weakness, that his suggestions for a more effective future national strategy are in the main too narrowly realistic to seem very hopeful.

To readers on this side of the Atlantic the most interesting part of the book may well prove to be the first third, a straightforward, objective account of the growth of American involvement in the area as seen through the eyes of a former State Department official. In later sections the author argues for an American policy in which the military, political, economic, and psychological factors are consistent and integrated;

one moreover which is flexible enough to live with neutralism. He questions the real effectiveness of the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact, and believes "that further attempts to build systems of pacts and alliances . . . would be self-defeating." Even in the case of limited war, "the core of resistance to Soviet aggression will be the power of the United States."

Dr Campbell does not seem to place much value on Israel as an outpost of Western political and technological thought, and appears to suggest that it might be in the interest of the United States to concur in a reduction of Israel territory (p. 352)—this presumably for the sake of placating Arab anti-Western feeling, a good deal of which the author interprets, on p. 16, as a reaction against Allied behaviour during the second World War!

This Glorious Cause. By Herbert T. Wade and Robert A. Lively. (*Oxford University Press for Princeton University Press.*) 40s.

The journals and diaries of men, written up day by day throughout the course of a campaign, have an immediacy which more than atones for the fact that, in the very nature of things, they can rarely see the wood for the trees. For as Corporal Trim so shrewdly put it, "A soldier's observation cannot extend beyond the muzzle of his firelock."

In this instance a voluminous collection of letters, from two typical linesmen of Washington's Army, collated through the industry of the late Henry T. Wade, have been incorporated in an outline of events between 1775 and 1783, written by Robert A. Lively. The narrative is sufficiently comprehensive to put anyone unacquainted with the details of the War of Independence well 'in the picture,' and to endow the letters themselves with their varying degree of significance.

By far the more prolific correspondent was the cobbler, Joseph Hodgkins, who, like his fellow-townsmen, the carpenter, Nathaniel Wade, was a native of Ipswich, Massachusetts. Neither man was more than semi-literate—connoisseurs of eccentricity in spelling will be held spellbound by Hodgkins's original handling of the gentle art of orthography—yet both obtained commissions in the Colonial Militia, a sufficient comment on the straits to which Washington was reduced to officer his forces. Yet in spite of their rough-and-ready, untutored approach to soldiering, both men experienced a plenitude of fighting, from Bunkers Hill to the abortive assault on Pigott's lines at Newport, Rhode Island.

Details of the campaigns, the wearying marches, the ghastly 'starving time' at Valley Forge, the moments of sober triumph as at Trenton and Saratoga, are interspersed with illuminating glimpses of the home-life, sustained with such tremendous fortitude, by the womenfolk, left to keep the home fires burning with such a rapidly dwindling reserve of fuel.

In the main the narrative on which the letters have been strung steers a reasonably clear path through the tangled thicket of events. But its author, like so many other writers on this subject, seems to have overlooked, or failed to discover, the real reason why good-natured Billy Howe went prancing off to Philadelphia, leaving Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne 'out on a limb' 140 miles up the Hudson. Yet the full documentation is to be found in the late Frank Hudleston's *Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne*, published as long ago as 1928. Furthermore, it would be interesting to learn on what grounds Washington's 'John Moore,' Baron Frederick von Steuben, is cavalierly dismissed as no more than 'a fabulous impostor.' This is certainly not the estimate in which he is held by those two distinguished American military historians, Ganoë and Dupuy.

All of this, although tending to throw the narrative itself out of perspective, in no way detracts from the interest of the embodied letters themselves. They may constitute little more than a chronicle of small beer, but it is a sound brew, full-flavoured and richly satisfying, and warmly to be commended to addicts of this particular variety of tipple.

Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, 1939-45. Campaign in Western Asia. By Dharm Pal. (*Orient Longmans.*) 50s.

This volume is one of the series being prepared by the Combined inter-Service Historical Section, India and Pakistan. It deals with the campaigns in Iraq, 30th April-31st May, 1941, and in Syria, 8th June-11th July, 1941, and records the operations in Iran in August of the same year. In addition, nine chapters are devoted to the administrative activities of 'Paiforce' during the later years of the war.

Both the two campaigns referred to were reluctantly undertaken by General Wavell, whose available forces were then either committed in Abyssinia or the Western Desert, or reorganizing after the evacuations from Greece and Crete. The former was made possible by the despatch of a division from India and the latter by the use of Australian and Free French forces. In this connection, the divergent views expressed at the time in their appreciations by the Commanders-in-Chief in Delhi and Cairo are not without their interest today.

The story of the events leading up to Rashid Ali's seizure of power in Baghdad and of the resulting operations is well told. The Indian forces which began to arrive at Basra on 19th April were not heavily engaged, and the brunt of the fighting was borne by 'Kingcol,' of 'Habforce,' ably supported by the R.A.F. Their thrust *via* Habbaniya to the outskirts of the capital and the failure of the promised Axis air support convinced the Iraqis of their mistake, and on the flight of all the leading Nazi sympathizers, friendly relations with England were restored.

The opposition in the campaign in Syria was much stiffer, consisting of well-trained and well-equipped French forces, controlled by the Vichy Government. This account, though of great interest, is mainly concerned with the advance of the 5th Indian Infantry Brigade Group and so is rather out of perspective.

The plan for the invasion of Syria envisaged the main thrust being carried out by the forces under the command of H.Q. 7th Australian Division up the coastal road and through Merjayun towards Beirut. The 5th Indian Brigade Group and the Free French forces were to advance on Damascus by the Deraa-Kissoué route, whilst other columns from Iraq were directed on Palmyra, Deir ez Zor, and Hassetché. There can be no doubt that the Indian units engaged were highly trained, well led, and behaved most gallantly, especially in the assault on and final capture of Mezze, but even when Damascus had fallen the Vichy forces were able to hold this thrust in the Jebel Mazar. It was the Australian victory on the Damour which clinched the issue, but the author gives few details relating to it.

Iran had suffered the same infiltration of German 'tourists' and agents as had Iraq, and to clear the country both Russia and Britain undertook 'police action,' lasting from 25th to 29th August, 1941. This led to the abdication of the Shah on the 16th September, when the country passed under the Allied sphere of influence. As an example of this rare type of operation, the story was well worth telling in the detail given here.

'Paiforce' was called into being on the 15th August, 1942, to prepare plans for defending Iraq and Iran against any Axis advance through Anatolia or Caucasia. Its primary task was the defence of the vital oilfields, whilst administratively it had to develop routes for supplying aid to Russia. To carry out this latter task ports, bases, roads, railways, etc., had to be remodelled or constructed from scratch, and the data given are sufficient to show the immense scope of the whole project.

The great value of this volume lies in the fact that it contains information not readily available elsewhere. It should thus prove a useful adjunct to any history which takes a wider view of the operations in western Asia during the war years.

Australia in the War of 1939-1945. The Japanese Thrust. By Lionel Wigmore. (*The Australian War Memorial, Canberra.*) 30s.

This volume is the third to be published in the Army series of Australian Official Military Histories. It describes the part played by the Australian forces in the first five

months of the war in the Far East, when the Japanese, at the trifling cost of 15,000 casualties, inflicted 250,000 on the Allies and established a defensive perimeter on the line Wake Island, Gilberts, New Guinea, Timor, Java, Sumatra, and the Burma-India border. Within this vast expanse all the colonies of Britain, the United States, and Holland had been captured with all their immense resources and harbours, leaving an indelible effect on the minds of more than 100,000,000 Asiatics for whom Japan had become the new overlord.

This series of unparalleled military disasters originated in the lack of unity of purpose between the Allies prior to the war and the unwillingness of each to bear the high cost of security. When, therefore, Japan struck on 8th December, 1941, she was easily able to seize command of the sea and to establish air superiority in a theatre where both were of paramount importance.

This book is divided into three parts, of which the last is compiled by Mr. A. J. Sweeting and devoted to the fate of the prisoners. In this connection it is interesting to note that the historians in both New Zealand and Australia have thought it advisable to deal officially with this subject. The major portion deals with the reasons leading up to the despatch of the 8th Australian Division to assist in the defence of Malaya and tells the story of the operations in which they were engaged there and on the island of Singapore.

In 1941 the two principal Australian leaders in Singapore were Major-General H. Gordon Bennett, commanding the 8th Australian Division, and Mr. V. G. Bowden, representing the Australian Government. As the campaign developed, both became increasingly critical of the military and civil authorities with whom they had to co-operate. "The cumbrous administrative machinery never reached the necessary momentum, and dynamic leadership was among the many deficiencies which the defence of Malaya continued to suffer." The Australians were not, however, engaged until 14th January, 1942, by which time the Anglo-Indian forces had been defeated with considerable loss on the Jitra line and on the Slim river. Placed in command of 'Westforce' at this juncture, Major-General Bennett seems to have had no more success against the common enemy than any other commander had had previously. On the Island, with his own two Brigades and the 44th Indian Infantry Brigade under his command, he was responsible for the defence of the western area where the main Japanese assault landings took place.

The story covers the same ground as Volume I of the U.K. Official History of the War Against Japan, but the different approach to many of the problems then harassing the Allies is of importance. The question of the deployment of the 1st Australian Corps in February, 1942, is carefully considered and the conclusion reached that Australia was right in resisting "the well-meaning pressure of Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt" for its despatch to Rangoon to try to save Burma.

The technique used by the author to describe many of the operations under the names of the Australians engaged is confusing to the English reader, and the maps are in many cases too small to carry all the detail recorded.

* **Panmunjom—The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations.** By William H. Vatcher, Jr. (*Atlantic Books, Stevens and Sons, London.*) 37s. 6d.

Two years and 538 meetings were needed before an armistice could be signed in 1953 that ended—for the time being—the war in Korea. Professor Vatcher, a member of the United Nations negotiating team, has now given us a detailed, chronological account of the talks, which surely constituted one of the most severe trials in the whole of man's diplomatic experience. Lengthy, repetitive exchanges of propaganda alternated with bouts of close bargaining; one session lasted 15 seconds, in another occurred a period of two hours and 11 minutes during which both sides maintained absolute silence.

Professor Vatcher criticizes the occasional naïvete and bad public relations of his delegation which, in spite of its name as he points out, was in fact American, the South Korean representatives on it being merely tolerated. Perhaps its most serious mistake

lay in the assumption "that it could deal with the Communists on what it understood as an honourable basis . . . that the Communists were really sincere in seeking a peaceful resolution of differences, that negotiation meant to the Communists what it meant to the U.N. Command: to discuss sincerely and frankly the issues with a view to reaching an equitable and quick ending of the war." Such lack of realism, Professor Vatcher argues, "led to the protracted talkathons and an extension of the war."

Unfortunately the author's detachment leaves him when he comes to discuss the Chinese and North Korean side of the hill. For a psychological warfare adviser he really shows astonishingly little insight into enemy motives and interests. His analysis is characterized by such phrases as 'Communist perfidy' and 'Communist deceit,' and he appears to agree wholeheartedly with the judgment of Lieut.-General Harrison, Admiral Joy's successor as leader of the delegation: "The important thing in dealing with a Communist is to remember—and never forget—that you are dealing with a common criminal"—a formulation which clarifies nothing but the attitude of the speaker. That the Communists were often playing for time is true, but this is not in itself immoral nor unusual. When have delaying tactics not belonged to the equipment of diplomacy?

The dust jacket suggests that *Panmunjom* should prove the definitive work on the Korean armistice negotiations. To achieve this status would call for a degree of objectivity in the author that cannot be demanded from any participant; indeed it may be assumed that by definition the participant in an event can never give us more than a personal, partial account of it. Aside from this limitation, however, Professor Vatcher has written an interesting contribution to the still brief history of America's encounter with the new Asia.

An Atlas of World Affairs. By Andrew Boyd. (Methuen.) 15s.

The Background to Current Affairs. By D. W. Crowley. (Macmillan.) 21s.

World Affairs since 1919. By Peter Wales. (Methuen.) 11s. 6d.

Pattern of the Post War World. By Gordon Connell-Smith. (Penguin.) 3s. 6d.

In the study of current affairs there is a real need for a 'read-on-from-here' type of book as a foundation for tackling the news. And the news, in its turn, will not mean much without a map. Andrew Boyd's *Atlas of World Affairs* is a serviceable compilation of some 70 black-and-white maps of various parts of the world which are, or liable to be, in the headlines. Opposite each is a note saying what the problem is. This type of atlas saves much fruitless searching and irrelevance.

Of the other books mentioned, that of Dr. D. W. Crowley is quite outstanding. It is intelligent, perspicacious, and has the huge asset of being delightfully easy to read. Its 370 pages give the reader more meat, and well-digested meat, than any similar publication that has appeared. Dr. Crowley starts with a downright chapter on Britain's position in the post-war world; his second big section, internationalism, carries three chapters on the Commonwealth followed by chapters on Black and White, U.N.O., Communism and N.A.T.O., and Germany and the European Movement. The third section is on nationalism and covers China, the Indian Peninsula, the power-vacuum of South-East Asia, and finishes with two brilliant chapters on the Middle East and its periphery. The final section is a thorough examination of the problems put up by nuclear weapons. The price is low for such a fine volume. The author has, by the way, done much lecturing on his subject to candidates for the Staff College.

World Affairs since 1919 will be useful to those who want to go back further than 1945. It is concise, it concentrates on the inter-war period, and has a bibliography at the end of each chapter. Lastly there is an excellent Penguin, *Pattern of the Post-War World*. It gives a very good outline of the period and it will appeal specially to those for whom book buying is anathema.

NAVAL

Royal Australian Navy, 1939-1945. By G. Hermon Gill. (*The Griffin Press, Adelaide.*) 30s.

This volume of Series 2 (Navy), dealing with Australia in the War of 1939-45, describes in particular the part played by the ships, officers, and men of the Royal Australian Navy in the various theatres of operations from 3rd September, 1939, until March, 1942. A second volume will continue the story up to the end of the war in 1945.

The book begins with a factual account of how the modern Australian Navy was evolved from the comparatively small force which took part in the first World War, and how it was to be employed in the event of a future world war. The political ramifications during this inter-war period are well explained, and in each of the succeeding chapters the reader is kept fully informed of the political and strategical background to the events in the respective operational areas. While the many episodes are faithfully described, the emphasis is, naturally enough, centred upon the particular participation of the Royal Australian Navy in those operations. Numerous footnotes contain biographical details of the persons, both officers and ratings, who are mentioned in the text, as well as particulars of the ships in which they served.

In accordance with the policy agreed upon by the home and Australian governments, the ships of the Royal Australian Navy in time of war were employed to meet the requirements of imperial strategy and were by no means confined only to the defence of Australian waters.

The major actions and operations in the Mediterranean, Indian, and South-West Pacific Oceans are recounted at some length, as well as many encounters with the enemy by individual ships or small groups. These include the battle of Cape Matapan, the naval contribution to the operations in Greece, Crete, and the Western Desert, etc.: and after Japan entered the war, which jolted the United States into full offensive action, the conduct of operations in the A.B.D.A. area, the raid on Darwin, the loss of Singapore, and the ultimate destruction of practically the whole of the Allied forces in that part of the world for the time being. The depredations of the German surface commerce raiders, both warships and disguised merchant ships, in Australian and New Zealand waters and in the Indian Ocean are also recorded.

A lavish supply of illustrations and maps is provided. The photographs, however, are rather disappointing and many of them lack definition—they may be likened to the well-known 'curate's egg.' On the other hand, the maps and action diagrams are excellently reproduced, though it would be more convenient to the reader if the latter, at any rate, were 'pull-outs.' The index is comprehensive, but the page numbers relating to the plates require revision.

The book is written in simple language for the general reader. The story is easy to follow and it is enlivened with many personal anecdotes and descriptions of events which do not normally figure in the official reports. Mr. Gill is to be congratulated on his able presentation of a subject which should be of world-wide interest, and will be particularly so to all Australians.

The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909. By William Reynolds Braisted. (*University of Texas Press.*) \$5.

When Lee laid down his arms in the April of 1865, the Northern States were in possession of quite a respectable fleet. There followed 20 years of naval stagnation, tinged by the vague belief that the best plan in any foreign war would be to resort to a *guerre de course*, waged by privateers on lines perfected between 1775 and 1782, and 1812 and 1814.

Even the Congress of 1883, the first assembly to contemplate the rehabilitation of the Navy, regarded sea power exclusively from the viewpoint of defence. They were no

more disturbed by the fact that the Monroe Doctrine was, in effect, implemented by the existence of the British Navy than by the mundane implications embodied in Bismarck's mordant comment that "God protects women, fools, and the United States."

The Chester A. Arthur administration of 1881 accorded the Navy's needs a certain grudging attention, but gave little practical expression to the growing belief that the fleet could play a decisive role in support of the State Department's conduct of foreign affairs.

It was the Spanish-American War and the forcible pacification of the Philippines, which was its outcome, that first extended the American gaze westward from Hawaii. It was the United States participation in the international effort to suppress the Boxer rebellion that brought home the urgent need to fortify the Philippines and to establish a depot on the Chinese mainland. For it was now clear that America was irrevocably committed to the Pacific; and as Captain A. T. Mahan had always insisted, "without proper stations for coaling and supply, warships are like land birds, unable to fly beyond the shore."

The problem of maintaining the 'open door' in China, a process which hardened into a scramble on the part of all and sundry—including Japan—for spheres of influence, could not leave America unaffected. Russia, Germany, Japan; any one of them could be regarded as a potential antagonist. Thus there arose the concept of a chain of stations extending from the eastern seaboard of the United States through an isthmian canal westwards to the Philippines, by way of Hawaii and Guam, and terminating in China. Mahan's cherished dream of a two-ocean Navy was taking on the aspect of reality.

It was a process greatly accelerated by Japan's victory in her war with Russia. The Rising Sun of Nippon cast deep shadows across America's western seaboard, as that forgotten prophet Homer Lea was swift to appreciate. The writing was on the wall, and only time could serve to endorse or to erase it. It is with these pregnant years that the author of this useful work is concerned. His sober, well-documented narrative is warmly to be commended to all those interested in the history of naval development.

The Art of Navigation in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Times. By David W. Waters. (*Hollis and Carter.*) 84s.

Lieut.-Commander Waters, in his study of Elizabethan and Stuart navigation, has obviously taken immense pains in the compilation of his masterpiece. For masterpiece it is, not only in relation to the sheer physical size of the book but also on account of the tremendous amount of research and care which has gone into its writing. Commander Waters is nothing if not painstaking, and has assembled a wealth of contemporary material in setting out his thesis.

The period under review is, to all intents and purposes, that in which the art of navigation emerged from the crude rule of thumb of earlier ages into something that resembles, if only in limited fashion, the modern methods. It was a period of world expansion, with new discoveries adding almost annually to the knowledge of the oceans and continents of the world, and as such it set a challenge to the seamen, the mathematicians, and the cartographers of the world. It was on their discoveries and their ingenuity that the development of the new continents across the seas largely depended.

Their success sets the theme of Commander Waters's book, for this particular half-century or so marks a tremendous stride along the path of navigational knowledge. It is a theme that has in it much of romance, which in other hands might well have been developed at the expense of factual evidence. Commander Waters, however, is too good a historian to fall into this emotional trap.

This is a book for the enthusiast and the expert, who will no doubt welcome the tremendous detail in which the theme is developed. One could, perhaps, wish that the many quotations from 16th and 17th century works had, following the normal fashion, been put into modern spellings: it is apt to get a little tiring continually reading 'vpon'

for 'upon,' for instance. Yet this is but a minor criticism that fades into insignificance when set against the extensive and expert work and knowledge that has gone into this book. It is indeed a work of which the author can be justly proud.

ARMY

Field-Marshal Lord Ligonier. By Rex Whitworth. (*Oxford University Press.*) 42s.

Great heights are apt to distract attention from the interesting features adorning the valleys in between them. Thus we are so prone to concentrate our gaze upon such military giants as Marlborough and Wellington as to lose sight of a number of men of conspicuous ability who occupied the stage of world affairs in the years between 'Corporal John's' retirement and the 'Iron Duke's' rise to fame. Not the least among these men of mark was Jean Louis Ligonier, the subject of this painstaking and able memoir.

Ligonier was of Huguenot stock, and with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, flight was the only alternative to persecution. Threadbare and well-nigh penniless, somehow he contrived to join the British forces under Marlborough as a volunteer; and he could scarcely have chosen a better moment to start out on his career, or a better master from whom to learn his business.

At the outset Ligonier's rise was slow. He had little money with which to purchase his 'steps,' and scant influence. But the long years of tutelage were anything but wasted, since they ensured that to whatever rank he might subsequently attain Ligonier remained at heart a sound, thoroughly experienced regimental officer, with the well-being of the tools of his trade, the officers and men who did the actual fighting, as his first consideration. He knew their difficulties, their wants, and their temptations at first hand, and at all times he did his best to cope with them.

As a commander Ligonier's offensive spirit might, on occasion, tempt him into impetuosity, but his resource and ingenuity invariably served to restore the balance. If he can, in part, be held responsible for the perfunctory reconnaissance at Fontenoy which overlooked the all-important Redoubt d'Eu, his withdrawal of the battered regiments down the slope from the Gallic camp to the sanctuary of Verzon was masterly. In his maturity, his labours throughout the Seven Years' War were tremendous. For, as the author rightly emphasizes, Pitt's directives were little more than the decisions of Ligonier and Anson writ large. Even in old age he was still generously endowed with that robustness of spirit which Wavell esteemed the most valuable quality in a commander.

It has not been given to many erstwhile penniless refugees to command a British force against an army of his fellow-countrymen, and to fall a temporary prisoner to the German (Saxe) at the head of it. It has not been given to many alien patriots to rise to the heights of Commander-in-Chief and Master-General of the Ordnance, to acquire an earldom, a Privy Councillorship, and a Fellowship of the Royal Society. But these were amongst the honours and awards that crowned the 65 years of sterling service that Ligonier gave the country of his adoption.

The author confesses that undertaking this work was a labour of love. Like most tasks carried through in this admirable spirit the outcome is well worthy of the very considerable labour involved in its execution.

The Background of Napoleonic Warfare. By Robert S. Quimby. (*Columbia University Press. London: Oxford University Press.*) 6os.

A modern English compilation of tactical systems and their development in France from the War of the Spanish Succession to Napoleon has long been wanting. Dr. Quimby's study goes some way towards meeting this need. With careful attention to detail he discusses the work of the theoreticians and soldier-philosophers who gradually transformed the cumbersome masses facing Marlborough into the flexible divisions of the Ordnance of 1791. The issue generally to the forefront in their treatises was the controversy over *ordre profond* and *ordre mince*, the column against the line, as the better combat formation,

with the line emerging supreme. In a final chapter on post-Revolutionary tactics the author maintains against Sir Charles Oman that the Napoleonic ideal was to fight battles in extended order, though some of the Marshals could never rid themselves of a contrary predilection.

Dr. Quimby's analysis once again strongly underlines the folly of equating too closely systems of tactics and systems of government, e.g., the Hitlerite robot beloved of some commentators. Much has been written of the revolutionary independence and *elan* shown by the skirmishers and *tirailleurs* of 1792. In fact a long line of development preceded them. Light troops were already prominent among the Austrian and French during the Seven Years War, and the Allies used at least as many skirmishers to lead an attack as the forces thrown against them by Carnot.

The framework of the book rightly consists of essential passages from the authors it deals with, and of diagrams illustrating the deployments and evolutions they advocated. It must be said that the diagrams seem rather too minute and sketchy for a volume of this price, and that the translated texts, though on the whole competently done, lose some of their original precision through Dr. Quimby's partiality for literal translation. Occasionally this leads to riddles, as in the last part of 'the most famous quotation' from the Chevalier Du Teil's *De l'Usage de l'Artillerie Nouvelle*: "It is necessary to multiply the artillery on the points of attack which ought to decide the victory, relieving the batteries which have suffered, replacing them by others, without the enemy's being able to notice it, nor to prevail from an advantage which redoubles his ardour and discourages your troops." This should read: "... without the enemy noticing it and availing himself of an advantage that would redouble his ardour and discourage your troops." Dr. Quimby incidentally betrays odd views on modern gunnery when he writes of the same work—which among other things categorically opposes the practice of counter-battery fire—that "allowing for the changes brought about by modern ammunition, the basic ideas are still sound." Nevertheless his researches contain much that is useful, and the book may be recommended to all students of 18th century and Napoleonic warfare.

The Battle of the Ardennes. By Robert E. Merriam. (*Souvenir Press*.) 21s.

Germany's last bid for victory in the West, the Ardennes offensive, which began on 16th December, 1944, never had a reasonable chance of success. More than five years of war had greatly reduced the fighting capacity of the German Army. Outclassed in the air, they were compelled to stage the operation during a predicted period of bad, non-flying weather, but this also hampered their armour, the arm on which they mainly relied. Since the attempt on his life the previous July, Hitler had mistrusted the generals, but he did not improve the chances of victory in the Ardennes by giving command of the main striking force, the 6th Panzer Army, to Sepp Dietrich, a party man with little military training or ability, who was heartily disliked by the professional soldiers. Opposed as they were by well-led, well-trained, and superbly equipped opponents of about equal strength on the front as a whole, nothing but gross mishandling by the Allied high command could have brought the Germans the success for which they hoped. Yet, unless his troops were to sit supinely awaiting the end, there was no course open to Hitler except a final bid for victory in the West.

In addition to being on the scene at the time, the author has made an intensive study of this battle and interviewed many of the leading participants on both sides. Some readers may feel with the reviewer that he has been a little unkind to the American regimental officers and men, and that panic and confusion during the first few days were not quite so great, or as widespread, as the author would have us believe. Whether this is so or not, he leaves no room for doubt that there was cool and clear-headed direction from the top. General Eisenhower made a timely and wise decision when he split the command between Field-Marshal Montgomery to the north and General Bradley to the south of the German salient. It is pleasant to have the opinion of an American historian in vindication of Montgomery's handling of the northern armies. He had the difficult

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task of directing operations in which the chief participants were Americans, whilst the situation demanded that the British troops in the area, XXX Corps, should be given the least active, albeit an important, role. In spite of early criticism from other quarters it now seems abundantly clear that the Field-Marshal handled a very tricky situation with great skill.

Mr. Merriam has written a valuable and readable book, which is as suitable for the general reader with a bent for military affairs as it is for the military student. Distances are important in a study of military operations, and it is a pity that the otherwise excellent maps have no scales. The book is well illustrated.

The Battle for the Rhineland. By R. W. Thompson. (*Hutchinson.*) 21s.

This work, the author states, is an attempt to relate major strategy to the soldier on the battlefield. Furthermore, it is an attempt to argue that the disaster at Schmidt in the Hurtgen Forest was of vital importance in relation to the Rhineland battle. After some cryptic remarks about generals in his foreword, he tells his readers that some passages of the book have been suppressed, and comments thereon.

The book is divided into three parts. The first relates the events of October, 1944, describes the controversies, the changes in plans, and Montgomery's reactions. The 1st and 9th U.S. Armies were to advance towards the Rhine again in mid-November, but the importance of the Roer dams is not mentioned in any orders, and Patton was allowed to continue his offensive in the south. The plan included a preliminary attack by the 28th Division to protect the right flank of the 1st Army and to draw the enemy's reserves away from that Army's front. The objective was the small town of Schmidt which overlooked the Roer dams. After its capture, however, the Division was to swing back in a south-westerly direction and attack the enemy's positions about Monschau from the rear! The action which followed, badly planned and executed, is narrated in detail. It was a complete failure and the Division, driven back to its start line, lost heavily, one regiment alone having 2,093 casualties.

The second part discusses the strategic position in November, stresses the ill effects of Patton's attempts to clear the Saar, and ends with the defeat of the German offensive in the Ardennes. In the meantime the U.S. 1st and 9th Armies had made slow progress towards the Roer valley between Duren and Geilenkirchen, and when Bradley at last ordered the 1st Army to tackle the Roer dams the enemy offensive opened on a wide front and achieved complete surprise. The ensuing battle is described in outline; Montgomery's part in it and the command crisis are also considered. The author points out that during the first week of December the Chief of Staff, S.H.A.E.F., sent the head of his intelligence branch to warn Bradley personally as to the possibility of an enemy offensive on this part of the front.

The final part describes the battle of the Rhineland (4th February–10th March), which was the achievement of Montgomery's object, maintained in spite of every kind of difficulty. The 9th Army did not come into action as planned until three weeks after D-Day because the Germans had opened the sluices of the uncaptured Roer dams and flooded the Roer valley. The result was that, as in Normandy, the British attracted the bulk of the enemy's forces to themselves and thus prepared the way for a spectacular American advance.

This is an interesting book in which the author makes some good comments and argues his case forcibly and well. The detailed description of the battles of Schmidt, Heinsburg, and the long drawn-out struggle known as the Battle of the Rhineland are written in dramatic style. Unfortunately the five sketch-maps leave a lot to be desired.

AIR

Pathfinder. By Air Vice-Marshal D. C. T. Bennett. (*Muller.*) 18s.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur Harris, in his book *Bomber Offensive*, makes two remarks about Bennett which seem to put the book *Pathfinder* in a nutshell.

First, "he was, and still is, the most efficient airman I have ever met," and later, "he will forgive me if I say that his consciousness of his own intellectual powers sometimes made him impatient with slower or differently constituted minds, so that some people found him difficult to work with. He could not suffer fools gladly, and by his own high standards there were many fools."

When Bennett was chosen to set up and command Pathfinder Force he could with some reason claim to be amongst the half-dozen most highly qualified and experienced practising airmen alive. Besides high qualifications in other branches of airmanship, he had got his First Class Navigator's licence after two and a half months' intensive study at a time when only six others in the world had won it. All this he had gained before ending his first short tour with the R.A.F. Later he was an Imperial Airways pilot and instructor, and had the unique experience of being the only operating pilot of the *Mercury*, the top half of the Mayo composite aircraft. Early in the war he had much to do with the initiation of the Atlantic Ferry Service. He had immense facility in grasping and solving complex technical problems, and thus fortified himself with detailed knowledge which, when combined with operational experience, made him a convincing commander and a formidable figure at the conference table.

He was unquestionably the man to command Pathfinder Force and brilliantly did he do it. He should now be the man to describe what his command did, but in the event it is not difficult to say which is the more readable part of the book. The rise and development of a dedicated perfectionist must in itself be interesting and this account is. So should be the story of the command, but in this book it is so marred by intolerance, sometimes even to the point of sneering, that our enjoyment of its many good points is clouded and our learning hindered. What Pathfinder Force contributed to the bomber offensive can be read elsewhere, and the Official Histories will in due course pay it and its commander the tributes they undoubtedly deserve. In the meanwhile it is sad indeed that Air Vice-Marshal Bennett's own account should be less than worthy of so 'complete' an airman and so competent a commander.

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
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